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VESSELS: OWNERSHIP, CHARTER, AND SERVICEa 
THE "HAELEN" 
June 28, 1918 
(2 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 177) 
In the prize matter concerning the Belgian steamer 
.Haelen, home port Antwerp, the imperial superior prize 
·court in Berlin, in its session of June 28, 1918, decided: 
The appeal against the judgment of the imperial prize 
-court in Kiel of March 13, 1918, is dismissed with costs. 
Reasons: The Belgian steamer Haelen, en route from hstatement or 
t e facts. 
Montreal to Rotterdam,.was brought to on November 3, 
1917, by a German submarine within the German barred 
·zone in the North Sea, and br<;>ught in to Swinemunde 
for closer examination. Seizure in prize ensued on No-
vember 26, 1917, through authorized agents of the 
·admiralty staff. The vessel had a cargo of wheat for the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, consigned to Rotter-
dam, and 'vas possessed of a safe conduct pass, from the Safe conduct. 
Swiss cbnsul general in Montreal, which assures safe 
·passage to vessels sailing to the account of the Commis-
sion for Relief in Belgium. A condition that the vessels 
·shall take a course outside of the barred zones is adjoined 
to the privilege; otherwise they lose the right to claim 
:special treatment. 
11 At the meeting of the International Conference on Maritime Law in 1922 the leading 
·maritime countries of the world were represented. The matter of the status of state• 
·owned and state-charted vessels was considered, and the following resolution was unani-
mously adopted: 
1. Sovereign states, in regard to ships owned or operated by them and cargo owned by 
•them, and cargo and passengers carried in such ships, ought to accept all liabilities to the 
·same extent as a private owner. 
2. Except in the case of the ships and cargoes mentioned in paragraph 3, such liabilities 
·should be enforceable by the tribunals having jurisdiction over and by the procedure 
··applicable to a privately owned ship or cargo or the owner thereof. 
3. In the case of-
(a) Ships of war; (b) other vessels owned or operated by the Sovereign State and em-
-ployed only in governmental noncommercial work; (c) state-owned cargo carried only 
1or the purpose of governmental noncommercial work in ships owned or operated by 
the soverign state. 
Such liabilities should be enforceable only by the like tribunals but only of the state 
·by which the ships is owned or operated, and should be enforceable by action in per 
3onam against such state, and in addition, by any other form of procedure permitted by 
.the law of such state. 
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Claim " :-as raised by the o\\rners of the Ilaelen for the 
release of the ship and indemnity, also for loss of freight; 
and by the Commission for Relief in Belgi urn for the re-
lease of the cargo or for compensation. 'fhe claim 'vas 
based on the ground that the vessel, being intrusted 'vith 
a philanthropic mission, according to article 6c of the 
Prize Code, was not subject to capture. 
Judgment of B th · d t f h · K" l f M h Kiel prize court. Y e JU gmen o t e prize court at 1e o arc 
13, 1918, the claims 'vere dismissed, and the condemna-
tion of the vessel and its cargo decreed. The prize court 
adopted the opinion that the premises of article 6c of 
the Prize Code did apply to the vessel, but that the 
privilege arising therefrom had been forfeited because 
the vessel, in addition to its philanthropic mission, had 
pursued other purposes in the war area for the benefit 
of our enemy, and had for this reason traversed the 
barred zone. 
Against this judgment, both claimants have appealed~ 
Whereas the owners have maintained their claims, as 
made in the first instance, the representative of the sec-
ond claimant explained in the oral proceedings before 
the court of appeal that the niaj or portion of the cargo 
of wheat of the Commission for R.elief in Belgium had 
b~en refunded in kind. 'fhe claim was therefore only 
to be retained on behalf of the re1nainder of the cargor 
Reimbursement is demanded for the value of the -wheat 
in Canada, 'vith the addition of freight and expenses to 
Europe. The claimants assert that it was only the bad 
'veather "\vhich necessitated the captain's departure 
from the prescribed course. In the zone traversed, there 
had been neither occasion for any investigation in the 
interest of the enemy, nor intention on the part of the 
captain. In the court of second instance, a deposition, 
made under oath by the captain of the Haelen before the 
district court in Rotterdam, is presented, in 'vhich the 
allegations made the basis of the appeal a.re corrobo-
rated. 
The imperial commissioner before the superior court 
has moved that the appeals n1ay be dismissed. 
In the decision from 'vhich appeal is. made, the judge 
of first instance goes upon the assumption that the 
steamer Ilaelen, as incontestably enemy-o,Yned, 'vas sub-
ject to capture unless the protection of article 6c of the 
Prize Code is to be accorded it. The latter 'vould follo'v 
of necessity, if the vessel, in the prosecution of the voy-
THE HAELEN 
age in question, '\Vas charged with a. philanthropic mission. m~~~~~th r opic 
The prize court assents to this proposition, provided that 
the sole purpose of the I-Iaelen was to convey a cargo of 
wheat to Rotterdam for the Commssion for Relief in 
Belgium, which would inure to the benefit of the civil 
population of Belgian and French occupied territory. It 
further assumes that by the mere fact of having traversed 
the war zone, the ship did not forfeit the protection of war zone. 
article 6c of the Prize Code, because the proclamation 
of a part of the North Sea as a blockaded area made 
no change in the prize provisions, and, specifically, 
created no new grounds for seizure in prize. The vessel 
only· forfeited the protection of aTticle 6c of the Prize 
Code if in addition to its declared philanthropic mission, 
it '\Vas pursuing other purposes in traversing the barred 
zone, especially if it intended to collect certain informa-
tion for the enemy. That such was the intention of the 
captain of the Haelen in the present case, the judge of 
first instance regards as proved on the basis of the ascer-
tained facts, "rithout, however, specifying what definite 
belligerent purpose the vessel vras pursuing by its voy-
age through the war zone. His main argument is that 
it is not evident what other reason could have induced 
the captain to expose his vessel to the great danger in-
volved in traversing the barred zone, as his statement 
that he was forced to do so on account of heavy weather 
assumed, in view of the ascertained condition of the 
"reather, the guise of a pure evasion; just as his behavior 
after the capture revealed his conscious guilt. 
'l'he imperial superior prize court can not join in these 
considerations. It may be conceded to the judge of 
first instance that if the captain of the Haelen intended 
to assist the enemy's conduct of the '\var, his vessel '\Vould 
have lost the protection of article 6c of the Prize Code 
on this ground alone. But sufficient basis for such a 
conclusion is not given. 
The statements of the captain are certainly not cal- Deviation tram 
culated to justify the voyage of the vessel. He may in course. 
truth have had sufficient reason for not making his '\vay 
north of the Faroe Islands, as had been prescribed, for 
othenvise he '\vould have exposed his vessel to the full . 
lateral force of the northwesterly storm, which mani-
festly prevailed at the time he approached the Faroe 
Islands. The vessel '\vas not very seaworthy in heavy 
weather, and was listing badly besides. But the situation 
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changed \Vhen he reached the southern point of the Faroe 
Islands. With the diminishing \Vind it \Vas now possible 
to steer to the northeast under the protection afforded by 
the islands to the northwest, and thus even now avoid the 
barred zone. For, as the map with the records sho,vs, 
there is between the southern point of the Faroe Islands 
and the edge of the barred area an adequate passage 
open to traffic. In neglecting to take this route, and even 
()n the follo\ving day making no attempt to get out of the 
barred zone by a northerly course, but, on the contrary, 
continuing his course from the southern tip of the Faroe 
Islands in an easterly and southeasterly direction, the 
captain \vas no longer compelled by necessity so to do, 
but was acting according to his voluntary decision. The 
motive behind this, ho\vever, does not need to be regarded 
in the light of espionage, \Vhich under the circumstances 
is highly improbable. A much more proximate cause \Vas 
the wish to shorten the voyage, and the southern tip of 
the Faroe Islands once reached, to avoid the circuitous 
route around the war zone, undesired from the beginning 
on account of the condition of the vessel. In another case, 
the captain of a relief ship met in the barred zone frankly 
gave as the reason for his course of action that he thought 
he "\vould get by once again." A sirnilar thought may 
have determined the captain in this case. Looked at 
from this point of vie\v, the subsequent conduct of the 
captain is explained. For, after he had, by his incon-
siderate act, exposed the vessel intrusted to hin1 to the 
Suspicious con- serious risks of the war zone, contrary to his instruc-
duct of captain. . . . . d · d 1 · h tions, It was to his O\vn Interest to estroy evi ence \V uc 
would have incriminated him even in the eyes of those 
by whom he \Vas commissioned. Specifically, the de-
struction of the log, containing the record of his course, 
the erasure of the course from the map, and the expres-
sion of the wish that the vessel rright strike a mine, are 
explicable on this theory. If he had really made any 
observations of value to the enemy, that he should have 
entered these iii. his log, as the judge of first instance 
surmises, is highly improbable. In that case, moreover, 
he \Vould doubtless have destroyed the book, even before 
the visiting officer carne on board. Then, too, the latter, 
who examined the log, noticed ro entries of this sort. 
If, in accordance with what has been said, the conclu-
sions which the judge of first instance draws from the 
behavior of the captain do not appear valid, the judg-
HAGUE CONVENTION IX 
ment itself must be sustained on a different ground. The 
latter concerns the point of departure of the argument of 
the prize court, according to which, navigating within 
the war zone, in and of itself, had no influence upon the 
application of article 6c of the Prize Code. This view 
can not be concurred in. 
5 
The provision of article 6c is borrowed from Conven- H~~ee vc~:V!n~ 
tion XI of the Hague conference. It is based upon a tion. 
proposal of the Italian delegate, which originally con-
tained two clauses. The first of these set up the principle 
later adopted in the con~ention, while the second con-
tained a provision that the enemy state which \vishes to 
set forth a vessel for the purposes alluded to must notify 
its opponent to that effect. On his part, the latter must 
grant a safe conduct, in which he must specify the con-
ditions under which he will grant the vessel this privileged 
treatment (" indiquant les conditions de l' exemption"). 
The ninth session of the Comite d'exaraen dealt with 
the proposal. That the general principle required certain 
restrictions, such as had found expression in the proposal 
of the I tal ian delegate, met with no opposition. Differ-
ence of opinion ·arose only as to the formal requirement 
of a safe conduct, and as to the consequences if the ves~el 
had not obtained one. 
Under these circumstances, the fact that finally only 
the clause expressing the general principle was incor-
porated into the convention does not justify the assump-
tion that it was intended to deny the competence of the 
belligeren~ state to specify in detail the conditions under 
which it would concede to the vessels c_oncerned the 
privilege assured to them in the convention. As a matter 
of fact, the unlimited application of the general principle 
would lead to untenable consequences. If, for instance, 
one were to regard it as sufficient that a ship be conveying 
food to the inhabitants of occupied territory, in which 
scarcity of food prevailed, the necessary consequences 
would be that one would have to give safe passage to 
enemy vessels as \vell, if they \vere conveying necessities 
of life to the enemy's territory under the same assump-
tions. This proves that the principle can not have heen 
conceived as broadly as might be assumed from the \vord-
ing. On the contrary, the idea which \vas put for\vard 
in the deliberations, to \vit, that the application of the 
general principle requires greater precision in special 
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case of vessels "\vhich, like the one in question, are dedi-
cated to philanthropic missions only during the \var, 
occasionally, and not permanently even in time of peace. 
de- English decisions also take this point of vie\v. A 
German vessel engaged in taking women and children 
from the fortress of Tsingtau to Tientsin \vas seized as 
prize. The prize court in I-Iongkong held the capture 
was legal, adopting the opinion that the vessel \Vas not 
charged with a philanthropic mission in the sense of 
article 4 of the eleventh Hague convention. If, so the 
court reasoned, such a situatio:rtwas meant to be covered 
by the Hague convention, the provision in question 
would not be couched in such vague and indefinite terms. 
On the contrary, such a. contingency would have been 
provided for expressly and unambiguously. Were one 
to put as broad a construction on the expression "philan-
thropic mission" as did the plaintiff, it \Vould lead to 
serious consequences, which could not possibly have 
been intended by the wording of the article. ( Cf. case 
of the Paklat, 1 Trehern, British and Colonial Prize 
Cases, 515.) Thus, the English courts, too, adopt the 
view that an unlimited application of that general 
principle, at least as regards enemy ships, is not within 
the meaning of the provision. 
As a matter of fact, then, shipping for the relief com-
mission takes place not only under the protection of 
article 6c of the Prize Code, but on the basis of an agree-
ment between the German Government and the inter-
ested neutrals, which is embodied in the safe conduct 
which every relief ship must have \vith it on both the 
outbound and return voyage. In this safe conduct, 
several conditions are set up, whose fulfillment is desig-
ot nated as the premises of preferential treatment. More-
over, it contains a clause to the effect that the safe 
conduct has reference solely to the high seas outside of 
the \Var zones. In view of the history of the origin of 
article 6c of the Prize Code given above, it must be 
assumed that vessels which, contrary to prescriptions of 
their safe conduct, traverse the blockaded areas, not only 
expose themselves to the danger of destruction connected 
therewith, but forfeit the benefit of article 6c of the 
Prize Code as well. 
Since, as has been shown, the captain of the Haelen 
was not compelled by any urgent necessity, tantamount 
to force maJeure, to traverse the barred zone, he has 
THE WAUBESA 
forfeited the right to special treatment, in accordance 
vvith vvhat has been said of this claim. Therefore, his 
vessel, together with its cargo, is subject to the general 
provisions of prize lavv, namely, inasmuch as both 'vere 
admittedly of enemy ovvnership at the time of capture, 
condemnation. Notwithstanding this, the major part 
of the cargo, as the records show, and as substantiated 
by the representative of the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium, has in the meantime been restored to the com-
mission. Whether grounds of equity argue in favor of 
extending this concession to the rest of the cargo as well is 
a question which does not lie within the competence of 
the prize court, but is rather to be decided by the proper 
authorities of the Government. 
The judgment is therefore affirmed. The decision on 
the question of costs is conditioned by section 37 of the 
prize court rules. 
THE "WAUBESA" 
(American lvfaritime Cases, 1923, p. 659) 
United States of America, as owner of steamship Waubesa, libellant, 
v. City of New York, as owner of ferries Queens and Mayor 
Gaynor, respondent, and cross libel, etc. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DIS-
TRICT OF NEvV YORK 
May 3, 1923 
7 
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, D. J.: This case involves a col- statement of 
1. . b h h. TI7 b b 1 . h the case. 1s1on etween t e steams 1p rrau esa, e ong1ng to t e 
United States, and the ferryboats Queens and ),fayor 
Gaynor, belonging to the city of Nevv York. The collision 
occurred on March 17, 1919, in New York Harbor, during 
a dense fog. The Waubesa was anchored at or near the 
anchorage grounds in the upper bay to the south,vest of 
Bedloes Island. 
The United States appeared specially and filed a plea 
to the jurisdiction to the effect that the Waubesa 'vas not 
employed as a merchant vessel but 'vas engaged in the 
European food relief service, 'vhich is alleged to be a 
purely governmental function. 
In the first libel the United States sues to recover for Libels. 
damages caused the Waubesa by the collision, and the 
city of New York files a cross libel alleging that the 
collisions 'vere due to the negligence of those in charge 
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of the Waubesa in that the latter was anchored in the 
channel way and in that she did not ring her bell as 
required by la'v so as to notify vessels of her position at, 
anchor. 
The second libel is filed by the Grain Corporation 
against the city of New York, and alleges that the libellant. 
shipped on board the Waubesa grain in good order and 
condition to be carried from N e'v York to European 
ports, that the Waubesa, with libellant's cargo on board, 
took up anchorage on the general anchorage grounds at. 
a point to the south and east of the Statue of Liberty in 
New York Harbor, where the municipal ferries Queens-· 
and William J. Gaynor negligently collided with her, to · 
the damage of the merchandise belonging to the Grain 
Corporation. The city of. New York impleaded the 
United States as the one primarily liable, claiming the· 
right to sue it under the provisions of the act of March. 
9, 1920. 
In the third libel, the United States Grain Corporation,. 
organized under the laws of the State of Dela,vare,. 
alleges that the Waubesa vvas a general ship engaged in 
the common carriage of merchandise by water for hire· 
and was being operated under the control and direction. 
of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet 
Corporation; that the Grain Corporation shipped rye· 
grain on ·the Waubesa in good order and condition to be· 
carried from Philadelphia to Falmouth, England; that .. 
the Waubesa instead of proceeding to Falmouth, put in 
to the port of N e'v York, having oil and water in the· 
bilges, and beiag in such a condition that it was deemed 
best by those in charge of her not to proceed upon her-
voyage to Falmouth; that the cargo of grain was dis--
charged in the port of New York not in good order and 
condition as when shipped, but seriously injured and 
damaged by contact with fuel oil and sea water, for all 
of which damages are sought. The United States is-
made respondent under the act of March 9, 1920, in 
place of the Waubesa and the Emergency Fleet Corpora-
tion, and the city of New York is impleaded under the-
admiralty rule on the ground that it is primarily responsi-
ble for the alleged damage. 
[The court here reviews the evidence upon the question 
of liability for the collision and concludes that the city 
of New York is liable owing to the fact that the ferry-
boats 'vhich struck the Waubesa were being navigated 
MUNICIPAL R.EGULAT'IONS. 9 
in the fog at an improper speed, estimated as 7 to 8 
knots.] 
The claim that the city of New York can not limit its 
liability because its regulation for the municipal ferries 
contravened the inland rules seems to me without merit. 
Regulation 26 reads as follows: 
"In a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rainstorms, Regulations. 
boats must run at half speed, or less, having careful 
regard to the existing circumstances and conditions. If 
the weather is so thick or foggy that the regular adver-
tised schedule can not be maintained with safety to the 
ferryboats they will be run slo,vly and ~autiously with-
out regard to the schedule and proceed with great care 
and caution." 
Article 16 of the inland rules says: 
"Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling sno,v, or 
heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate speed, having care-
ful regard to the existing circun1stances and conditions." 
It is contended that the words "boats must be run · at 
half speed or less" suggest running at half speed under 
unsafe conditions. I see no ground for this. Each regu-
lation prescribes a caution and a limitation of speed 
dependent on the circumstances. It might as well be 
argued that the municipal regulation imposed greater 
moderation rather than less. In my opinion the two 
regulations are equivalents. There is no proof that the 
city rule was not made in good faith. The words of the 
Supreme Court in La Bourgoyne, 210 U. S. at p. 126 are 
applicable: 
"* * * The petitioner having shown the promulga-
tion of regulations for the conduct of its business, which 
exacted a compliance by the captains of its vessels with 
the international rules, we think the burden of proving 
that the rules were not promulgated in good faith or that 
a willful departure from their requirements 'vas indulged 
in, and was brought home to or countenanced by the 
petitioner, was cast upon the claimants, and that the 
court properly held that that burden was not sustained 
by the evidence.'' 
In my opinion the municipal regulations, 'vhile dif-
ferently phrased, were in entire accordance 'vith the 
inland rules, and the city sustained the burden imposed 
by law of proving the absence of privity in respect to 
undue speed in a fog. 
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The Grain Corporation contends that the ship 'vas 
Seaworthiness. unseaworthy because oil leaked from the tank and got 
Deviation. 
Liability. 
into the grain and that for this reason the exceptions in 
the bill of lading and under the Harter Act are not ap:-
plicable. 
[The court here reviews the evidence upon this point, 
and concludes as follows:] 
It seems clear, therefore, that oil which had leaked 
from the tanks caused the damage in holds 1 and 2, and 
that the collision and the resulting beaching of the vessel 
contributed to this da1nage. 
The suit by the Grain Corporation against the United 
States is for failure to deliver the grain shipped and 
receipted for in good order in accordance with the terms 
of the bill of lading. As Goble, the master (deposition, 
p. 13) and Glen, the inspector for the United States 
Shipping Board (minutes, p. 82), both said, the trip \Vas 
really a trial trip, though the voyage for which the cargo 
was shipped was from Philadelphia to Falmouth. The 
vessel left Philadelphia with oil in her bilges under the 
protest of her engineer, and in substance that of her 
master also (Goble deposition, p. 8). The soundings, 
however inaccurate, showed a large amount of oil in her 
bilges, and this oil, when the vessel listed as a result of 
the accident, damaged the grain in holds 1 and 2. It 
seems clear that the vessel should not have left Phila-
delphia under such circumstances and that she was 
unseaworthy for the carriage of grain. Moreover, the 
trial trip was a deviation by an unseaworthy vessel that 
deprived the Waubesa of the benefit of the exceptions 
in the bill of lading and the provisions for exemption of 
the Harter Act. The St. Paul (1921), 277 Fed. 99; The 
Elizabeth Dantzler (1920), 263 Fed. 596. The _ Waubesa 
was not definitely proceeding on her voyage, but only 
going to New York and then on in case she 'vas found fit 
and after she was satisfied that the oil could be pumped 
out and did not imperil the cargo. N e'v York 'vas not a 
port of refuge, but a stopping place for convenience on a 
trial trip, 'vhich, irrespective of the delay caused by the 
collision, proved to be a stopping place of long duration 
because of the condition of the vessel. I can hardly see 
a more fit application for the doctrine of deviation. 
Under such circumstances if the vessel 'vere not 
Government owned the Grain Corporation could re-
cover damages to her cargo and the owner of the Waubesa 
IN PUBLIC SERVICE 
would have the right to recover over from the city of 
New York the total damages to the grain caused by 
water in holds 4 and 5 and one-half of damages caused 
by oil in holds 1 and 2. The city could limit in all cases. 
The United States has filed exceptions to the juris-
diction because: 
(1) The Waubesa \Vas not e1nployed as a merchant 
vessel, but was engaged in public business; 
(2) The libel is for the sole benefit and account of 
private underwriters; 
11 
(3) The policies of insurance issued by underwTiters Jurisdiction. 
were issued to an agency of the United States. Hence 
the underwriters are not in a position to sue; 
(4) Any money paid by under\\rriters should inure 
to the benefit of the United States. 
In order to establish that the Waubesa \Vas not em-
ployed as a merchant vessel, but \Vas engaged in public ne!'s~blic busl· 
business, counsel for the United States has introduced 
documentary proof that the Grain Corporation \Vas 
incorporated by the United States in pursuance of an 
Executive order and that by Executive orders the 
President managed the corporation and arranged for 
an increase and decrease of its capital stock; that the 
Government owned the stock of the corporation and 
that by Exe.cutive order its liquidation \Vas provided 
for and the assets were to be paid into the Treasury of 
the United States. The Governrnent also sho\ved that 
the Grain Corporation in delivering the grain shipped 
on the Waubesa, which was shipped under a bill of lading 
providing for delivery to the order of the United States 
Grain Corporation, care of American Embassy, London, 
was really engaged in the relief of the starving countries 
in the East and not in mercantile business. The case of 
The Western Maid (1 922), 257 U. S. 419, is relied upon. 
That vessel, like the lVaubesa, \Vas o\vned by the United 
States and was engaged in transporting foodstuffs for 
the relief of the civilian population of Europe. 1'he 
Supreme Court said (Mr. Justice Hohnes \vriting for 
the majority, p. 431): 
"* * * It is suggested that the lVestern Jfaid \Vas 
a merchant vessel at the time of the collision, but the 
fact that the food was to be paid for and the other detnils 
adverted to in argument can not disguise the obvious 
truth, that she was engaged in a public service that \Vas 
one of the constituents of our activity in the \Val' and its 
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sequel and that had no more to do \vith ordinary mer-
chandizing than if she had carried a regiment of troops." 
The same view \Vas taken by the Supreme Court in 
the recent case of United States Grain Corporation vs. 
Phillips, 1923 A. M. C. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283, 67 
L. Ed. 342, Feb. 19, 1923, where a naval officer carried 
gold from Constantinople to New York on the steamship 
Laub, a destroyer in the Navy. This gold was being 
forwarded on the Laub in payment by Bulgaria for wheat 
furnished by the Grain Corporation, and the captain of 
the Laub, under a statute applicable to shipments by 
private persons or corporations, claimed a commission 
for the carriage of the gold. The court said that in sub-
stance the gold was the property of the United States 
and while the legal title was in the Grain Corporation 
and the property of that corporation might have been 
taken to pay a judgment rendered against it, yet the 
property was clothed with such a public interest "that 
the transportation of it no more could be charged for by 
a public officer than the carrying of a gun, we must look 
not at the legal title only but at the fact~ beneath forms." 
The counsel for the Grain Corporation endeavors to 
distinguish these cases on the ground that in the case at 
bar the Grain Corporation employed its own assets in 
purchasing the grain instead of carrying grain as in the 
Western Jfaid purchased with funds appropriated di-
rectly by Congress; that it also insured the grain, as is 
not done in a direct government transaction, and paid 
freight to the Waubes~ and received bills of lading there-
for. The proof sho\vs, however, that the object of the 
governmental activities was the relief of Europe and that 
any profit over cost which the Grain Corporation may 
have made was only for the purpose of paying interest on 
moneys advanced to purchase supplies to relieve the, 
famine-stricken countries. I can not regard the distinc-
tions as sufficient to take the case out of the sweeping 
decisions in The Western Maid and United States Grain 
Corporation vs. Phillips, supra. 
In surance. Advances by the underwriters to cover damage to the 
grain cargo have been made in ~onsideration that "best 
endeavors to recover the value of the flour * * * from 
any and all persons and corporations who may be liable 
therefor" would be exercised. Such a clause can not, 
however, create a right on the part of the Grain Corpora-
LIABILITY FOR DAiviAGES 
tion against the United States when the latter has not by 
appropriate legislation consented to be sued. 'l'he 
Western Maid and the case of United States Grain Cor-
poration vs. Phillips preclude any such result. Whether 
or not the warranty in the insurance policies that the 
insurance shall not inure directly or indirectly to the bene-
fit of the carrier is sufficient to avoid the insurance in 
this case because of the fact that the United States Grain 
Corporation, as well as the United States Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, really belong by reason of stock owner-
ship to the United States, is not a matter for determina-
tion in this litigation. I can not see that these \var-
ranties, or the clause in the loan receipts that "the Grain 
Corporation shall use its best endeavors to recover the 
value of the flour * * * from any and all persons and 
corporations who may be liable therefor * * *" can 
affect the rights of the parties here. 
While it is true that if the Waubesa had under the 
meaning of the decisions been a "merchant vessel" the 
damages suffered by the Grain Corporation would have 
been divided as between the city of New York and the 
United States, yet the Grain Corporation itself would 
have been entitled to recover the whole of its damages 
again~t either wrong doer. ·The Beaconsfield, (189.5) 
158 U. S. 303. The English rule that owners of the 
cargo could only recover one-half of their damages from 
each par.ty does not apply in our courts. Ralli vs. 
Societa Anonima di Navigazione (1915), 222 Fed. 944, 
at page 998. Inasmuch, however, as neither the United 
States nor the Wau.besa are liable to suit, the Grain 
Corporation may prove its full damages against the 
city of New York subject to the right of the latter to 
limit. In proof of its claim against the surrendered 
vessels, or their proceeds, the claim for damages of 
the .United States for injuries to the Waubesa should 
be deferred to the claim of the Grain Corporation since 
the Waubesa was unseaworthy and guilty of a deviation. 
The George W. Roby, 6th C. C. A., 1901, 111 Fed. 601. 
In the first libel an interlocutory decree is granted Dt?ci.5icn. 
to the United States against the city of New York with 
right of the latter to limit damages to proved value 
of surrendered vessels. The cross libel of the city of 
New York against the United States of America is 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
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In the second libel brought by the United States 
Grain Corporation against the city of N evv York, an 
interlocutory decree is granted to the libellant, with 
the right to the city of N e'\v York to limit the amount 
of damages to proved v~lue of the surrendered vesseis. 
The petition impleading the United States of America 
is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There are two 
claimants to the same fund in the foregoing libels, 
namely, the United States and the United States Grain 
Corporation, and the causes have all been tried together . 
. For the reasons hereinbefore stated the claim for damages 
of the United States _for injuries to the Waubesa should 
be deferred to the claim of the Grain Corporation since 
the Waub~sa was unseaworthy and guilty of a deviation. 
The third libel brought by the United States Grain 
Corporation against the United States of America is 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the petition by 
the United States of America impleading the city of 
New York is dismissed. 
Settle deCTees on notice. 
THE "CONNER"; THE "ESPERANZA" 
(American l-.1aritime Cases, 1924, p. li 70) 
l"~ew York & Cuba Mail Steamship Co., libellant, vs. United 
States of A1nerica, respondent, and cross libel 
~ 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT OF NE\V YORK 
July 29, 1924 
WINSLow, D. J.: These are cross suits in admiralty-
one brought by the New York & Cuba Mail Steamship 
Co., owner of S. S. Esperanza, against the United States, 
owner of the torpedo-boat destroyer Conner, and by the 
United States against the S. S. Esperanza, to recover 
damages arising from a collision between the Esperanza 
and the Chnner on February 15, 1918, off Barnegat. 
By act of Congress approved February 28, 1923, 
jurisdiction was conferred upon this court to hear and 
determine the suit and to enter a judgment or decree 
"upon the same principles and measures of liability as 
in like causes in admiralty bet'\veen private parties." 
(67th Cong., Private Act No. 192.) 
The facts material to the determination of the issues, 
not disputed, are as follows: 
THE CONNER AND THE ESPERANZA 
The Esperanza, with pas·sengers and cargo, left Brook- ca:e~cts 
lyn at 3.05 p. m., February 14, 1918, bound for Cuban 
and Mexican ports. At 7.55 she passed Scotland Light, 
her course being S. by W. Y2 W. This course was 
maintained until off Sea Girt, when it was changed to 
S. by W. 7.1 W., and later was changed to S. by W. 
At 10.25 p.m., the weather h~ving thickened, the engines 
were put half speed and fog signals \Vere sounded at 
regular intervals. At 10.30 fog shut in and speed was 
reduced to slow. About 10.40 the speed \Vas reduced 
to dead slow-3 to 4 knots, "just steerage way." The 
Esperanza' s fog whistles, in the meantime, were blown 
at regular intervals. At 12.08 a. m., February 15, 
ship's time, while running at dead slow on a course 
S. by W., the fog signal of another vessel \Vas heard 
about three points on the starboard bow of Esperanza. 
The master and second officer were on the bridge and a 
lookout stationed on the forecastle head. The fog 
signal was heard and reported by the lookout, \Vhereupon 
the Esperanza blew a regular blast of her fog \vhistle. 
The captain then took the whistle cord and blew three 
fog whistles at approximately three-quarter minute 
intervals. No whistle was heard from the Conner 
during this time. Then a loud whistle was heard from 
the Conner and, at the same tin1e, she broke out of the 
fog, apparently coming at high speed and ahnost hn-
mediately struck the Esperanza a glancing blow on her 
starboard side, thence disappearing in the fog under 
the Esperanza' s stern. An inspection disclosed that 
the Esperanza was able to make port without assistance 
and she put about, heading toward New York, \Vhere 
she arrived February 15, at 12.32 p. m. 
The Conner, a new torpedo-boat destroyer, left Phila-
delphia February 14, 1918, for Newport, R. I., under 
orders to make test runs of 12.16, and 20 knots, using 
the cruising combination of her turbines. Ten minutes 
prior to the termination of the 12-knot test, at 9.30 p.m., 
February 14, a dense fog shut in, \vhich continued until 
the collision. The 12-knot test was terminated at 9.40 
p. m., \Vhen the engines were shifted to high-pressure 
combination, but no change \Vas made in the Conner's 
speed of 12 knots. 
The Conner passed Five Fathom Bank Jjghtship at 
7.20 p. m . .about 100 yards on her port beam. From 
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speed of 12 knots were held until the collision occurred. 
The Conner's comlnander testified that at 12.12 a. m. 
February 15: 
cJ'n~!:~onboci! "I heard a sound * * * This sound attracted my 
mander. attention on the ground that it might be a fog signal. I 
inquired and found no one else on the bridge had heard 
anything which sounded like a fog signal. I gave im-
mediate orders to exercise unusual diligence in listening 
and to sound our own signal, so that if this sound had 
been a fog signal we would have given an immediate 
response to the other vessel. Our signal had just been 
sounded when, through the fog, came a loud, piercing 
fog signal of a steam vessel under way on our port bow. 
I immediately called out 'Stop the engines' and, being the 
nearest person to the engine-room telegraph shoved them 
myself to the stop position and got the stop signal back 
from the engine room." 
The commander further says that-
" The only thing which was seen at first was a string 
of white lights, nothing to indicate the heading of a 
vessel or her character.'' 
He thereupon ordered "hard right" to the steersman 
and-
" just after that a green light appeared close under the 
bow and the Conner struck a glancing blow against some 
large vessel." ~ 
It may be noticed that the Conner's engines were or-
dered stopped and her helm put "hard right" before 
either of the Esperanza's side lights came into vie\V. The 
engines were not reversed nor her head\vay checked and 
she continued on, striking the Esperanza on the starboard 
side, glancing off and passing under the Esperanza' s stern 
and disappearing in the fog. 
The litigants do not agree as to the place of the colli-
sion. The commander of the Conner fixes it at about 12 
miles from Barnegat buoy. The Esperanza fixes it at 3 
miles southeast of Barnegat buoy. 
Owing to the fact that no suit could be brought, due 
to lack of the court's jurisdiction, until after the act of 
Congress some five years after the collision, the deposi-
tions could not be taken earlier. Owing to the lapse of 
time, only two depositions of Esperanza' s \Vitnesses were 
produced-that of the master of the Esperanza and of 
the second officer, both of \vhom \Vere in extremely 
feeble health. There was also received in evidence, how-
INTERNATIONAL RULES 
ever, the record of the proceedings of the investigation 
on board U. S. S. Arkansas, February 16, 1918, made 
pursuant to order of the commander of the Battleship 
Force 2, United States Atlantic Fleet. There is also in 
evidence the record of the investigation held by the 
Steamboat Inspection Service at the office of the local 
inspectors in New York on February 28, 1918. 
In determining the question of responsibility, the con-
duct of each vessel will be considered separately. The 
International Rules adopted for the purpose of prevent-
ing collisions provide that the regulations. to that end 
"shall be followed by all public and private vessels of 
the United States upon the high seas." 
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"ART. 16. Every vessel shall in a fog mist falling International 
' ' rules. 
snow, or heavy rainstorm, go at a moderate speed, hav-
ing careful regard for the existing circumstances and 
conditions." 
That these rules govern the navigation of a war ves-
sel in time of war has been distinctly held by this court. 
Watts vs. U. S., 123 Fed. 105. This case arose out of 
a collision between the U.S. S. Columbia and the Foscolia 
during the Spanish-American War. It was contended 
that the Columbia was proceeding at an immoderate 
speed in fog, the speed, however, being 6 knots. The 
Government contended that the failure of a war vessel 
to obey the navigation rules during war time was ex-
cusable. The court refused to agree with this contention. 
In the act which authorized the present suit it is pro-
vided, among other things, that the issues shall be de-
termined "upon the same principles and measures of 
liability as in the cases in admiralty between private 
parties.'' 
The Oonner was under a duty to observe the rule as to 
moderate speed in like manner as a privately operated 
ship in the admittedly dense fog. · 
In a recent case, in which Judge Ward wrote the opin-
ion, not yet reported (N.Y. & Porto Rico S. S. Go. 
vs. Director General, June 3, 1924) the definition of a 
dense fog is given as the obscuration of objects 1,000 
feet away or less. 
Some evidence in the instant case is that the fog \vas 
so thick that the lookout on the Conner's bow could not 
be seen from her bridge 50 feet away. Commander 
Howe, a most excellent witness, described the visibility 
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What is a moderate speed, is of course a relative term, 
but it has been the subject of frequent comment and de-
termination. 
The Colorado, 91 U. S. 692, 702; The Nacoochee, 137 
u. s. 330, 339. 
Mr. Justice Brown, in The Umbria, 160 U. S. 404, 
stated the rule as follows: 
'' The general consensus of opinion in this country is to 
the effect that a steamer is bound to use only such pre-
cautions as will enable her to stop in time to avoid a 
collision, after the approaching vessel comes in sight, pro-
vided such approaching vessel is herself going at the 
moderate speed required by law." 
And, again, in The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, Mr. 
Justice Brown again referred to the rule, using the fol-
lowing language: 
"No absolute rule can be extracted from these cases. 
So much depends upon the density of fog and the chance 
of meeting other vessels in the neighborhood, that it is 
impossible to say what ought to be considered moderate 
speed under all circumstances. It has been said by this 
court in respect to steamers that they are bound to 
reduce their speed to such a rate as will enable them to 
stop in time to avoid a collision after an approaching 
vessel comes in sight, provided such approaching vessel 
is herself going at the moderate speed required by la,v" 
(p. 548). 
Ordinarily, it would hardly be debatable that a speed 
of 12 knots in a fog of the density which prevailed at the 
time of the collision in the instant case 'vould be wholly 
unwarranted and immoderate. Indeed, many times this 
court has held that a very much less speed than 12 knots 
is an immoderate speed. 
The Columbia (supra))· The H. F. Dimock, 77 Fed. 226; 
The Hilton, 213 Fed. 997; The Rosaleen, 214 Fed. 252. 
The Government contends, however, that the Conner 
was justified in proceeding at 12 knots because of her 
tremendous backing power, which 'vould enable her to 
stop in a shorter distance than ordinary vessels. Her 
maximum speed was upwards of 30 knots. It is quite 
apparent that, whatever the backing power of the 
Conner may have been, it was of no avail here. That 
speed in this dense fog brought her into collision in a few 
seconds, before her engine power could even be brought 
into play. The distance that the ships were visible to 
MODERATE SPEED 
each other in the fog and the speed at ,vhich they 'vere 
approaching and traversing the space between them are 
the real factors in the present problem. How futile is 
engine power in stopping or reversing if the colliding 
vessels are upon each other in a few seconds of time 
before the power can be brought into play 1 
In The J.fanchioneal, 243 Fed. 801, the Circuit Court 
said: 
" * * * Speed is always excessive in a. vessel that 
cannot reverse her engines and come to a standstill 
before she collides with a vessel that she ought to have 
seen, having regard to fog density." (Citing cases.) 
In The Haven, 277 Fed. 957, the court said: 
"A vessel navigating in a fog must go no faster than 
will permit her to stop within the distance she can see 
ahead" (p. 959). 
In The Oity o.f Nor_folk, 266 Fed. 641, the court said: 
"In such navigation 'moderate speed' means speed so 
slow that a vessel can be stopped within the distance at 
which another vessel can be seen.'' 
At the rate of 12 knots, the Conner was making approxi-
mately 1,300 feet per minute, or 300 feet in about 15 
seconds. According to the witnesses, the boats, when 
visible to each other, were at most not over 150 to 300 
feet apart. According to the commander's testimony, 
it would have been impossible to stop the Conner's speed 
of 12 knots at the point when they became visible. It 
may be speculation to endeavor to estimate what might 
have been done had the Conner been proceeding slower, 
but we are dealing with what actually happened at a 
speed which the court believes 'vas highly excessive under 
the circumstances with the known result. 
In the case of Watts v. U. S. (supra) the warship 
Columbia was proceeding at about 6 knots per hour. The 
vessel with which she collided, the Foscolia, was not seen 
by anyone on the Columbia until she was within 7 5 yards. 
The Esperanza claims that the Conner was further at 
fault in failing to obey further provisions of article 16 of 
the International Rules, wherein it is provided that-
" A steam vessel hearing, apparently forward of her 
beam, the fog signal of a vessel, the position of \vhich 
is not ascertained, shall, so far as the circumstances of 
the case admit, stop her engines and then navigate with 
caution until danger of collision is over." 
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This rule is, of course, applicable to the Esperanza, as 
well as to the Conner. In view of the excessive speed of 
the Conner, which I believe was the proximate and con-
tributing cause of the collision, the Experanza's failure 
to wholly stop her engines recedes in importance. It is 
not clear that the Conner heard the Experanza' s first fog 
signal, although the commandei: says he heard a sound 
he thought might be a fog signal. Although his sense 
of hearing indicated that it might be a fog whistle, no 
change of speed took place. In Lie v. San Francisco & 
J>ortland S. S. Go., 243 U. S. 291, the master of the Selja 
attempted to excuse his failure to stop as required by 
article 16 by saying that \vhen he first heard the faint 
signal from the approaching vessel he thought it might 
be a foghorn on the shore. The court, however, overruled 
the Selja's contention and held that the provisions of 
article 16 were mandatory and required all vessels to stop 
their engines immediately. The same argument, ho\v-
ever, as to the duty of the Esperanza might be applied 
to her, unless the circumstances of the case do not so 
admit. Neither of the navigators was free to substitute 
his judgment for the positive requirements of the rule. 
A former navigation rule vested the navigator \vith a 
rut! and story degree of discretion. The present rule is mandatory 
and is positive law. It is also true that the position of a 
vessel whose fog signal is heard must be ascertained 
· before proceeding. Three elements are involved, indeed, 
before proceeding-bearing, distance, and course. vVhat-
ever we might say, however, in regard to the duty to 
stop, it seems to me that the paramount negligence-
indeed, the proximate cause, of the collision-was the 
excessive speed of the Conner and her failure to observe 
the rule regarding speed in fog. It is admitted by the 
commander of the Conner that had her speed been 4 knots, 
the collision would not have occurred. The 12-knot 
speed had continued for quite a time before the collision, 
and brought her swiftly to the point of collision. 
In view of the court's conclusion, I do not deem it 
necessary to consider the question as to whether the 
Conner \Vas at fault for changing her course before the 
position and course of the Esperanza had been ascertained. 
The commander of the Conner hard aported his helm as 
soon as the Esperanza' s "string of lights" broke in to 
view, and he admitted that in so doing he "gambled" 
on the Esperanza's course. However, I think it is proper 
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to conclude that the error, if it was error, was committed 
at the moment of collision and may be regarded 'vith less 
strictness than one committed when the vessels are more 
distant from each other. In like manner, reference 
might be made to the alleged contention that the Conner 
was at fault for failing to reverse her engines. This 
contention, however, is of interest n1ore particularly 
because the Conner contends that she was justified in 
maintaining a speed of 12 knots, because of her tremen-
dous backing power. That tremendous backing povver-
which was not exercised at the moment of crisis-dis-
poses of the argument that the speed was excusable. 
The potential power was neither brought into play, nor 
in all human probability could it have had any effect in 
avoiding the collision, if used. In considering the re-
sponsibility of the Esperanza, the court does not deem it 
necessary to consider the charge that she \Vas navigated 
by persons not wholly ~ompetent. The evidence is to 
the contrary, and this contention requires no considera-
tion; but the question as to whether or not the Esperanza 
should have stopped her engines when she heard the fog 
signal of the Conner requires consideration. 
For more than an hour prior to the collision the 
evidence satisfies the court that the Esperanza had been 
making perhaps 3 knots, which was barely steerage,vay. 
Not only 'vas that the testimony of the Esperanza' s 
witnesses, but it is also supported by the Esperanza' s 
engine-room slate. "The ship 'vas turning over just as 
slow as the engine can be turned.'' 
Assuming that the burden also rests upon the Esper- Burden. 
anza of showing not merely that her failure to stop her 
engines 'vhen she heard the signal of the Conner might 
not have been one of the causes, or, rather, that it could 
not have been one of the causes of the collision, the 
record convinces me that that burden has been sus-
tained. Had she stopped her engines, she 'vould have 
lost steerageway entirely and "could not have been 
maneuvered." The failure of the Esperanza to stop her 
engines, assuming that it was her duty so to do, could 
not have been one of the causes of the collision. It 'vas 
the gross negligence on the part of the Conner 'vhich 
accounts for the collision. In The City of Ne1v Yorlc, 14 7 
U. S. 72, at p. 85 Mr. Justice Brown said: 
"Where fault on the part of one vessel is established 
by uncontradicted testimony, and such fault is of itself 
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sufficient to account for the disaster, it is not enough for 
such vessel to raise a doubt with regard to the manage-
ment of the other vessel." 
The Conner did not stop her engines when the com-
mander "thought" he heard a whistle \Vhen proceeding 
at 12 knots, nor yet did he reverse his engines at any 
time either before or after the Esperanza became visible. 
He did, however, change his course. It no\V appears 
that had the rudder been put over exactly the opposite 
way, it vvould have "worked out better," as the com-
mander said. Ho\vever, these acts were done in extremis, 
and ought not to be considered faults of navigation. 
Judgment. The excessive speed of the Conner, particularly in its 
relation to the bare steerageway of the Esperanza, leads 
me to t:q.e conclusion that the total stoppage of the 
Esperanza's engines \Vould not have prevented the 
collision, nor yet did that failure on her part in any way 
contribute to it. The Esperanza, at her speed, would 
have moved a negligible distance in the time that the 
Conner would have traversed a very considerable distance. 
The relation bet\veen t\vo n1oving objects with differences 
of speed such as those t\vo vessels is similar to the rela-
tion of an almost stationary object and a moving object. 
The negligence of the Conner continued to operate as 
an efficient cause until the moment of the collision. 
The libel of the United States against the S. S. Esper-
anza should be dismissed, with costs, and a decree \Vill 
be entered in favor of the libellant. 
THE "MUDROS" 
May 2, 1918 
(2 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 87) 
In the case of the steamer Mudros the imperial su-
perior prize court, in its session of May 2, 1918, has 
decided that the complaint of the imperial commissioner 
in Hamburg against the decree of the prize court of that 
place of May 18, 1917, must be rejected as inadmissible .. 
Reasons: 
Stat ement of The steamer Mudros was before the \Var a German 
the facts. 
merchant vessel and was lying in an I tali an port at the 
time when Italy entered the \Var. The Italian Govern-
Requisition by ment later req~isitioned the vessel a1~d handed it over to 
foreign govern- . R · · I ·1 d d 
ment. the I tahan State a1hvays for their use. t sa1 e un er 
THE MUDROS. THE SAO VICENTE 
the Italian flag, and on such a voyage was sunk in mi 
ocean by a German submarine. '"fhe case came before 
the prize court in Hamburg, which denied its compe-
tence inasmuch as it lacked proof that the vessel had 
lost its German character. 
The judgment itself is to the point even if the con-
siderations noted, upon which it rests, can not be con-
curred in. The Mudros should have been regarded as a 
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public vessel of Italy at the time of sinking, and should Public vessel. 
have been treated accordingly. In accordance with 
Article 2 of the Prize Code, vessels employed in services 
of the state, under the control of the state, are reckoned 
as public vessels, and public vessels of the enemy are for-
feited without further formality under the laws of war. 
The suppositions mentioned \Vere present in the case of 
the Mudros, she having been requisitioned by the Italian 
Government and employed for purposes of state under 
the Italian flag. On this ground, overtures for judicial 
proceedings before the prize court must in truth be 
refused. 
The complaint of the imperial commissioner, therefore, 
requires no actual change in the decision attacked. In-
asmuch, however, as the prize court rules only take cog-
nizance of judicial methods by which a decision as such 
can be attacked, the complaint must be rejected. 
THE "SAO VICENTE" 
(295 F. 829) 
Transportes Maritimos Do Estado v. 'J;. A. Scott Co. (Inc.) 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT 
January 9, 1924 
WooLLEY, Circuit Judge: The question brought here 
on this appeal, broadly stated, is whether the District 
Court lost its jurisdiction in admiralty on a suggestion 
of immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit. The 
general rule exempting a government, sovereign in its 
attributes, from being sued \vithout its consent is not 
disputed. Porto R1:co v. Rosaly, 227 U. S. 270. The 
real question in the case is whether the sovereign, under 
the circumstances, gave or withheld its consent. 
The steamship Sao Vicente stranded on Packet Rock, statement or 
Sconticut Point, Mass. She \Vas floated and delivered facts. 
at Ne\V Bedford by the T. A. Scott Co. Later she made 
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her way to New York Harbor where, incurring debts for 
repairs and supplies and failing to pay them, she was 
arrested under several libels filed in the District Court 
of the United States for the Southern District of New 
York and under this libel filed in the District Court of 
the United States for the District of New Jersey. Being 
represented in several suits by the same proctors who 
pursued in each suit the same line of defense, the pro-
ceedings in some of the actions are, in the main, the 
same, and, to a certain extent, the questions raised are 
likewise the same. Hence, we refer to the opinion of 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
The Sao Vicente, 281 Fed. 111, for a statement in detail 
of proceedings which, with the quoted pleadings, are, 
in a measure; similar, mutatis mutandis, to those in the 
case at bar. 
We shall discuss the law applicable to the proceedings 
in the order in which they occurred. 
On April 11, 1921, the T. A. Scott Co. filed a libel in 
the district court against the steamship Sao Vicente and 
Transportes Maritimos Do Estado for salvage services. 
Whatever may be the character of this body, there can 
be no doubt of the libellant's right to institute suit or 
of the jurisdiction of the district court initially to enter-
tain suit against it. Nor did the Transportes Mariti-
mas Do Estado question either this right of the libellant 
or the jurisdiction of the court just then, but appeared 
by its proctors and filed a claim of ownership in the usual 
form, concluding with a prayer for leave to defend the 
action (281 Fed. 112). 
There was nothing said or done to indicate either the 
fact or purpose of a special appearance. Without doubt 
the claimant's appearance was general. Pursuant there-
to, its proctors proceeded to a stipulation for costs, and 
to a stipulation for value in the usual form (281 Fed. 
113), upon condition to "abide by all orders of the court, 
interlocutory and final, and to pay the amount awarded." 
Whereupon the ship 'vas released from custody and she 
sailed away. 
Olaim of im· On June 2, 1921, the claimant changed its proctors. 
munity. 
On the same day its new proctor filed its answer, trav-
ersing none of the averments of the libel, but raising for 
the first time the defense that the ship is a Portuguese 
vessel O\vned and operated by the Transportes Maritimos 
Do Estrada, \Vhich is a department of the Republic of 
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Portugal; that it objects to and protests against the 
assumption of jurisdiction by the District Court in a 
suit to which the sovereign foreign government has not 
consented, maintaining that the settlement of the matter 
in dispute "should be left to the Portuguese consul at 
the port of New York." 281 Fed. 113. 
The answer was verified by Prista, vice consul general 
for the Republic of Portugal at New York. 
[1] Exceptions by the libellant to the claimant's 
answer were sustained by the District Court on the 
ground that the claimant had entered a general appear-
ance, and, having submitted itself to the jurisdiction of 
the court, it thereby had waived any right to appear 
specially at that late day for the purpose of attacking 
its jurisdiction. 
We think the court was right on two grounds: First, 
because a sovereign may waive its immunity, and it is 
considered to have done so when it has entered litigation 
with a general appearance and when, as here, it has 
acted for a time and in a manner entirely consistent with 
such an appearance. Beers v. Arkansas, 20 lio'\\r. 527; 
OZark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447; Richardson v. 
Fajardo Su.gar Co., 241 U. S. 44; Porto ;Rico v. Rosaly, 
227 U. S. 270; Porto. Rico v. Ramos, 232 U. S. 627; 
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U. S. 273, 284; The 
Sao Vicente (C. C. A.), 281 Fed. 111. We know of no 
more orderly way for a foreign government to consent to 
suit and ·submit to jurisdiction than by the voluntary 
act of entering a general appearance, and v;hen this is 
follo\ved by conduct permissible only under an appear-
ance of that character, the sovereign must be held to 
have \Vaived its immunity to suit. It will not suffice for 
it to change its attitude after the litigation is under 
. way, for, as Mr. Justice McKenna, in the Ramos case, 
supra, said: 
"The immunity of sovereignty from suit \vithout its 
consent can not be carried so far as to permit it to reverse 
the action invoked by it and to come in and go out of 
court &t its will, the other party having no right of 
resistance to either step." 
[2] Second, \Ve think the trial court \Vas right in sus-
taining the exceptions to the claimant's ans\ver for the 
added reason that the suggestion of immunity of the 
sovereign-itself insufficient in substance-was not n1ade 
33474-25t·-3 
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through the proper official channels. It was made in 
the claimant's answer signed by its proctor and verified 
by the Portuguese vice consul general at the port of 
New York. 'I'hat the public status of a ship can not be 
determined upon the mere suggestion of private counsel 
was decided in ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, and that the 
consul general of the Republic of Portugal is not com pe-
tent, merely by virtue of his office, to appear in court 
and claim immunity for his Government was decided 
in The Sao Vicente, 260 U. S. 151, on certiorari to the 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, it being 
the case to v;hich 've have made frequent reference (281 
Fed. 111). Lacking competency by virtue of his office 
to speak for his Government, there is nothing in the 
record which shows that the vice consul general 'vas 
specially authorized by his Government to interpose a 
claim to immunity on its behalf. Therefore, on the rec-
ord as it stood after the court had, without error, sus-
tained exceptions to the claimant's answer by striking 
out the abortive suggestion of immunity of a sovereign, 
the claimant remained on the record in the situation in 
which it had placed itself by its general appearance. 
Thereupon .th~ court entered an interlocutory decree 
and made an order referring the amount of salvage to a 
special commissioner. Here another substitution of 
proctors occurred. 
The claimant did not introduce before the commis-
sioner any evidence in opposition to the libellant's claim 
for salvage services, but presented to him an informa-
tion, suggestion and petition of the Republic of Portugal 
for immunity from suit. This, very naturally, the com-
missioner refused to accept. From this point the case 
differs from The Sao Vicente (c.· C. A.) 281 Fed. 111. 
On January 24, 1923, the commissioner made a report. 
awarding the libellant $50,000. No exceptions having 
been filed, the court, on February 20, 1923, affirmed the 
report and entered a final decree. 
[3] On March 2, 1923, the proctor for the claimant 
left in the office of the clerk of the court an order for 
the allo\vance of an appeal and at the same time "left 
for filing in the office of the said clerk" the information 
and suggestion previously presented to the commissioner, 
signed and verified by his excellency, Jose d' Alte, envoy 
extraordinary and n1inister plenipotentiary of the Re-
public of Portugal, objecting to the exercise of jurisdic-
PROCEDURE 
tion by the district court over the Transportes Maritimos 
Do Estado as an integral part of the sovereign Govern-
ment of Portugal. As this information and suggestion 
had been signed and verified at Washington more than 
a month before the date of the final decree, and as it 
was brought to its attention for the first time 10 days 
after the date of the final decree, the District Court 
refused to regard it as having any bearing on the case. 
The claimant now maintains that the District Court 
erred in not opening the decree, accepting the suggestion, 
and yielding its jurisdiction. Without passing upon any 
question of error involved in the refusal of the court to 
open the decree and accept the suggestion, it is sufficient 
to say that, even if the court had done so, it would not 
have availed the claimant or the Republic of Portugal 
because the atten1pted suggestion \:<v~as not conformable 
with the practice in such cases in that it \vas not pre-
sented through the proper official channels. (Ex parte 
Muir, 254 U. S. 522.) 
The suggestion in the ca.se at bar was presented by 
the Portuguese minister directly to the court. True, 
it \vas accompanied by a certificate of the Secretary of 
State to the effect that the minister \vhose name is 
subscribed thereto is duly accredited to this Government 
as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of 
Portugal. As the Supreme Court said in The Pesaro, 
255 U. S. 216, "while that established his diplomatic 
status it gave no sanction to the suggestion." This is 
particularly true in vie\v of a footnote to the certificate 
of the Secretary of State that, "For the contents of the 
annexed document the departinent assumes no re-
sponsibility." In these circumstances "the libellants' 
objection that, to be entertained, the suggestion should 
come through official channels of the United Stat es \vas 
well taken." Ex parte .1lfuir, 254 U. S. 522; United 
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 209; Societa Gommerciale 
Italiana di . Nav. v. Maru Nav. Go. (D. C.), 271 F ed. 97; 
I d. (C. C . . A .. ) 280 Fed. 334, 335. 
On these authorities \\~e are of opinion that the sug-
gestion \vould have been \Yithout force had it been 
accepted by the court . The scYeral acts of the 'rrans-
portes Mnritimos Do Estado, the Portuguese vice 
consul general at the port of New .. York, and the Portu-
guese minister at Washington, being both tardy and 
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on its general appearance and, therefore, left undisturbed 
the proceedings 'vhich 'vent to final decree. 
We find ourselves in full accord 'vith the decision of 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
The Sao Vicente, 281 Fed. 111, in so far as that case 
resembles this one. Doubtless apprehending the force 
of that decision, based in part on The Carlo Poma, 255 
U. S. 219, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal. 
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. 
Buffington, circuit judge, took no part in this decision. 
THE "GUL DJEMAL" 
The docket title of this case is: Steamship Gul Djemal, her engines, etc.,· Hu.ssein Lutfi 
Bey, master, v. Campbell & Stuart (Inc.). 
(264 u. s. 90) 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT 
OF NEW YORK 
No. 83. Argued January 4, 1924.-Decided February 18, 1924 
The objection that a vessel, owned, possessed, manned, and oper-
ated by a foreign State, but engaged in ordinary commerce 
under charter to a private trader, is immune to libel in the 
District Court for services and supplies, can not be raised 
by her master, who, although a naval officer, is not func-
tioning as such, and is not shown to have authority to 
represent his sovereign in making the objection. 
296 Fed. 567, affirmed. 
APPEAL from a decree of the District Court sustaining a 
libel against a ship, for services and supplies. 
Mr. William A. Purrington and Mr. John M. Woolsey, 
'vith \Vhorn Mr. Frank J. McConnell was on the brief, for 
appellant. 
Mr. Oscar R. Houston, \vith whom Mr. Ezra G. Bene-
dict Fox \Vas on the brief, for appellee. 
~A:r. JusTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
or Seeking to recover for supplies and services furnished 
at Ne"\v York during November, 1920, in order to fit her 
for an intended voyage across the Atlantic, appellee 
libeled the steamship Gul Ddemal and caused her arrest 
under the ordinary admiralty practice. Her n1aster, 
appearing for the sole purpose of objecting to the court's 
jurisdiction, claimed immunity for the vessel because 
o\vned and possessed by the Turkish Govern1nent, and 
THE GUL DJERNAL 
asked that she be released. No one except the master has 
advanced this claim. 
The parties stipulated :1 The Turkish Government and 
the United States are at peace with each other, but diplo-
1 "First. That at all the times mentioned in the libel herein, and at the time of the arrest 
of the Gul Djemal, the G1tl Djemal was owned by the Turkish or Ottoman Government, 
that it flies the Turkish flag; that Turkey has but one flag, for both national and com-
mercial uses; that it is registered in the name of Seire-Seffain administration; that the 
Gul Djemal is the absolute property of the Ottoman Seire-Seffain administration, the 
third division of the ministry of marine of the Turkish Government, which is attached 
to the ministry of war; that the maritime title has been given to the administration 
Seire-Seffain by the ministry of war. Said Seire-Seffain administration, at the times 
above mentioned, was (and is) the transport section of the ministry of marine, and was 
(and is) charged with the control of transport vessels of the Turkish Government, and 
said vessels (of which the Gul Djemal was one), which are capable of commercial uses, 
are, when not used as transports, used in commerce; whether such vessels are used as 
transports or in commerce is subject to the direction of the ministry of marine, which, 
through departments other than the Seire-Seffain, has charge of battleships, artillery, 
torpedoes, wireless, and engineering work pertaining to all the vessels of the Turkish 
Navy; that the Gul Djemal was transferred for operation to the administration Seire-
Seffain from the ministry of war in 1914 and has since been under the control of admin· 
istration of Seire-Seffain. 
"Said Seire-Seffain administration, at the times above mentioned, had (and has), as 
its head, a military offier of the Turkisk Govenment, in the active or reserve service 
of the Turkish Government, and said head must be, at all times, a military officer 
in the employ of the Turkish Government, the Seire-Seffain administration being 
charged with the transport of troops, and at all the times above mentioned, said head of 
the Seire-Seffain administration was a colonel; although said head of the Seire-Seffain ad-
ministration, at the times above mentioned, was, in respect of the Gul Djemal, not 
functioning in a military or naval capacity. 
"Second. That at all the times mentioned in the libel herein, and at the time of the 
arrest of the Gul Djemal, the Gul Djemal was in the possession of the Turkish Government, 
being manned by a master, officers, and crew employed by or under the direction of said 
Seire-Seffain administration, and paid by the Treasury Department of the Turkish 
Government through the administration Seire-Seffain; said master, at the times above 
mentioned, wa5 (and is) a reserve officer in the Turkish Navy employed by the branch 
of the ministry of marine known as the administration Seire-Seffain, and the navi-
gating officer was a lieutenant in the active service of the Turkish Navy, both detailed 
by the said ministry of marine to serve on the Gul Djemal during the times above men-
tioned, but in such service they were not performing any naval or military functions, 
although they were subject to any orders from the department of the Turkish Govern-
ment charged with naval or military affairs; the other officers and entire crew of the Gul 
Djemal, during the times above mentioned, were civilians, paid by the Turkish Govern-
ment. 
"Third. That at all the times mentioned in the libel herein, and at the time of the 
arrest of the Gul Djemal, the Gul Djemaz " was engaged in commercial trade, under 
charter for one round voyage to George Dedeoglou, who engaged to carry passengers 
and goods ior hire, and in such trade the Gul Djemal was not functioning in a naval or 
military capacity, nor was there anything of a naval or military character connected 
with the voyage of the Gul Djemal from Constantinople to New York and return. 
"Fourth. That the ,..rurkish Government, prior to the time mentioned in the libel 
herein, had severed diplomatic relations with the United States of America, advising 
its peoples by proclamation, however, that American institutions should not be molested 
but should be treated as heretofore; that said diplomatic relations have not been resumed; 
although the United States of America maintains unofficial relations with the Turkish 
Government by American consular representatives, and through the medium of a high 
commissioner; that during said period of the severed relations, the Spanish ambassador 
to the United States has represented, and still represents, Turkish interests in the 
United States, and bas been recognized as such representative by the Department of 
State of the United States of America. 
"Fifth. That the Turkish or Ottoman Government, and the Government of the 
United States of America, are sovereign governments, and were at all tho times men-
tioned herein, at peace with each other, although the Turkish or Ottoman Government 
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matic relations have been severed . The Gul DjP,rrt al is 
the absolute property of the Turkish Government and 
under the administration of the transport section of the 
tm- n1inistry of marine. That government employed and 
paid the master, officers, and crew-the n1aster being a 
reserve naval officer- and 'vas in possession of the ship 
when arrested. She "'vas engaged in commercial trade, 
under charter for one round voyage to George Dedeoglou, 
who engaged to carry passengers and goods for hire, and 
in such trade tlie Gul I}j emal was not functioning in a 
naval or military capacity, nor was there anything of a 
naval or military character connected with the voyage of 
the Gul Djemal from Constantinople to N e'v York and 
return.'' 
The court below denied the alleged immunity and 
passed a decree for the libellant. Upon this direct ap-
peal only the question of jurisdiction is presented. The 
relevant certificate follows: 
"The sole question raised by the answer of the claim-
ant herein, and the sole issue before this court, was the 
jurisdiction of the court over the steamship Gul Djernal, a 
vessel owned, manned, qperated by and in the possession 
of the sovereign Governme~t of Turkey, at peace 'vith 
the Government of the United States of America. The 
allegations of the libellant that it had furnished supplies 
to the vessel, were adn1itted by the claimant, 'vhose 
answer set up that the vessel was immune, as a sov-
ereign-o,vned vessel, from the process of this court, and 
that the vessel was not within the admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction of this court. I have granted a decree 
for the amount prayed for by the libellant, and have 
denied immunity to the v~ssel because at the time the 
cause of action and liability on which the libel is founded 
were created, and at the time the vessel was seized under 
process of this court, she was, although owned, manned 
by, and in the possession of the sovereign Government 
of Turkey, engaged in commercial trade, under charter 
for hire to a private trader; and furthermore, because 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Tur-
key were then severed and no appropriate suggestion 
was filed from the State Department of the United 
States." 
Appellee maintains that whatever may be the proper 
rule in our courts concerning the ultimate immunity of 
vessels owned by foreign governments and employed in 
PUBLIC STATUS 
ordinary trade and commerce, such immunity will not 
be granted upon the mere claim of the master, especially 
when the United States has no diplomatic relations with 
the sovereign owner. Such claim can be made only by 
one duly authorized to vindicate the owner's sovereignty. 
Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 532, 533, is relied upon to 
support this view. It is there said-
" As of right the British Government was entitled to 
appear in the suit, to propound its claim to the vessel, 
and to raise the jurisdictional question. * * * Or, 
with its sanction, its accredited and recognized repre-
sentative might have appeared and have taken the 
same steps in its interest. * * * And, if there was 
objection to appearing as a suitor in a foreign court, it 
was open to that Government to make the asserted 
public status and immunity of the vessel the subject of 
diplomatic representations to the end that, if that claim 
was recognized by the ~xecutive department of this 
Government, it might be set forth and supported in an 
appropriate suggestion _to the court by the Attorney 
General, or some law officer acting under his direction." 
Treating Ex parte Muir as relevant, appellant insists 
that within the meaning of the declaration there made 
31 
the master of the Gul DJ'emal a duly commissioned officer Accredited rep--
' resentatlve. 
of the Turkish Navy, was the accredited and recognized 
representative of that Government, possessed of ade-
quate authority to protest against the seizure and object 
to the court's jurisdiction. 
We agree with the view advanced by the appellee. 
The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, reaffirmed by The Sao Vicente, 
260 U.S. 151, is enough to show that the immunity could 
not have been successfully set up by a duly recognized 
consul, representative of his sovereign in commercial 
matters, in the ordinary course of his official duties, and 
there seems no adequate reason to presume that the 
master of the Gul Djemal had any greater authority in Decision. 
respect thereto. Although an officer of the Turkish 
Navy, he was performing no naval or military duty, and 
was serving upon a vessel not functioning in naval or 
military capacity but engaged in commerce under 
charter to a private individual \Vho undertook to carry 
passengers and goods for hire. He was not shown to 
have any authority to represent his sovereign other 
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than can be inferred from his position as master andlthe 
circumstances specified in the stipulation of.Jacts . 
. Affi.rmed. 
Mr. Justice Holmes concurs in the result. 
THE "WESTERN MAID" 
(257 u. s. 419) 
Ex parte in the matter of the United States, owner of the American 
steamship Western Maid, petitioner 
Ex parte in the matter of the United States, former requisitioned 
or chartered owner of the auxiliary schooner Liberty, petitioner 
Ex parte in the matter of the United States, former requisitioned 
and chartered owner of the American steamship Carolinian, 
petitioner 
PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF PROHIBITION AND/OR 
~1ANDAMUS 
Decided January 3, 1922 
1. Neither upon general principle nor under section 9 of the ship-
ping act of September 7, 1916, or section 4 of the "Suits in 
Admiralty" act of March 9, 1920,2 is the United States 
liable for a collision committed by a vessel while owned by 
it absolutely or pro hac vice and employed by it in public and 
government purposes. 
2. Held, that a vessel owned by the United States, assigned by the 
United States Shipping Board to the \Var Department, 
manned by a navy crew and engaged in transporting food-
stuffs provided by the Government for the relief of the 
civilian population of Europe after the Great 'Var, to be 
paid for by the buyer, was not a merchant vessel but a 
2 Pertinent parts of the statutes above mentioned are as follows: 
C. 451, sec. 9, 39 Stat. 730: "That any vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from the 
[United States Shipping) board may be registered or enrolled and licensed, or both 
registered and enrolled and licensed, as a vessel of the United States and entitled to the 
benefits and privileges appertaining thereto. * * * 
"Every vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from the board shall, unless otherwise 
authorized by the board, be operated only under such registry or enrollment and license. 
Such vessels while employed solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all laws, regu-
lations, and liabilities governing merchant vessels, whether the United States be inter-
ested therein as owner, in whole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien, or other interest 
therein. No such vessel, without the approval of the board, shall be transferred to a 
foreign registry or flag, or sold; nor, except under regulations prescribed by the board, 
be chartered or leased. * * *" 
C. 95, sec. 4, 41 Stat. 525, 526: "That if a privately owned vessel not in the possession 
of the United States or of such [United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet) corpora-
tion is arrested or attached upon any cause of action arising or alleged to have arisen from 
previous possession, ownership, or operation of such vessel by the United States or by 
such corporation, such vessel shall be released without bond or stipulation therefor upon 
the suggestion by the United States, through its Attorney General or other duly author-
ized law officer, that it is interested in such cause, desires such release, and assumes the 
liability for the satisfaction of any decree obtained by the libelant in such cause, and 
thereafter such cause shall proceed against the United States in accordance with the 
provisions of this art ." 
THE WESTERN MAID 
vessel engaged in a public service; and that two others, 
while let or chartered to the United States on a bare-boat 
basis and devoted to military and naval uses were also of 
public status. 
3. The maritime law is part of the law of the country only in so 
far as the United States has made it so, and binds the United 
States only in so far as the United States has consented. 
4. The United States has not consented to be sued for torts and 
therefore it can not be said that, in a legal sense, the United 
States has been guilty of a tort. 
5. This immunity extends to public vessels of the United States, at 
least while employed in operations of Government; and lia-
bility for a tort cannot be fastened upon them by the fiction 
of a ship's personality, to lie dormant while they remain 
with the Government and to become enforceable when they 
pass into other hands. The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and Work-
man v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552, distinguished. 
6. Prohibition lies to restrain the District Court from exceeding its 
jurisdiction in admiralty cases. 
Rule absolute for writs of prohibition. 
Petitions by the United States for writs of prohibition 
and mandamus to prevent District Courts from exercis-
ing jurisdiction in three proceedings in rem for collisions 
that occurred while the vessels libeled were owned abso-
lutely or pro hac vice by the United States and employed 
in the public service. 
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Mr. Solicitor General Beck, with whom Mr. Assistant t ~illif~nf t !0J 
Attorney General Ottinger and Mr. J. Frank Staley, states. 
special assistant to the Attorney General, were on the 
brief, for the United States. 
The vessels 'vere all of distinctively public status when 
the collisions occurred. 
Section 9 of the shipping act has not waived the im-
munity of the United States or its vessels from suits in 
rem for losses arising while they are employed in the war 
service. Both the collision loss and the enforcement of 
the claim against the· vessel must occur while the Govern-
ment vessel is employed solely as a merchant vessel, and 
then is operating for the account of others than the Gov-
ernment, under charter or lease. 
The filing of suggestions under section 4 of the suits in 
admiralty act only determines the United States as claim-
ant for the vessel and substitutes its credit for the pay-
ment of the decree finally entered, if any, instead of the 
usual bond or stipulation for value otherwise entered to 
secure the release of a vessel from attachment. The 
proceedings continue as proceedings in rem. . Manifestly, 
33474-25t-4 . ; 
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if the libel does not state a cause of action, in re1n against 
the vessel, this section can not create one. 
Unless there is some magic in such public vessels' per-
sonification, the Government can not be held for these 
torts. There is no distinction between t.he Government 
and its property. There should be no relief by indirection 
where Congress has not provided relief directly. Bigby 
v. United States, 188 tJ. S. 400, 408; Langford v. United 
States, 101 U. S. 341, 344; Gibbons v. United States, 8 
Wall. 269, 27 4. Public vessels are part of the sovereign 
State and their liabilities are merged in those of the 
sovereign. United States v. Ansonia Brass Go., 218 U.S. 
452; Board of Commissioners v. 0' Connor, 86 Ind. 531, 
537; Rowley v. Conklin, 89 Minn. 172; The Fidelity, 16 
Blatchf. 569, 572, 573; The Parle1nent Belge, 4 Asp. 1v1. C. 
234, 237, 241; The Prins Frederik, 2 Dads. 451. 
The la'v merchant personified the commercial ship not 
a public ship. . Commercial vessels are sent in trade to 
all ports. Their owners are usually inaccessible for pur-
poses of suit, and their personal responsibilities are uncer-
tain. The necessities of the vessel's operation in merchant 
service demand that the vessel, the res, shall be respon-
sible for her torts and contracts. The basis of the law 
governing merchant vessels is aid of commerce. Vande-
water v. Mills: 19 How. 82; United States v. Brig Malek 
Adhel, 2 How. 210; The China, 7 Wall. 53; The Eugene 
F . .1lforan, 212 U. S. 466; TheY oung Mechanic, 2 Curtis 
404; Holmes, The CommonLa,v, page25; Mayer's Admi-
ralty Law and Practice, page 8. The reason and the 
origin of the rule show that it can not apply to public 
ships engaged in war service. Cf. Ex parte New York, 
No. 1, 256 U. S. 490. 
Sovereign immunity includes immunity from lien 
liability as well as from process. Ex parte Muir, 254 
U.S. 522; Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616; Ex 
parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490; Ex parte Ne'l!J 
York, No. 2, 256 U. S. 503; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15; The 
Tampico, 16 Fed. 491; Johnson Lighterage Go., 231 Fed. 
365; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213; Kawananakoa 
v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349; Riddock v. State, 68 Wash. 
329; 32 Harv. Law Rev. 447; 30 Harv. Law Rev. 20. 
The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and Workman v. New York City, 
179 U. S. 552, distinguished. Cf. Carr v. United States, 
98 u. s. 433, 439. 
CLAI)\1 FOR OWNERS 
. h 1 ,.r. J W R C 1 aim Mr. T. Gatesby Jones, '\VIth w om .lJ:Lr. ames . yan owners. 
was on the brief, for respondent in No. 21, Original. 
The Western Maid was a merchant vessel at the time 
of the collision. The sale of foodstuffs to enemy aliens 
is not a necessary function of the sovereign. Indeed, the 
act of -February 25, 1919, 40 Stat. 1161, indicates the 
opinion of Congress that it was un,vise for the Govern-
ment to engage in trade with enemy populations. It is 
doubtful whether it is constitutional for the Gover.nment 
to engage in transporting foodstuffs to be offered for sale 
at destination. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491; 
United States Shipping Board v. Wood, 274 Fed. 893. 
The collision took place two months after the armistice. 
Under such circumstances, the vessel could in no event be 
ca.lled a vessel engaged in a military operation. The 
Government has the burden of proof to establish that she 
was a public vessel engaged in a military operation. Ex 
parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522; In re Jupp, 274 Fed. 494, 485. 
Even if it were a fact that no freight was to be paid for 
the carriage, this circumstance would not affect the case. 
It '\Vas intended that her cargo '\vas to be sold to the 
civilian population of Europe. 
There is no suggestion that the vessel was commis-
sioned. The Exchange, 7 Cr. 116. On the contrary, the 
record sho"\\rs that she was registered as a merchant ship, 
and it is to be inferred that she was operating under this 
registry. (Rev. Stats. sees. 4170, 4171; Navigation Laws 
of the United States, 1919, p. 41.) 
Congress, by the suits in admiralty act of 1920, has 
waived immunity as to merchant vessels. In effect this 
is a suit under that act. 
If we assume that the Western Maid was a public 
vessel at the time of the collision, nethertheless a claim 
in favor of the libelant was created against her at that 
time, which could be enforced in rem. The Siren, 7 
Wall. 152, 13 Wall. 389. The Government contends 
that the language in 7 Wall. 155, 156, 158, is a dictum. 
When the mem hers of this court, in face of a single dis-
sent, make a doctrine one of the principal grounds for 
the court's decision, such a doctrine can hardly be called 
a dictum. The Government suggests that, because the 
Siren was a prize, the case is distinguishable. This 
conclusion does not follow. See Lord, Admiralty Claims, 
19 Col. Law Rev. 477. 
35 
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As we view the case, The Siren was a decision directly 
in point. The proposition relied upon by Mr. Justice 
Nelson as a ground for his dissent (7 Wall. 165), viz, that, 
if an owner of an offending vessel is not liable, it follows 
that there can be no lien, is contrary to the decisions in 
The Ohina, 7 Wall. 53; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386; 
The [!lackheath, 195 U. S. 361; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 
183 U. S. 424; The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1; Brig. Malek 
Adhel, 2 How. 210; The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 122; 
and The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 467. 
Liability in rem is entirely independent of liability in 
personam. Homer Ramsdell Go. v. La Compagnie Gen-
erale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406. 
Because of the difference between the American and 
English conceptions of the liability of a ship, the Eng-
lish authorities are not in point. The Davis, 10 Wall. 
15; The Oarlo Poma, 259 Fed. 369. But even in Eng-
land it is settled, as was said in Workman v. New York 
Oity, 179 U. S. 552, that a collision impresses a liability 
on a public vessel which becomes enforcible when the 
cro'vn waives the immunity of the public vessel. The 
Ticonderoga, 1 Swab. Adm. Rep. 215; Fletcher v. Brad-
dick, 2 Bos. & P. 182. 
In Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, this court 
said that the Workman Oase dealt with a question of the 
substantive law of admiralty, not the power to exercise 
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 
The doctrine of The Davis- and The Siren has long been 
familiar to the Federal courts. The Tampico, 16 Fed. 
491; Thompson Navigation Go. v. Chicago, 79 Fed. 984; 
Johnson Lighterage Go., 231 Fed. 365; The Attualita, 238 
Fed. 909; The Luigi, 230 Fed. 493; The Othello, 5 
Blatchf. 343. 
The Fidelity, 16 Blatchf. 569, was disapproved in 
Thompson Navigation Oo. v. Chicago, 79 Fed. 984, and, 
so far as its dictum indicated a departure from the doc-
trine of The Siren and The Davis, was expressly dis-
approved in Workman v. New York Oity, 179 U. S. 552, 
and in The Oeylon Maru, 266 Fed. 396. See also The 
U. S. S. Hisko, U. S. S. Roanoke and U. S. S. Pocahontas, 
S. D. N. Y., March 17, 1921, Manton, J., (unreported); 
The U.S. S. Newark, S.D. N.Y., March 18, 1921, Knox, 
J., (unreported); The U. S. S. Sixaola, S. D. N. Y ., April 
21, 1921, Mayer, J., (unreported); The F. J. Luckenbach, 
267 Fed. 931; The Liberty (unreported); no'v before this 
MARITil\iE LA \V AND PUBLIC. VESSELS 
court; The Carolinian, 270 Fed. 1011. .A.nd see The Flor-
ence H, 248 Fed. 1012; The Gloria, 267 Fed. 929; The 
City of Philadelphia, 263 Fed. 234; United States v. 
Wilder, 3 Sumner, 308, 312. 
The principle that the maritime law extends to public 
vessels has been recognized by _C9ngress, Act of August 
19, 1890, c. 802, 26 Stat. 320; Rev. Stats., sec. 4233; The 
Esparta, 160 Fed. 269; The A. A. Raven, 231 Fed. 380. 
Cf. Admiralty v. S. S. Eleanor, VI Lloyd's List Law Rep. 
456. 
It can not be said that the liability arises from the act 
of the Government in waiving its immunity from suit. 
It existed before this suit; otherwise there could be no 
cause of action on v;hich to base the suit. United States 
v. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 162; United States v. Lee, 106 lJ. S. 
196, 206; Lord, Admiralty Claims, 19 Col. Law Rev. 477; 
Hearings, Senate Committee on Commerce, 66th Cong., 
1st sess., on S. 2253, p. 18. 
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, \vas not 
a suit in admiralty and the facts were wholly different. 
from those in this case. It was not there intended to 
modify the doctrine of The Siren, The Davis, and of the· 
Ringgold Case, supra. 
Mr. Edward E. Blodgett, with whom Mr. Foye M .. 
Murphy was on the brief, for respondent in No. 22, 
Original. 
The burden of proving immunity from the lien is upon 
the petitioner. The Tampico. 16 Fed. 491. 
The Liberty was subject to a maritime lien arising out 
of this collision. The Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore P. C. 
267; The China, 7 Wall. 53; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 
386; Briggs v. Light Boat, 7 Allen, 287; The John G. 
Stevens, 170 U. S. 113; Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 
26-34; The Little Charles, 1 Brock. 34 7; The Palmyra, 
12 Wheat. 1; United States v. Brig jlfalek Adhel, 2 Ho\v. 
210; The John Fraser, 21 I-Io,v. 184; The Jferrimac, 14 
Wall. 199; The Clarita, 23 Wall. 1; The Barnstable, 181 
U. S. 464; The Luigi, 230 Fed. 493; Johnson Lighterage 
Go., ·231 Fed. 365. 
The lien arises though the vessel be owned, manned, 
and operated by a sovereign for 'va.r purposes. United 
States v. Wilder, 3 Su1nner, 308; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15; 
The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; Work1nan v. New York City, 179 
U. S. 552; The Florence H, 248 Fed. 1012; The Gloria, 
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267 Fed. 929; The F. J. Luckenbach, 267 Fed. 931; The 
City of Philadelphia, 263 Fed. 234. 
The property of a sovereign is not im1nune from pre-
existing maritime liens. Briggs v. Light Boat, supra; 
United States v. Wilder, supra; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 
Wheat. 416; The Copenhagen, 1 C. Rob. Adm. 289. 
The petitioner by the act of March 9, 1920, has im-
pliedly admitted that a lien may be created upon vessels 
owned or operated by it. 
In England, technical immunity attaches to all prop-
erty owned by the crown, irrespective of whether or not 
it is in possession of the sovereign. The Broadmayne, 
L. R. [1916] P. D. 64; The Scotia, [1903] A. C. 501. 
But the lords co1nmissioners of the admiralty represent 
the crown, and have a discretionary power, freely exer-
cised, to waive the privileges of the crown and consent to 
jurisdiction. The Fidelity, 16 Blatchf. 569; United States 
v. New York & OrientalS. S. Go., 216 Fed. 61; Thompson 
Navigation Go. v. Chicago, 79 Fed. 984; United States v. 
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208; Homer Ramsdell Go. v. La Com-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406. Further-
more, the personification of the res is not carried so far 
in England as in the United States. In the former the 
procedure in rem is used merely as a means to compel the 
appearance of the respondent, and judgment runs against 
the individual-the seizure of the res is incidental. The 
Parlement Belge, 5 P. D. 197. 
Mr. Charles S. Haight, with who1n Mr. Wharton Poor 
was on the brief, for respondent in No. 23, Original. 
The case of the Carolinian is materially different from 
that of the Western ~!aid and other cases, \Vhere at the 
time of the collision title to the ship was in the Govern-
ment. 
The officers in command of the Oarol·inian \Vhen this 
collision occurred, while imposed upon the ship by the 
authority of the Government under the act of June 15, 
1917, occupied no different position from the compulsory 
pilot imposed upon the China. (7 Wall. 53.) The John 
G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 
U.S. 424; Workman v. New York Oity, 179 U.S. 552. 
The decisions show that in order to sustain a suit in 
rem for collision only two conditions need exist: (1) 
Fault on the part of the navigators, and (2) the ability 
of the court to execute its process by seizure. 
EXEMPTION FR.OM LIEN 
The attributes of sovereignty do not inure to the 
benefit of private individuals. Moran v. Horsky, 178 
u.s. 205. 
That a national war vessel may be held in fault for a 
collision due to the negligence of her officers and crew 
\vas directly decided in The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164. 
Even if, at the time of the collision, the Carolinian 
had been owned by the United States, an inchoate lien 
would nevertheless have been created which could be 
enforced in the present suit. The Florence H, 248 Fed. 
1012; The F. J. Luckenbach, 26 7 Fed. 931; The Gloria, 
267 Fed. 929; The Ceylon Maru, 266 Fed. 396; Johnson 
Lighterage Go., 231 Fed. 365; The Tampico, 16 Fed. 491; 
United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumner, 308; The City of 
Philadelphia, 263 Fed. 234; The Siren, 7 Wall. ~52; The 
Davis, 10 Wall. 15; Workman v. New York Oi,ty, 179 
u.s. 552. 
The only basis on which the exemption of Govern-
ment property from such a lien can be rested is the 
medireval doctrine of "prerogative," which forms no 
part of our jurisprudence. Dollar Savings Bank v. 
United States, 19 Wall. 227; United States v. lYilder, 
supra. 
Nor is there any principle of public policy "rhich pre-
vents the creation of a maritime lien against a public 
vessel owned by the United States. When the privately 
owned vessel is at fault, the United States collects its 
damages from the ship or her o"\vners, and it is only fair 
that a private owner should have a like right when the 
Government ship is to blame. Congress has recognized 
this principle of equality by 1naking the statutory rules 
for preventing collisions at sea binding upon public ships 
as well as private, 26 Stat. 320; 28 Stat. 645; 2 Fed. 
Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 376, 402, 449. If a merchant ship 
and a war ship are equally at fault, the damages are 
divided. The Sapphire, supra. 
The justice of paying clailns arising out of collisions for 
which public vessels were at fault has always been recog-
nized by Congress through many special acts allo,ving 
claims. 
The doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from 
suit-to "\Vhich so many exceptions have been made by 
statute as almost do a\vay with the rule-is based not 
upon principle but upon precedent. United States v. 
Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 206; United States v. Emery Bird 
Thayer Realty Go., 237 U. S. 28, 32. 1"'his is evidenced 
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by the practical relief from it in collision cases afforded 
in England, France, Germany, and in the State of N e'v 
York. 
The act of March 9, 1920, is; an express recognition by 
Congress that a maritime lien may: exist against a public 
vessel even though used solely for governmental purposes, 
and as the United States has secured the release of the 
Carolinian under this act it can not no'v contend that the 
court is without jurisdiction. 
of 1~r. Justice HoLMES delivered the opinion of the court. 
These are petitions for prohibition to prevent district 
courts of the United S~ates from exercising jurisdiction of 
proceedings in rem for collisions that occurred while the 
vessels libeled were owned, absolutely or pro hac vice, by · 
the United States, and employed in the public service. 
The questions arising in the three cases are so nearly the 
same that they can be dealt with together. 
of The Western Maid was and is the property of the 
United States. On January 10, 1919, she was allocated by 
the United States Shipping Board to the War Department 
for service as a transport. She had been loaded with 
foodstuffs for the relief of the civilian population of 
Europe, to be delivered on arrival at Falmouth, England, 
to the order of the~Food Administration Grain Corpora-
tion, the consignor, American Embassy, London, care of 
the chief quartermaster, American Expeditionary Forces, 
France; subject to the direction of Mr. Hoover. If it 
should prove impracticable to reship or redirect to the 
territories lately held by the Central Empires, Mr. 
Hoover was to resell to the Allied Governments or to the 
Belgian Relief; the foodstuffs to be paid for by the buyer. 
The vessel was manned by a Navy crew. Later on the 
same day, January 10, 1919, in the New York Harbor, 
the collision occurred. On March 20, 1919, the vessel 
was delivered to the United States Shipping Board. The 
libel was filed on November 8, 1919. Act of September 
7, 1916, c. 451, sec. 9, 39 Stat. 728, 730. The Lake Mon ... 
roe, 250 U. S. 246. On February 20, 1920, the Govern-
ment moved that it be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
The district court overruled the motion. On April 11, 
1921, the Attorney General moved for leave to file the 
present petition in this court. Leave was gran ted and 
the case has been heard. 
THE LIBERTY AND THE CAROLINIAN 
The Liberty was a pilot boat let to the United States 
on the bare-boat basis at a nominal rate of hire. She had 
been manned by a crew from the United States Navy and 
commissioned as a naval dispatch boat, and was employed 
to serve military needs in war service. rrhe collision took 
place on December 24, 1917, while she was so employed, in · 
Boston Harbor. Afterwards the vessel was redelivered to 
the owners, and still later, on February 5, 1921, the suit 
now in question "ras brought against her. On February 
14, under the act of March 9, 1920 (c. 95, sec. 4, 41 Stat. 
525), the United States filed a suggestion of its interest, 
and also set up the above facts. The district court held 
that they constituted no defense, and this petition was 
brought by the Attorney General along with that last 
mentioned. 
The steamship Carolinian had been chartered to the 
United States upon a ~are-boat charter and had been 
assigned to the War Department, by which she \Vas 
employed as an Army transport and furnished \vi th an 
Army crew. While she was so employed the collision 
took place in the harbor of Brest, France, on February 15, 
1918. Afterwards the Carolini-an \Vas returned to the 
ovvrners and she was employed solely as a merchant vessel 
on July 9, 1920, when the suit in question was begun, 
under which the vessel \Vas seized. In the same month 
the United States filed a suggestion of interest and on 
January 6, 1921, set up the foregoing facts . and prayed 
that the libel be dismissed. The District Court· main-
tained its jurisdiction and this petition was brought by 
the Attorney General along with the other t\vo. (270 
Fed. 1011.) 
41 
It may be assumed that each of these vessels might Liability of the 
have been libeled for maritime torts committed after the United States. 
redelivery that we have mentioned. But the· act of Sep-
tember 7, 1916 (c. 451, sec. 9), does not create a liability 
on the part of the United States, retrospectively, \Vhere 
one did not exist before. Neither, in our opinion, is such 
a liability created by the act of March 9, 1920 (c. 95, 
sec. 4), authorizing the United States to assume the 
defense in suits like these. It is not required to abandon 
any defense that otherwise \Vould be good. It appears 
to us plain that before the passage of these acts neither 
the United States nor the vessels in the hands of the 
United States were liable to be sued for these alleged 
maritime torts. The Liberty and the Carolinian \Vere 
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employed for public and Government purposes and were 
o~Nned pro hac vice by the United States. It is suggested 
that the lVestern Maid was a merchant vessel at the time 
of the collision, but the fact that the food \Vas to be paid 
for and the other details adverted to in argu1nent can not 
disguise the obvious truth that she was engaged in a 
public service that \Vas one of the constituents of our 
activity in the \Var and its sequel and that had no more 
to do \Vi th ordinary merchandizing than if she had car-
ried a regiment of troops. The only question really open 
to debate is whether a liability attached to the ships 
which, although dormant while the United States \Vas in 
possession, became enforcible as soon as the vessels came 
in to hands that could be sued. 
Maritime law. In deciding this question we must realize that however 
ancient may be the traditions of maritime Ia,v, however 
diverse the sources from which it has been dra\vn, it de-
rives its \vhole and only power in this country from its 
having been accepted and adopted by the United States. 
There is no mystic overlaw to which even the United 
States must bow. When a case is said to be governed by 
foreign law or by general maritime law, that is only a 
short way of saying that for this ·purpose the sovereign 
power takes up a rule suggested from \Vithout and makes 
it part of its own rules. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 
571, 572. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. 54, 58, 
59. Dicey, . Conflict of La,vs, 2d ed., 6, 7. Also we must 
realize that the authority that makes the law is itself 
superior to it, and that if it consents to apply to itself the 
rules that it applies to others the consent is free and may 
be withheld. The sovereign does not create justice in an 
ethical sense, to be sure, and there may be cases in \vhich 
it would not dare to deny that justice for fear of war or 
revolution. Sovereignty is a question of power, and no 
human power is unlimited. Carino v. Insular Govern-
ment of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449, 458. But 
from the necessary point of view of the sovereign and its 
organs whatever is enforced by it as law is enforced as the 
expression of its will. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 
U. S. 349, 353. 
The United States has not consented to be used for 
torts, and therefore it can not be said that in a legal sense 
the United States has been guilty of a tort. For a tort is 
a tort in a legal sense only because the law has made it so. 
If then we i1n agine the sovereign power announcing the 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
system of its laws in a single voice it is hard to c~nceive 
it as declaring that "\vhile it does not recognize the possi-
bllity of its acts being a legal wrong and while its immu-
nity from such an imputation of course extends to its 
property, at least when employed in carrying on the oper-
ations of the Government-specifically appropriated to 
national objects, in the language of Buchanan v. Alexan-
der, 4 How. 20-yet if that property passes into other 
hands, perhaps of an innocent purchaser, it may be seized 
upon a claim that had no existence before. It may be said 
that the persons who actually did the act complained of 
may or might be sued and that the ship for this purpose 
is regarded as a person. But that is a fiction, not a fact, 
and as a fiction is the creation of the law. It would be a 
strange thing if the law created a fiction to accomplish 
the result supposed. It is totally immaterial that in deal-
ing with private wrongs, the fiction, ho,vever originated, 
is in force. See Liverpool, Brazil cf~ River Plate Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 
251 U. S. 48, 53. The personality of a public vessel is 
merged in that of the sovereign. The Fidelity, 16 
Blatchf, 569, 573. Ex parte State o_f New York, No. 2, 
256 U. S. 503. 
But it is said that the decisions have recognized that 
an obligation is created in the case before us. Legal obli-
gations that exist but can not be enforced are ghosts that 
are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp. The 
leading authority relied upon is The Siren, 7 Wall. 152. 
The ground of that decision was that "\vhen the United 
States came into court to enforce a claim it vvould be 
. assumed to submit to just claims of third persons in 
respect of the same subject-matter. 7 Wall. 154. Carr v. 
United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438. In reaching its result 
the court spoke of such claims as unenforcible liens, hut 
that was little more than a mode of expressing the consent 
of the sovereign power to see full justice done in such 
circumstances. It would have been just as effective and 
more accurate to speak of the claims as ethical only, but 
recognized in the interest of justice when the sovereign 
came into court. They \Vere treated in this 'vay by Dr. 
Lushington in The Athol, 1 vVm. Rob . 374, 382. Further 
distinctions have been taken that need not be adverted to 
here. There was nothing decided in lVorkman v. NevJ 
York City, 179 U. S. 552, that is contrary to our conclu-
sion, which, on the other hand, is favored by The Fidelity, 
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16 ]3latchf. 569, 573, and Ex parte State of New York, 
No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, and Ex parte State of New Yorlc, 
No. 2, 256 U. S. 503. The last cited decisions also sho\v 
that a prohibition may be granted in a case like this. 
See The Ira M. Hedges, 218 U. S. 264, 270. 
Rule absolute for writs of prohibition. 
Mr. Justice McReynolds did not hear the argument 
in this case and took no part in the decision. 
~~ssenting Mr Justice McKenna with whom concurred Mr 
opmwns. • ' • 
Justice Day and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting. 
The question in the cases is without complexity, and 
the means of its solution ready at hand. 'fhe question is, 
What is the law applicable to colliding vessels and \vhat 
remedy is to be applied to the offending one, if there be 
an offending one? The question, I venture to say, has 
unequivocal answer in a number of decisions of this court 
if they be taken at their word. And why should they 
not be? That they have masqueraded in a double sense, 
can not be assumed; that they have successively justified 
implications adverse to their meaning would be a matter 
of wonder. 
What then do they express to be the la\v of colliding 
vessels, the assignment of offence, if offence there be, 
and how far is it dependent, if at all, upon whether the 
offender was in public or private service? 
Admiralty iu· The answer may be immediate. This court has kept 
risdiction 
steadily in mind that the admiralty jurisprudence of the 
country, as adopted by the Constitution, has a distinctive 
individuality, and this court has felt the necessity of 
keeping its principles in definite integrity, and the r me-
dies intact by which its principles can alone be realized .. 
The most prominent and efficient of its remedies is that 
which subjects its instrumentalities, its ships particularly, 
to judgment. Personality is assigned to them and they 
are considered to pledge to indemnify any da1nage in-
flicted through them. They are made offenders and have 
the responsibility of offenders, and the remedy is suited 
to the purpose. In Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & 
Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303, 306, it is said, Mr. Justice 
Hughes delivering the opinion of the court, "The pro-
ceeding in rem which is within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of admiralty is one essentially against the vessel itself 
as the debtor or offending thing,-in which the vessel is 
itself 'seized and impleaded as the defendant, and is 
judged and sentenced accordingly.'" 
COLLISION LIABILITY 
In the John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113, 120, the court, 
through Mr. Justice Gray, declared, "The foundation of 
the rule that collision gives to the party injured a jus in re 
in the offending ship is the principle of the maritime la'v 
that the ship, by whomsoever owned, or navigated, is con-
sidered as herself the wrongdoer, liable for the tort, and 
subject to a maritime lien for the damages. This princi-
ple, as has been observed by careful text writers on both 
sides of the Atlantic, has been more clearly established 
and more fully carried out, in this country than in Eng-
land. Henry on Admiralty, section 75, note; Marsden 
on Collisions (3d ed.) 93." The case in many ways and 
by many citations fortifies and illustrates the principle.5 
The Siren was cited and the fact is pertinent as 've 
shall presently see. The China, 7 Wall. 53, was also cited 
and quoted from. The quotation was repeated in Ralli 
v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386, 402, 403, where it is said that the 
liability of a vessel is not derived from the authority or 
agency of those on board, either under the civil or com-
mon law," but upon a distinct principle of maritime law, 
namely, that the vessel, in whosesoever hands she la,v-
fully is, is herself considered as the 'vrongdoer, liable for 
the tort, and subject to a maritime lien for the damages. 
In Tucker v. Alexandrojf, 183 U.S. 424, 438, this court 
by Mr. Justice Brown gave graphic representation to the 
same principle. He described a ship prior to her launch-
ing as ''a, mere congeries of wood and iron '' but after 
launching she took on a name, a personality of her o'vn 
and had in a sense volition, became competent to contract 
and be contracted with, sue and be sued, could have 
agents of her own, was capable of committing a tort and 
was pledged to its reparation. Cases were cited, the 
Siren among others. 
The doctrine thus explicitly announced is denied appli-
cation in the pending cases and upon what grounds~ As 
I understand, the contention is that a vessel has not inde-
pendent guilt, that there must be fault in its o'vner or 
operator, his fault becoming its fault. This has been said, 
but it puts out of view her character as bail and that the 
innocent victim of the injury she has inflicted shall not 
'General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. 351, 363; The Creole, 2 Wall. 
Jr. 485, 518; The .J.lfayurka, 2 Curtis, 72, 77; The Younq lrfechanic, 2 Curtis, 404; Tbe 
Kiersaqe, 2 Curtis, 421; The Yankee Blade, 19 How. 82, 89; The Rock Island Fridqe, 
6 Wall. 213, 215; The China, 7 'Vall. 53, 68; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 155; Thr. Lottawar111a, 
21 Wall. 558, 579; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1, 10, 11, 20; The Glid.•, 167 U.S. 606. 
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be remitted to the insufficient or evasive responsibility of 
persons but shall have the security of the tangible and 
available value of the thing. And this responsibility and 
fullness of indemnity we have seen it was declared in the 
John G. Stevens, supra, distinguished the law of this 
country from that of England. 
But if the contention were conceded it would not deter-
mine these cases. I reject absolutely that because the 
Government is exempt from suit it can not be accused of 
fault. Accountability for wrong is one thing, the wrong 
is another. 
But I do not have to beat about in general reasoning. 
I may appeal to the authority of the Siren, 7 Wall. 152 
and the cases that have approved and followed it. A 
gloss is attempted to be put upon it-which we think is 
unjustified and inaccurate unless, indeed, it can be as-
. serted that the writer of the opinion did not know the 
meaning of the words he used, and, that the members of 
the court who concurred with him, were equally deficient 
in understanding. And their insensibility to \vhat the 
words conveyed had no excuse. A dissenting justice 
tried to bring their comprehensive in1port to understand-
ing, proclaimed indeed, that the words had the extent 
and consequence that the court now says wer~~ not 
intended or accomplished. 
The Siren. The Siren, while in charge of a prize master and crew., 
having been taken in prize by the United States, ran into 
in the port of New York and sank the sloop Harper. The 
collision was regarded by the court as the fault of the 
Siren. She was condemned as prize and sold and the 
proceeds deposited with the Assistant Treasurer of the 
United States. The owners of the Harper asserted a 
claim upon her and her proceeds for the damages sus-
tained by the collision. The District Court rejected the 
claim. Its action was reversed by this court. 
The United States was an actor in the case and this 
was regarded by the court, who spoke by Mr. Justice 
Field, as removing the impediment to the clailn of the 
owners of the Harper. It was not, however, the basis 
of recovery. There 'vas no confusion in the language or 
conception of the learned justice, nor in the court, of 
that. By becoming the actor, the United States, it was 
said, waived its exemption from direct suit and opened 
"to consideration all claims and equities in regard to the 
DISTINCTION IN LIABILITIES 
property libelled ''-not, of course, that the waiver of 
exemption created the "claims and equities." They, it 
was explicitly said, were created against the offending 
vessel by the collision. '' In such case,'' the language 
was, "the claim exists equally as if the vessel belonged to 
a private citizen, but for reasons of public policy, already 
stated, can not be enforced by direct proceedings against 
the vessel." And again, ''The inability to enforce the 
claim against the vessel is not inconsistent with its 
existence." 
The distinction was clearly made between exemption 
of the United States, the offense of the vessel and the 
existence of a claim aga!nst it in consequence of its 
offense. And the distinction was emphasized in the dis-
sent of Mr. Justice Nelson. He was at pains to distin-
guish between liability to suit and legal liability for the 
act of injury, the ground of suit. And the basis of his 
dissent was the same as the basis of the opinion of the 
court in the present cases, but not so epigrammatically 
expressed. In the opinion in these cases it is said that 
"the United States has not consented to be sued for torts, 
and therefore it can not be said that in a legal.sense, the 
United States has been guilty of a tort. For a tort is a 
tort in a legal sense only because the la\v has made it so." 
Mr. Justice Nelson was more discursive. He said that 
"if the owner of the offending vessel [he regarded the 
Siren as owned by the United States] is not liable at all 
for the collision, it follows, as a necessary legal conse-
quence, that there can be no lien, otherwise the nonlia-
bility would amount to nothing." And again, "if the 
Government is not responsible, upon the principles of the 
common law, for wrongs committed by her officers or 
agents, then, whether the proceedings in the admiralty are 
against the vessel, or its proceeds, the court is bound to 
dismiss them.'' And giving point to this view the learned 
justice observed that "no principle at common law is 
better settled than that the Government is not liable for 
the wrongful acts of her public agents." 
I repeat, that in view of these extracts from Mr. Justice 
Nelson's dissent, misapprehension of its opinion by the 
court is not conceivable nor carelessness of utterance. 
Yet the opinion in the present cases practically so asserts 
and, in effect, regards Mr. Justice Nelson's dissent as the 
la\V of the Siren and not that which the court pronounced. 
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The court decided that the vessel was the offending thing, 
and though it could not be reached in the hands of the 
Government, this "inability to enforce the claim against 
the vessel" was "not inconsistent with its existence." 
'fhe inevitable deduction is that in such situation the 
enforcement of a claim is suspended only, and when the 
vessel passes from the hands of the Government, as the 
offending vessels have in the cases at bar, they and "all 
claims and equities in regard to" them may be enforced. 
The case was commented on in The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, 
20, and the gloss now put upon it rejected. It is there 
said that the 'veil-supported doctrine of the case is "that 
proceedings in rem to enforce a lien against property of 
the United States are only forbidden in cases where, in 
order to sustain the proceeding, the possession of the 
United States must be invaded under process of the 
court." 
So again in Workman v. New York Oity, 179 U. S. 552, 
where it is said, Chief Justice White delivering the opinion 
of the court, after an exhaustive review of cases, such as 
he usually gave, "It results that, in the maritime law, the 
public nature of the service upon which a vessel is engaged 
at the time of the commission of a maritime tort affords 
no immunity fron1 liability in a court of admiralty, where 
the court has jurisdiction." In view of this it is difficult 
to understand how it can be said that there was nothing 
that case decided contrary to the conclusion in these cases. 
Against this array of cases and their reasoning, Ex parte 
State of New York, No. 2, 256 U. S. 503, and Ex parte 
State of New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, are adduced. 
Neither case has militating force. The latter case decided 
nothing but that a State can not be sued without its con-
sent. An indisputable proposition which this court in its 
opinion had to clear from confusing or disturbing circum-
stances. In the former case, The Queen City, a steam 
tug, was in the possession and service of the State of New 
York and to have awarded process against it as the dis-
trict court did, "\Vould have arrested the service. This 
court rightfully reversed that action. The tug had not 
been released from that immunity as the vessels were in 
the pending cases. 
THE CHARLOTTE 
Counsel for claimants in opposition to the petition cite 
cases at circuit and district "rhich follo,ved The Siren.4 
It is not necessary to revie"\v or comment upon them. 
They are testimony of what the judiciary of the country 
considered and consider The Siren and other cases decided. 
Therefore we can not refrain from saying that it is strange, 
that notwithstanding the language of The Siren, its under-
standing and acceptance in many cases in this court, the 
enforcement of its doctrine at circuit and district, it should 
now be declared erroneous. The cases at bar "\Vould seem 
to be cases for the application of the maxim of stare decisis 
which ought to have force enough t"o resist a change based 
on finesse of reasoning or attracted by the possible accom-
plishment of a theoretical correctness. 
The rules should be discharged . 
. 
THE "CHARLOTTE" 
(299 F. 595) 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT 
April 28, 1924 
Before HOUGH, MANTON, and MAYER, Circuit 
Judges. 
PER CuRIAM: This is the same litigation which gave 
rise to the proceedings in Ex parte New York No. 1, 256 
u.s. 491. 
The Charlotte, owned by claimants herein, was by a 
document called a charter and lease, in the employment 
of the State of New York and used by the authority of 
that State in towing on the Erie Canal. Libelant asserts 
by this suit in rem that she was negligently navigated to 
the injury of his barge or canal boat. The question here 
is whether this action can be maintained under the author-
4 The U.S. S. Hisko, U. S. S. Roanoke, and U.S. S. Pocahontas (Circuit Judge :Manton 
S. D. N. Y.) (March 17, 1921, unreported opinion annexed to brief); 
The U. S. S. Newark (District Judge Knox, S.D. N.Y.) (March 18, 1921, unreported 
opinion annexed to brief); 
The U. S. S. Sixaola (District Judge 1\iayer, S. D. N.Y.) ·(April 21, 1921, unreported 
opinion annexed to brief); 
The F. J. Luckenbach, 267 Fed. 931; The Liberty, now before this court; The Carolinian, 
270 Fed. 1011, also now before this court. 
Also: The Florence li., 248 Fed. 1012; The Gloria, 267 Fed. 929; The City of Philadel· 
phia, 263 Fed. 234. 
Counsel also cites: The Tampico, 16 Fed. 491; Thompson Navigation Co. v. C1ty of 
Chicago, 79 Fed. 984; Johnson Lighterage Co., 231 Fed. 3G5; The Attualita, 238 Fed. 909; 
The Luigi, 230 Fed. 493; The Othello, 5 Dlatchf. 343. 
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ity of the case above cited, of The Queen City (Ex parte 
.IVew York No. 2) 256 U. S. 503, and The Western Maid, 
257 u. s. 419. 
[I] Nothing need be added to the opinion of the court 
below in respect of its holding that the charter and lease 
of the Charlotte existing at the time of the alleged negli-
gence was a demise of the vessel and made the State of 
New York her owner pro hac vice. 
ImmunityN of The first case cited above shows that no action in 
State or ew 
York. personam would lie against the State of New York in the 
admiralty for the damage complained of; The Queen City 
shows that if the Charlotte had been owned absolutely 
by the State, no action in rem could have been maintained 
against the vessel; and the lVestern ]faid shows that in 
respect of the sovereign United States there is no differ-
ence between a vessel owned outright and one owned 
pro hac vice by the sovereign. 
[2] This reduces the question at bar to an inquiry 
whether there is any difference between the sovereignty 
of the United States and that of the State of New York 
in so far as its immunity from suits of this kind is con-
cerned. 
The general nature of a State's sovereignty has been 
too often set forth to require additional exposition now; 
it is summarily stated with due citation of authorities in 
36 Cyc. 828. 
It is thought that no State has been more insistent 
upon the extent of its sovereign powers than the State of 
New York, and that sovereignty has recently received 
full recognition in Marshall v. People of the State of New 
York, 254 U. S. 380, where all the New York cases are 
cited. We think it unnecessary to do more than state 
our acceptance of the proposition that in the absence of 
any diminution of power in this regard by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, the State of New York can 
neither be sued in personam for the tort complained of, 
nor can its property, whether absolute or owned pro hac 
vice, be made to respond for the same tort. In other 
words, the doctrine of Western ]laid, supra, applies to and 
governs this case. 
Decree affirmed, with costs. 
THE PORTO ALEXANDRE 
THE "PORTO Al,EXANDRE" 
([1920], p. 30) 
Admiralty-Public vessel-Immunity from process of arrest-Trad-
ing by public vessel 
A vessel owned or requisitioned by a sovereign independent state 
and earning freight for the state, is not deprived of the 
· privilege, decreed by international comity, of immunity 
from the process of arrest, by reason of the fact that she 
is being employed in ordinary trading voyages carrying 
cargoes for private individuals. 
The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 P. D. 197 considered and applied. 
APPEAL from a decision of Hill J. setting aside the 
writ in rem and all subsequent proceedings against the 
steamship Porto Alexandre. 
The Porto Alexandre, formerly the German-owned 
steamship lngbert, a vessel of 2,699 tons gross, by a 
decree of the Portuguese prize court of January 30, 1917, 
was adjudged a lawful prize of war. She had previously 
been requisitioned by the Portuguese Government and 
handed over to the Commission of Services of Transports 
Maritims and was being employed in ordinary trading 
voyages earning freight for the Government. 
In September, 1919, she loaded a cargo of cork shavings 
for carriage to Liverpool under a hill of lading from which 
it appeared that the cargo was shipped by and consigned 
to the Portuguese Import and Export Co., (Ltd.). 
On September 13, when in the Crosby Channel at the 
en trance to the Mersey, the vessel got agrou'nd and 
salvage services were rendered to her by three Liverpool 
tugs, the Nora, Expert, and Torfreda. On September 16 
a writ in rem was issued on behalf of the owners, masters, 
and crews of these tugs in respect of the services against 
"the owners of the Portuguese steamship Porto Alexandre 
. ' her cargo and freight." On September 24 the solicitors 
for the defendants accepted service of the writ and 
undertook to appear on behalf of the cargo owners, anrl 
on September 25 entered appearance "under protest" 
for the owners and freight. On October 2 a motion was 
set down to set aside the writ and all subsequent pro-
ceedings on the ground that the Porto Alexandre and the 
freight "were and are the public national property of 
and/or requisitioned by and in the possession and public 
use and service of the Portuguese Government." The 
motion came before Hill, J., on October 20 and 27, 1919, 
and was supported by a communication from the 
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Portuguese charge d 'affaires to Lord Curzon, the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who in turn com-
municated it to the learned judge, that the Porto Alexandre 
was ''a state-owned vessel belonging to the Govern-
ment of the Portuguese Republic." 
Hill, J., in giving judgment said that he had arrived at 
his decision with the greatest reluctance. Upon the ·facts 
he was prepared to find, if it were necessary, that the 
Porto Alexandre was being used in ordinary commerce, 
and that the only interest of the Portuguese Government 
was in the earning of freight. But in his view the law 
as laid down in The Parlement Belge 5 was that a sovereign 
state could not be impleaded either by being ·served in 
personam or indirectly by proceedings against its prop-
erty; and if that were the principle it mattered not how 
the property was being employed. His lordship con-
tinued: "I think, therefore, that this motion succeeds 
upon the ground that it is established that this ship was 
· the property of the Portuguese Government at the time 
of arrest and is now its property. It therefore follo\vs 
that so far as the ship and freight are concerned the "\vrit 
and all subsequent proceedings must be set aside, but the 
vrrit and all subsequent proceedings so far as the cargo 
is concerned will remain good. I have already, in pre-
vious cases, pointed out what I conceive to be very strong 
reasons why it is undesirable that cases should be with-
drawn, as this is being withdrawn, from the courts, but I 
have only to assert now what I conceive to be the la,v." 
The plaintiffs appealed. 
th!r:fi~~t;,or November 10. C. R. Dunlop, K. C., and J. B. Aspinall 
for the appellants. Although a sovereign ruler can not 
be impleaded even in respect of private transactions, 
international comity does not extend the same immunity 
to the property of states unless employed in the public 
service. The decision of the court of appeal in The Parle-
ment Belge 5 no doubt qualifies to some extent the vie"rs 
of Sir Robert Phillimore as expressed in the court below 
in that case 6 and in The Oharkieh. 7 But the court of 
appeal, in reversing Sir Robert Phillimore, took a differ-
ent view of the facts, and the case is not an authority for 
the proposition that a foreign state-o,vned merchant ship 
6 5 P. D. 197. e (1879) 4 P. D. 129. 7 (1873) L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, 74. 
SALVAGE 
engaged on an ordinary mercantile voyage is immune 
from the process of arrest. The Parlement Belge was a 
mail boat, and although carrying passengers and cargo 
this was merely ancillary to her real employment, 'vhich 
was that of carrying the Belgian State mails. The cor-
rect view was that stated by Marshall, C. J., in an old 
American authority (U.S. Bank v. Planters' Bank 8), that 
"when a Government becomes a partner in any trading 
company it devests itself, so far as concerns the transac-
tions of that company, of its sovereign character." [The 
Prins Frederik 9 was also referred to.] 
D. Stephens, K. C., and .._t\.. W. Grant for the respond-
ents were not called on. 
BANKES, L. J.: This is an appeal from a decision of 
Hill, J., '\vho made an order that the writ and warrant for 
arrest, and all subsequent proceedings against the Porto 
Alexandre and freight, be set aside, but the proceedings 
against the cargo should stand. The learned judge was 
only concerned with the question of the ship, and this 
appeal has only reference to the ship. 
The vessel in question was on a voyage from Lisbon to 
Liverpool, and she ran aground in the Mersey, and three 
tugs were engaged to get her off. An action was brought, 
and the ship was arrested in respect of the services ren-
dered to her by these tugs. The application '\vhich the 
learned judge granted was founded upon the contention 
that the vessel was the property of a sovereign state, the 
Republic of Portugal, and on that ground, that she \vas 
exempt from arrest. The conclusion of fact at which the 
learned judge arrived '\vas that it had been established 
that the ship was the property of the Portuguese Govern-
ment at the time of the arrest, and is still their property, 
and on that ground he made the order. 
It is now contended that it is not sufficient for a sover-
eign or a sovereign state to allege that a vessel is the 
property of such ~overeign or sovereign state, and that 
the allegation must go further and say the vessel is 
employed in the public service or on public service. 
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The facts with regard to the vessel are as follo'\vs: She statement of 
· · 11 G h . facts. was or1g1na y a erman mere ant vessel, and In August, 
191(1, she was requisitioned by the Portuguese Government. 
On August 11 what is called· a passport was issued, '\vhich 
authorized the employment of the vessel and contains 
s (1824) 9 Wheat. 904, 907. g (1820) 2 Dods. 451. 
54 VESSELS: 0\VNER.SHIP, CHARTER, AND SERVICE 
notes upon it, indicating that during the period that the 
vessel \Vas at the service of the Portuguese Government, 
for which she was requisitioned, her port of register 
should be Lisbon. There is also an indorsement on the 
passport stating that on January 30, 1917, she was ad-
judged a lawful prize of war. Mr. Dunlop has pointed 
out that the statement that she was adjudged a la\vful 
prize of war leaves it doubtful whether she has become 
the actual property of the Portuguese Government, or 
whether she \vas merely detained pending the conclusion 
of peace. It would rather appear that the latter is the 
proper conclusion, because there is an affidavit by the 
Portuguese vice consul at Liverpool, who says that the 
vessel is, and has been, requisitioned by the Portuguese 
Government for the service of the State, and is employed 
under the orders of the Government. There is a further 
statement in writing by the Portuguese consul at Liver-
pool, in which he says in reference to this particular 
voyage that the freight on the cargo was paid before 
shipment and belongs solely and entirely to the Portu-
guese Government. In addition to that, there is a letter 
fro1n the Portuguese charge d'affaires, in ,vhich he states 
definitely that the Porto Alexandre is a public service 
vessel belonging to the Portuguese Government. 
There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the state-
ments that have been made on affidavit in .this case-
that the vessel has been requisitioned under the order of 
the Portuguese Government, and that on the particular 
voyage she \vas carrying freight for that Government. 
Mr. Dunlop, however, contends that is not sufficient, 
because it is shown she 'vas engaged in ,vhat he says 'vas 
an ordinary commercial undertaking, as an ordinary 
trading vessel carrying goods for a private individual or 
a private con1pany. The question is, 'vhether it is pos-
sible in the circumstances of this case to distinguish it. 
from The Parlement Belge, 10 \vhich wa~ a decision of this 
court, and is binding upon us. 
I gather from the judgment of Hill, J., and from 'vhat 
has been said by learned counsel, that this question is 
becoming one of growing i1nportance. In the days 'vhen 
the early decisions 'vere given, no doubt ,vhat 'vere 
called Gov-ern1nent vessels 'vere confined almost entirely, 
if not exclusively, to vessels of 'var. But in n1odern 
ti1nes sovereigns and sovereign states have taken to 
to !i P. D. 197. 
THE PAR.LEMENT BELGE 
o'vning ships, 'vhich may to a still greater extent be em-
ployed as ordinary trading vessels engaged in ordinary 
trading. That fact of itself indicates the gro,ving im-
portance of the particular question, if vessels so employed 
are free from arrest. 
The function of this court in this particular case is to 
decide whether it is covered by The Parlement Belge. 7 I 
think it is, and it is therefore not neccessary or desirable 
that the court should enter upon a discussion of the 
wider question at this stage, or consider the importance 
of other views that may be taken. T·here is very little 
difference between the material facts in The Parlement 
Belge and in the present case, and in my opinion The 
Parlement Belge is an authority \Vhich covers the 
present case. It is quite true that in many of the 
earlier cases the claim put forward, 'vith regard to a 
particular ship, 'vas that she was on public service and 
employed in the public service, and no doubt the state-
ment so made was applicable to the particular case, and 
was made because it was applicable to the particular 
case, and the judgments were ·delivered in reference to 
the facts so stated. But in this case the court is bound 
by the decision in The Parlement Belge and the appeal 
must be dismissed 'vith costs. 
V\T ARRINGTON, L. J.: I am of the same opinion. I think 
the case is clearly covered by the decision in The Parlement 
Belge 11 , and, that being so, 've have no alternative but to 
dismiss the appeal. 
In the present case, the facts proYed appear to me to 
amount to this: It is first proved that the ship in question 
is a public vessel, the property of the Portuguese Govern-
ment; next it is proved by the affidavits that it is in their 
possession for the service of the State; and, thirdly, it is 
proved that it is employed under the orders of the Govern-
ment. There is one passage in the judgn1ent of Brett, 
L. J., in The Parlement Belge in 'vhich he is expressing 
'vhat he considers to be the result of the judgment in 
Briggs Y. Light Boats 12, an American case, of 'vhich he 
obviously approves a~d on 'vhich he founds his o'vn con-
clusion. He says:" The ground of that judgrncnt is that 
the public property of a Government in usc for public 
purposes is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of either 
11 5 P. D. 197, 213, 217. 12 (1865) 93 ;,r ass. 157. 
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its O\Vn or any other state, and that ships of .. ~ar are 
beyond such jurisdiction, not because thay are ships of 
\Var, but because they are public property. It puts all 
the public movable property of a state, \vhich is in its 
possession for public purposes, in the same category of 
immunity from jurisdiction as the person of a sovereign, 
or of an an1bassador, or of ships of 'var, and exempts it 
from the jurisdiction of all courts for the same reason, 
viz, that the exercise of such jurisdiction is inconsistent 
\vith the independence of the· sovereign authority of the 
state." And then again, when he is summing up the 
principle \vhich he thinks is to be deduced from all the 
cases, he says: "As a consequence of the absolute inde-
pendence of every sovereign authority and of the inter-
national comity \vhich induces every sovereign state to 
respect the independence of every other sovereign state, 
each and every one declines to exercise, by 1neans of any 
of its courts, any of its territorial jurisdiction over the 
person of any sovereign or an1bassador of any other state, 
or"-and these are the material vvords-'' over the public 
property of any state \vhich is destined to its public use, 
or over the property of any an1bassador, though such 
sovereign, ambassador, or property be '>Yithin its territory, 
and, therefore, but for the comn1on agreement, subject to 
its jurisdiction." 
Whatever may be the actual use to \Vhich this ship is 
put, I think the evidence is quite sufficient to sho\v that it 
is the property of the state, and is destined to public use; 
and, that being so, the case seems to me to come exactly 
vvithin the principle of the judgment in The Parle1nent 
Belge 13, yvith the result \vhich I indicated at the beginning 
of my judgment. 
ScRUTTON, L. J.: In this case the Porto Alexandre came 
into the Mersey, got on to the mud, and "\Vas salved by 
three Liverpool tugs. On arresting her to obtain security 
for the payment of their salvage, the Portuguese Republic, 
through the Portuguese charge d'affaires, put forward a 
statement that she \Vas a public vessel of the Portuguese 
Republic, and vvas therefore exen1pt from any process in 
England. Accordingly the defendants moved to set 
aside the writ and arrest. Hill, J., in the admiralty court 
granted the application, and the plaintiffs' appeal to this 
court. 
13 5 P. D. 197. 
STATE IMMUNITY 
N o,v, this State and other States proceed in their 
jurisprudence on the assumption that sovereign States 
are equal and independent, and that as a matter of inter-
national courtesy no one sovereign independent State 
will exercise any jurisdiction over the person of the 
sovereign or the property of any other sovereign State; 
and now that sovereigns move about more freely than 
they used to, and do things \vhich they used not to do, 
and now that States do things which they used not to 
do, the question arises "rhether there are any limits to 
the immunity which international courtesy gives as be-
tween sovereign independent States and their sovereigns. 
I think it has been well settled first of all as to the sov-
ereign that there are no limits to the immunity which Immunity, 
he enjoys. His private character is equally free as his 
public character. If he chooses to come into this coun-
try under an assumed name and indulge in privileges 
not peculiar to sovereigns, of making promises of mar-
riage and breaking them, the English courts still say on 
his appearing in his true character of sovereign and 
claiming his immunity, that he is absolutely free from 
the jurisdiction of this court. That is the well-known 
case of Mighell v. Sultan of Johore. u It has been held, 
as Mr. Dunlop admits, in The Parlement Belge 15 that 
trading on the part of a sovereign does not subject him 
to any liability to the jurisdiction. His ambassador is 
in the same position; an ambassador, coming here as an 
ambassador of the sovereign may engage in private 
trading, but it has been held that his immunity still 
prptects him even from proceedings in respect of his 
private trading. Jervis, C. J., in Taylor v. Best, 16 
said: "* * * if the privilege does attach, it is not, 
in the case of an ambassador or public minister, for-
feited by the party's engaging in trade, as it \Vould, 
by virtue of the proviso in the 7 Anne, chapter 12, 
section 5, in the case of an an1bassador's servant . If 
an ambassador or public minister, during his residence 
in this country, violates the character in which he is 
accredited to our court by engaging in commercial trans-
actions that may raise a question bet\veen the govern-
ment of this country and that of the country by \vhich 
he is sent; but he does not thereby lose the general 
H [1894]1 Q. B . 149. 
33474-25t--5 
u 5 P. D. 197. IG (18.5 1) 14 C. D. 487, 519. 
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privilege which the law of nations has conferred upon 
persons filling that high character, the proviso in the 
statute of Anne limiting the privilege in cases of trading 
applying only to the servants of the embassy." There 
being no limitation in the case of the sovereign, and no 
limitation in the case of the ambassador, is there any 
limitation in the case of the property~ Mr. Dunlop has 
argued before us that in the case of property of the 
State there is a limitation, and that-as I understand 
him-if the property is used in trading, that can not be 
for the public service of the State. That is not the way 
in which he expressed it, but it appears to me to be the 
proposition which emerges from his argument. 
We are concluded in this court by the decision in The 
Parlement Belge.11 Sir Robert Phillimore took the view 
that trading with the property of a state might render 
that property liable to seizure; but the court of appeal in 
The Parlement Belge overruled the views of Sir Robert 
Phillimore, as I understand them. The principle then 
laid down has been recited by the other members of the 
court. Brett, L. J., said: "As a consequence of the abso-
lute independence of every sovereign authority and of the 
international comity which induces every sovereign state 
to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, 
each and every one declines to exercise by means of any 
of its courts, any of its territorial jurisdiction over the 
person of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, 
or over the public property of any state which is destined 
to its public use." One of the reasons given seems to me 
conclusive: the moment property is arrested in the 
admiralty court a proceeding is instituted against the 
person, and the person is compelled to appear if he wants 
to protect his property, and by seizing his property the 
personal rights of the sovereign or the personal rights of 
the state are interfered with. The position seems to me 
to be very accurately stated in the seventh edition of 
Hall's Inter:Q.ational Law, at page 211, where, after dealing 
with warships and public vessels so called, Mr. Hall goes 
on to deal with other vessels employed in the public 
service and property possessed by the state 'vithin foreign 
jurisdiction, and says: "If in a question with respect to 
property coming before the courts a foreign state shows 
the property to be its o'vn, and claims delivery, juris-
17 5 P. D. 197, 217. 
THE TERV AETE 
diction at once fails, except in so far as it may be needed 
for the protection of the foreign state." 
I quite appreciate the difficulty and doubt which 
Hill, J., felt in this case, because no one can shut his eyes, 
now that the fashion of nationali.?.ation is in the air, to 
the fact that many states are trading, or are about t<;> 
trade, with ships belonging to themselves; and if these 
national shi\ps wander about without liabilities, many 
trading affairs will become difficult; but it seems to me 
the remedy is not in these courts. The Parlement Belge 
excludes remedies in these courts. But there are prac-
tical commercial remedies. If ships of the State find 
themselves left on the mud because no one will salve them 
when the State refuses any legal remedy for salvage, 
their owners will be apt to change their views. If the 
owners of cargoes on national ships find that the ship 
runs away and leaves them to bear all the expenses of 
salvage, as has been done in this case, there may be 
found a difficulty in getting cargoes for national ships. 
These are matters to be dealt with by negotiations 
between governments, and not by governments exercis-
ing their power to interfere with the property of other 
States contrary to the principles of international courtesy 
which govern the relations between independent and 
sovereign States. While appreciating the difficulties 
which Hill, J., has felt, I think it is clear that we 1nust, 
in this court, stand by the decision already given, and the 
appeal must be dismissed. 
THE "TERV AETE" 
[1922] p. 259] 
Shipping-Collision-Foreign state-owned vessel- }.If aritime lien-
Vessel sold into private ownership-Jurisdiction-Immunity from 
arrest 
Damage occasioned by collision with a foreign state-owned vessel 
does not impose a maritime lien upon the vessel, and if the 
vessel be subsequently sold into private ownership she is 
not then liable to arrest in an action in rem. 
Decision of. Duke, P., reversed. 
Appeal from a decision of Sir I-Ienry Duke, P., sitting 
in admiralty, dismissing a motion to sot aside a 'vrit in 
an action in rem. 
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Argument for 
the appellants. 
The appellants, defendants in the action, were the 
o'vners of the steamship Tervaete_,· the respondents 'vere 
the owners of the steamship Lynntown. 
The action was brought to recover damages in respect 
of a collision which took place bet\veen the Lynntown, a 
J3ritish vessel, and the Tervaete on May 18, 1920, in the 
port of Bonanza, on the Guadalquivir River. At that 
time the Tervaete belonged to the Government of the 
l{ing of the Belgians and was being run as a coal ship 
for public purposes. After the collision she was sold by 
the Belgian Government into private O\Vnership, and at 
the time of the commencement of the present proceedings 
she was the property of the Societe Anonyme Belge 
d' Armement et de Gerance. The plaintiffs issued and 
served their writ on January 10, 1922, the Tervaete being 
then in Barry Dock; but they refrained from arresting 
her in consideration of an undertaking by the solicitors 
for the defendants to enter an appearance and put in 
bail. Appe_arance was entered under protest, and a 
motion was then set down by the defendants to discharge 
the solicitors' undertaking and to set aside the writ. 
Duke, P., held that a foreign state by its authorized 
agents could impose a lien upon one of its public ships, 
and that the lien might be enforced if it could be done 
without directly or indirectly impleading the foreign 
state. He was of opinion that the maritime lien in the 
present case \Vas capable of being enforced \vithout any 
assertion of jurisdiction over the Belgian State or its 
property, and accordingly dismissed the motion. The 
defendants appealed. 
Bateson, K. C., and E. Aylmer Digby for the appellants: 
The court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action. 
As a state-owned vessel is immune from arrest, no mari-
time lien can attach to her, and if it never attached it 
can not revive \Vhen the vessel is sold into private owner-
ship. A maritime lien does not attach in every case of 
collision-e. g., collisions caused through the barratrous 
acts of the master or, before the pilotage act, 1913, by 
the negligence of a compulsory pilot, do not give a right 
of action against the o\vners: See also The Tas1nania 17 
as to the position of vessels under charter. 
[ScRUTTON, L. J. This collision took place in a Spanish 
port; before the admiralty court act of I861 the court 
-vvould not have entertained such an action: The Ida.18] 
17 (1888) 13 P. D. 110. 1s (1860) Lush. 6. . 
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No. It has, however, been held that Alexandria and 
Algiers are "on the high seas," because they are not 
within the body of a country: The Mecca. 19 
A maritime lien is not a lien at all; it is a claim to M aritime lien. 
priority involving an action in rem and therefore implea.ds 
the oYrner of the res. It was defined in The Bold BtlC-
clengh 20 as "a claim or privilege to be carried into effect 
by legal process;" and in 01trrie v. },fcl{night 21 Lord 
Watson described it as a remedy against the corpus 
of the offending ship; see also The Dictator 22 and The 
Ripon Oity,23 where the nature of a maritime lien 'vas 
fully discussed. The collision with the Lynrdo,wn gave her 
owners no claim against the then owners of the Tervaete 
which could be earried into effect by legal process; and 
Brett, L. J., said in The Parlement Belge 24 that "the 
property can not be sold as against the new owner, if 
it could not have been sold as against the owner at the 
time." Similarly in The Oastlegate 25 Lord Watson said 
that the general principle of maritime la"\V was that 
"jnasmuch as every proceeding in rem is in substance 
a proceeding against the owner of the ship, a proper 
maritime lien must have its root in his personal liability;" 
and Sir Francis J eune in The Utopia 26 made· similar 
observations. The president, therefore, wa.s wrong in 
holding that there 'vas a maritime lien capable of being 
given effect to without impleading the foreign· state. 
A dormant maritime lien attaching to a state-o,vned 
vessel necessarily diminishes the value of the state's 
property. A maritime lien is, in the "\vords of Barnes, J., 
in The R,ipon Oity,Z3 a jus in re aliena, and to allo'v such 
a lien to attach at all would be a subtraction from the 
absolute property of the o'vner. The cases in "\vhich 
there have been cross claims against a foreign sovereign 
or sovereign states-e. g., The lvewbattle 27-stand in a 
different category; for if a foreign sovereign sues in a 
British court he submits himself to the jurisdiction of 
the court, and the court naturally "\vill see that justice 
is done. If, therefore, there is a counter-claim or cross 
action the court, if necessary, 'vill order the foreign 
lQ [1895] p. 95. 
20 (1851) 7 Moo. P. C. 267, 284. 
21 [1897] A. C. 97, lOG. 
22 [1892] P. 304. 
23 [1897] P. 226. 
24 (1880) 5 P . D. 197, 218. 
2s [18~3] A. C. 38, 52. 
26 [1893] A. C. 492. 
27 (1885) 10 P. D . 33. 
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sovereign t.o give security: The }lewbattle 21. While 
there is no English authority on the question at issue, 
it arose recently in the United States, and the Supreme 
Court decided by a 1najority that no maritime lien 
attached in the case of collision with a Government-
owned vessel: []nited States of America, Owners of the 
Western Maid v. Atlxiliary Schooner Liberty and Stearn-
ship Carolinian. 28 
[R.eference was also made to The Aline 29 and, on the 
position of requisitioned vessels, The Broadmayne.30] 
Argument tor C. R. Dunlop, K. C. and Dumas for the respondents: 
the respondents. . . l . 
There are two questions Invo ved. l-Ias the admiralty 
court jurisdiction to entertain the action at all; and if it 
has, is there any ground why it should refuse to do so~ 
As regards the locus, there can be no question that the 
ad1niralty court act, 1861, gives the court jurisdiction 
over cases of collision in foreign inland waters, \Vhether 
the vessels concerned are British, The Diana; 31 or 
foreign, The Courier. 32 The argument of the appellants 
confuses the position of the British Crown, which can 
do no \vrong, cf. Tobin v. The Queen/'3 with the position 
of a foreign sovereign, in favor of whom there is no such 
axiom. A foreign sovereign is not incapable of commit-
ting a tort. In Mighell v. Sultan of J ohore 34 it was not 
suggested that the Sultan could not create against himself 
a good cause of action, nor in South African Republic v. 
La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord 35 
that the Republic could not commit a libel. Also, a 
foreign sovereign who is plaintiff is liable to have a count-
erclaim or cross-action brought. against him: The New-
battle.21 
[BANKES, I..~. J. In The Newbattle 27 the court said it 
could not order the vessel to be seized.] 
No, but the foreign sovereign was compelled to give 
security to answer the cross action: see also Strousberg 
v. Republic of Costa Rica.36 In Magdalena Steam Navi-
gation Co. v. 1llartin/1 in \vhich the position of ari ambas-
sador was considered, the case appears to have proceeded 
on the footing that the remedy was in suspension. 
[Scrutton, L. J., referred to J,fusurus Bey v. Gadban. :-H~l 
27 (1885) 10 P. D. 33. 
2S [257 u.S. 419]. 
2g (1839) 1 \V. Rob. 111. 
30 [1916] p. 54. 
31 (1862) Lush. 5~.i9. 
11 (1~132) Lush. MI. 
33 (1864) 33 L. J. (C. P.) 199. 
34 (1894) 1 Q. B. 149. 
35 (1897) 2 Cb. 487. 
36 (1880) 44 L. T.199. 
37 (1859) 2 E. & E. 94. 
3S (1894) 2 Q. B. 352. 
JURISDICTION 
On the second point, namely, whether the Court ought 
to exercise jurisdiction, it 'vill do so unless a claim of 
sovereignty is asserted, and the claim must be asserted 
by the foreign sovereign or some one on his behalf. It 
is not suggested by the secretary to the Belgian ambassa-
dor that the Belgian Government objects to the action 
against the Tervaete; the affidavit in support of the mo-
tion to set aside the writ is made by the Belgian vice 
consul at Cardiff acting on behalf of the appellants, a 
commercial firm. The president was right in his con-
clusion that the maritime lien could be enforced without 
impleading the foreign government. The date when the 
action is brought and not the date of the contract or tort 
is the material date: Munden v. Dulce of Brunswick.39 
The rule in The Parlement Belge 40 is not infringed by the 
present action; and the dictum of Brett, L. J., in that 
case, relied on by the appellants, is obiter, and further 
had reference to a different state of facts-the lord justice 
'vas discussing whether a lien could attach to a ship in 
the hands of a subsequent owner when there was no negli-
gence on the servants of the owners at the time of the 
collision. 
[Reference was also made to The Ticonderoga 41 and 
The Porto Alexandre.42l 
Digby in reply: The fallacy in the respondents' 
case is their contention that there is a distinction be-
tween the case of an action against the British Crown 
and an action against a foreign sovereign or state, and 
that in the latter case the court merely declines to 
exercise jurisdiction, while in the former it is admitted 
that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action 
at all. Both cases stand on the same footing. There 
is no jurisdiction in either case: See The Oonstitution,43 
where the defendants being a foreign state it was held 
that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the 
action: See also the report of The Parlement Belge in 
the admiralty court/4 where the attorney general's 
protest is set out, from which it appears that the point 
taken was absence of jurisdiction. 
ag (1847) 4 C. B. 321; 10 Ad. & E. 656. 
40 5 P. D. 197, 218. 
41 (1857) Swa. 215. 
12 [1920] P. 30. 
43 (1879) 4 P. D . 39 . 
H 4 P. D. 129, 131. 
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Statement of 
facts. July 12. The following judgments were read: 
BANKES, L. J.: The material facts lie in a small 
compass. In May, 1920, a collision occurred between 
the respondents' vessel, the Lynntown, and the Tervaete, 
which at that time was the property of the Belgian 
Government and employed on Government service. 
Subsequently to the collision the Belgian Government 
transferred the Tervaete to a private owner, and after 
she had been so transferred she came in to Barry Dock. 
The respondents contend that as a result of the collision 
a maritime lien attached to the Tervaete, which, now 
that she is private property and is found within· the 
jurisdiction, they are entitled to enforce by proceedings 
in rem in the admiralty court of this country. The 
present proceedings were taken by the respon~ents 
to test the correctness of that contention. The re-
spondents do not contest the proposition that as a 
general principle of maritime law, in the case of a claim 
for damage arising out of collision, a proper maritime 
lien must have its root in the personal liability of the 
owner, or of the person for this purpose in the position 
of owner. The subject is very fully discussed by Gorell 
Barnes, J., in The Ripon Oity, 45 in which he gives a defini-
tion of maritime lien in language which is, I think, of 
assistance in this case. He says: "Such a lien is a 
privileged claim upon a vessel in respect . of service 
done to it, or injury caused by it, to be carried into 
effect by legal process. It is a right acquired by one 
over a thing belonging to another-a jus in re aliena. 
It is, so to speak, a subtraction from the absolute_property 
of the owner in the thing. This right must, therefore, 
in some way have been derived fron1 the owner either 
directly or through the acts of persons deriving their 
authority from the owner." The respondents further 
do not dispute that, so long as the Tervaete remained 
the property of the Belgian Government, no proceedings 
could be taken either in personam or in rem in respect 
of the damage done to their vessel by the collision. 
The contention upon which the respondents relied in 
the court below, and which \Vas accepted by the presi..; 
dent~ was that the fact that no such proceedings could 
be taken was not due to an absence of any liability on the 
part of the Belgian Government for the negligence of 
~5 [1897), pp. 226, 24:?. 
LIABILITY OF' FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
their servants which brought about the collision, but to 
the rule introduced by international comity which pro-
hibited the taking of any proceedings to enforce that 
liability. As a further contention founded upon the one 
just mentioned, it was said that a maritime lien did at-
tach to the Tervaete as a consequence of the collision, 
and though it remained, as it were, dormant and unen-
forceable during the ownership of the vessel by the Bel-
gian Government, it became enforceable when the vessel 
passed into private ownership. These contentions raise 
the question whether a maritime lien ever did attach to 
the vessel at a time when· she was owned by the Belgian 
Government. This is quite a different case from a case 
where a maritime lien attached to a vessel at a time when 
she was privately owned, and which vessel afterwards 
passed into government ownership, and then into pri-
vate ownership again. It, may well be that in such a 
case the maritime lien is dormant during the period of 
government ownership. The present case is quite dis-
tinct from that, and involves the question whether a 
maritime lien ever attached to the Tervaete at all. 
65 
I think it may be conceded for the purposes of the argu~ _Liability ~rror-
mgn sovereign. 
ment that the fact .that a sovereign or a sovereign powe1 
can not be proceeded against in the courts of a foreign 
country does not exclude all idea of liability for a breach 
of contract, or for a tort, in the sense that under no cir-
cumstances can the sovereign or the sovereign state do 
wrong. The rule that where a foreign sovereign sues in 
the courts of this country, proceedings may be taken 
against him in mitigation of the relief claimed by him, 
would be of no value except upon the assumption that 
claims for breaches of contract, or for torts, might be 
established and set off in mitigation. In Imperial J apa-
nese Government v. P. & 0. Oo.,46 the whole discussion 
as to the court in which proceedings might be taken 
would have been avoided had the law been that the Em-
peror of Japan could not be liable for damages resulting 
from the collision of his vessel \vith that of the defendants. 
The point was, however, not suggested in that case. In 
The Newbattle 41 it was assumed that the I{ing of the 
Belgians might be held liable in damages in the cross 
cause for the negligence of those in charge of his vessel, 
the Louise Marie. .The fact that the immunity of an 
46 [1895] A. C. 644. 
33474-25t--6 
H 10 P. D. 33. 
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ambassador from process in the courts of this country 
in respect of debts contracted while he was ambassador 
lasts during the time during which he is accredited to the 
sovereign and for such a reasonable period after he has 
presented his letters of recall to enable him to 'vind up 
his official business and to prepare for his return home, 
which is the law as laid down in ),_fusurus Bey v. Gad-
ban, 48 points also in n1y opinion to the same conclusion. 
In the numerous cases such as South 4frican Republic 
v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du 
Nord, 49 in which t the question arose of enforcing cross 
claims in actions by sovereigns or sovereign states, it 
appears to me to be assumed that the cross claims are in 
respect of breaches of conduct or of tort actually com-
mitted, and for which the sovereign or the sovereign 
state 'vould have been responsible but for the immunity 
from process which he or they enjoyed. 
In spite of the fact that so far I have accepted the 
arguments of the respondents in support of the judgment 
of the President, I am unable to agree with his final con-
clusion, and I do so upon a point to which his attention 
does not appear to have been specially directed. The 
point is founded partly upon the effect upon the property 
of the sovereign state if a maritime lien attached to the 
Tervaete as alleged, and partly upon a consideration of 
the nature of a maritime lien itself. If the judgment of 
the president is right, and the maritime lien attached to 
the Tervaete, the value of the vessel to the Belgium 
Government must necessarily have been affected; how 
seriously of course depends upon the amount of the 
respondents' claim. A vessel to which a maritime lien 
extends for any substantial amount must necessarily be 
worth less in the market than if she was free from any 
lien. In The Bold Buccleugh 50 Sir John Jervis, 'vhen 
dealing with the question of a maritime lien, adopts 
Lord 'renterden 's definition of it, as a claim or privilege 
to be carried into effect by legal process; and he then 
goes on to say that a maritime lien is the foundation of 
the proceedings in rem, a process to make perfect a right 
inchoate from the moment the lien attaches. In Currie 
v. J,fcl(night 51 Lord Watson speaks of a maritime lien 
i: V3 a remedy against the corpus of the offending ship. 
48 [1894] 2 Q. B. 352. 
4g [1898] 1 Ch. 190. 
50 7 Moo. P. C. 267, 284. 
51 [1897] A. C. 97, 106. 
PUBLIC PROPERTY LIABILITY 
vVhether a maritime lien is properly to be regarded as a 
step in the process of enforcing a claim against the 0\Vners 
of a ship, or as a remedy or partial remedy in itself, or as 
a n1eans of securing a priority of claim, it can not, in my 
opinion, consistently \Vith the rule of immunity laid 
down by the lavv of nations, be attached to a vessel 
belonging to a sovereign po\ver and being used for public 
purposes. To allow such a lien to attach would be to use 
Gorell Barnes, J. 's, language in The Ripon Oity,52 to 
create a jus in re aliena, a subtraction from the absolute 
property of the sovereign state. 
I may here refer to Jfusu.rus Bey v. Gadban 53 , in which 
the immunity from process of an ambassador was con-
sidered. It was argued in that case that it was permis-
sible. to issue a writ against an ambassador in order to 
prevent the running of the statute of limitation, pro-
vided no further step of ~erving or attempting to serve 
\Vas taken. The court, taking the same view as was 
taken in Magdalena Steam Navigation Go. v. Martin, 54 
refused to accept the contention. Davey, L. J., said: 
"With regard to the first" (that is the contention I 
have just referred to) "it is in my opinion sufficient to 
refer to the third section of 7 Anne, chapter 12, which 
makes all writs and processes, \Vhereby the person of 
any ambassador or other public minister may be arrested 
or imprisoned, or his goods and chattels may be dis-
trained, seized, or attached, utterly null and void. It 
has been decided in Magdalena Steam Navigation Go. v. 
Martin 54 that this section applies not only to writs of 
execution against the property or person of a privileged 
person, but also to writs which lead up to and would 
in ordinary course have the consequence of attaching 
his goods or person. If so, I am of opinion that a \Vrit 
of summons in an action is of that character, and that 
the effect of the statute (which is said to be declaratory 
only of the common la,v) is to make such a \vTit void 
and of no effect. Mr. Pollard is quite right in saying 
that the writ had been served in the J.llagdalena case, 
and that all that it was necessary to decide \Vas that that 
service was bad. But the grounds upon \Vhich the 
decision \Vas based in I.1ord Campbell's juclgn1ent go 
beyond that point, and in my opinion sho\V a total \Vant 
of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action at all. 
52 [1897], p. 226. 63 (1894) 2 Q. B. 352, 360. 642 E. & E., 94, 
G7 
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Lord Campbell, at page 111, states the principle to be 
that for all juridical purposes an ambassador is supposed 
still to be in his own country, and he concluded his 
judgment in these words: 'It certainly has not hitherto 
been expressly decided that a public minister duly ac-
credited to the Queen by a foreign state is privileged 
from all liability to be sued here in civil actions; but we 
think that this follows from well-established principles.' 
These pass~ges, in my opinion, correctly state the legal 
principles on which the exemption is founded, and are in 
accordance with the course of decisions in our courts: 
See, for example, the latest case of The Parlement Belge 
in the court of appeal, in which it was said (I am reading 
from the marginal note, which is fully borne out by the 
judgment) that as a consequence of the absolute inde-
pendence of every sovereign authority and of the inter-
national comity which induces every sovereign state to 
respect the independence of every other sovereign state, 
each state declines to exercise by n1eans of any of its 
courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person 
of any sovereign or ambassador, or over the public 
property of any state which is destined to its public use, 
or over the property of any ambassador, though such 
sovereign, ambassador, or property be within its terri-
tory. I am unable to think that the issue of a "\Vrit 
in an action which action the court has no jurisdiction 
to entertain, and which writ, therefore, the court has no 
jurisdiction to issue, can prevent the statute running." 
It seems to me impossible consistently "\Vith the la'v as 
there expressed to hold that it is permissible to recognize 
a maritime lien as attaching to the property of a sovereign 
or a sovereign state. I see no distinction in principle 
bet,veen the act of the individual issuing the 'vrit and 
the act of the law attaching the lien. Each equally 
offends the rule affording immunity. If this is the cor-
rect vie'v of the law then the appellants are entitled to 
succeed, because unless a maritime lien attached to the 
Terraete while she \Vas the property of the Belgian Gov-
Judgment. ernment it can not attach at all. In my opinion the 
appeal must be allo,ved with costs here and belo'v and 
the order made 'vith costs relieving Messrs. Do,vning 
and Handcock of their undertaking dated January 12, 
1922, and setting the writ aside and staying all pro-
ceedings therounde.r. 
PROCEDURE IN REM 
ScRUTTON, L. J.: In May, 1920, the English steamer, 
Lynntown, being in the Spanish port of Bonanza on the 
Guadalquivir River and within Spanish territorial waters, 
but on the "high seas," as that term is interpreted in the 
English admiralty court, sustained damage by collision 
with the steamship Tervaete. The Tervaete had been sur-
rendered by the German Government to the allied powers, 
who handed her over to the Belgian Government, whose 
property she was at the time of the collision. After the 
collision the Belgian Government sold the Tervaete to 
private owners, under whose ownership she came to Barry 
Dock \vhere she \vas arrested by a procedure in rem at the 
suit of. the owners of the Lynntown. They alleged that 
the collision gave rise to a maritime lien, inchoate till the. 
Tervaete came within British territorial \Vaters, dormant 
till she ceased to be the property of the Belgian Govern-
ment, but which could be enforced \vhen the Tervaete, as 
the property of private~ o\vners, came within British 
jurisdiction. 
The owners of the Tervaete replied that as the Tervaete 
at the time of the collision was the property of the Belgian 
Government, against whom no proceedings could be taken 
in personam and against whose ship no proceedings could 
be taken in rem, no maritime lien could arise. The 
president, in a reserved judgment, adopted the contention 
of the owners of the Lynntown, and the O\vners of the 
Tervaete appeal. 
In my view it is no\v established that procedure in rem 
is not based upon wrongdoing of the ship personified as an 
offender, but is a means of bringing the o\vner of the ship 
to meet his personal liability by seizing his property. 
The so-called maritime lien has nothing to do \vith pos-
session, but is a priority in claim over the proceeds of 
sale of the ship in preference to other claimants. It does 
not appear eo nomine in cases of collision in the reports 
till The Bold Buccleugh 55 \vas heard in 1851, where it is 
defined as a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried 
intq effect by legal process; and it is stated, erroneously 
as is now admitted, that wherever an action in re1n lies 
there a maritime lien exists. The report proceeds: 
"This claim or privilege travels \vith the thing, into 
\vhosesoever possession it may come. It is inchoate from 
the moment the claim or privilege attaches, and \vhen 
65 7 1\t[oo. P. C. 267, 284. 
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carried into effect by legal process, by a proceeding in 
rem, relates back to the period when it first attached." 
The cases as to the relation of a maritime lien to the 
personal liability of tbe owner are exhaustively examined 
by the late Lord Gorell in The Ripon City. 56 He comes 
to the conclusion that a maritime lien may exist, though 
the owner is not personally liable, where there is personal 
liability in those to whom he has voluntarily intrusted the 
control of the vessel, as charterers, though not if his 
intrusting is compulsory, as in th.e case of compulsory 
pilots. But for a lien to arise, in my view, some person 
having by permission of the owner temporary ownership 
or possession of the vessel must be liable for the collision. 
If he is so liable, a privilege or lien at once arises in this 
sense, that if the vessel comes within English territorial 
waters it may be arrested, and the claim or privilege on it 
will date back to the time of the lien. Any purchaser 
after the collision takes the ship subject to this possibility 
of claim. · 
At the time of the collision, if it happ.ened in English 
waters, would it have been possible to arrest the Tervaete 
and claim a maritime lien? The well-known decision of 
The Parlement Belge compels the answer in the negative. 
Neither the Belgian Government could have been sued 
in personam, nor could their ship have been arrested 
in rem. If this is so, I do not understand how there could 
then be any maritime lien on the ship. To hold that a 
lien would come into existence, if the Government sold 
the ship to a private purchaser, would be to deprive 
the Belgian Government of part of their property, for 
such a lien about to arise must reduce the price paid to 
the Government and so affect the property of the Gov-
ernment. 
The general language of Lord Watson in The Castle-
gate, 57 that "a proper maritime lien must have its root 
in the personal liability of the owner," approving the 
language of Lord Esher to the same effect in The Parle-
ment Belge, and the similar langu~ge of Sir Francis 
Jeune in The Utopia, 58 appear to me entirely to support 
this vie,v, even if that general language is not applicable, 
as Gorell Barnes, J., in The Ripon City 59 thought it \Vas 
66 [1897] p. 226. 
67 [1893] A. C. 38, 52. 
58 [1893] A. C. 492, 499. 
f9 [1897] p. 226. 
GOVERNMENTAL EXEMPTION 
not, to the complicated facts in that case. And while I 
agree \vith the president that the passage in The Parle-
ment Belge 60 was not strictly necessary to Brett, L. J.'s, 
decision, yet it was so closely related to it that coming 
from such a master of maritime law I have no hesitation 
in following it, especially as I agree \Vith it in principle. 
Brett, L. J., says: "The property can not be sold as 
against the new owner, if it could not have been sold as 
against the owner at the time when the alleged lien 
accrued. This doctrine of the courts of admiralty goes 
only to this extent, that the innocent purchaser takes the 
property subject to the inchoate maritime lien which 
attached to it as against hin1 who was the owner at the 
time the lien attached." In the present case no lien 
attached against the Belgium Government, nor could 
their ship have been arrested in rem. But if they could 
only sell the ship subject to the lien, their property 
would be affected by the lien, in that they would receive 
less than the value of the ship free from encumbrances 
or liens. The result would be that our law would assert 
a right over the property of a foreign sovereign not 
arising from any voluntary action on his pa~t, which 
adversely affected his property. 
I agree that a sovereign may call upon us to enforce 
legal rights in his favor. The Newbattle 47 sho\vs that 
if he does so, we may refuse to enforce those rights 
unless he allows the legal rights \Ve recognize to be 
effectively enforced against him. I agree that cases 
like Gladstone v. Musurus Bey 60 and Larivere v. Mor-
gan 61 show that where English trusts are concerned, this 
court will proceed though foreign sovereigns' rights are 
concerned, while, on the other hand, Vavasse,ur v. 
Krupp 62 involves the proposition that this country will 
not enforce English patent rights against property in the 
jurisdiction 'vhich a foreign sovereign claims. I am 
disposed to agree that the ground of the decisions is tha.t , 
though there are English rights, we do not enforce them 
against a foreign sovereign directly or indirectly be-
cause of the comity of nations. But it respectfully 
appears to me that the error of the president's judgment 
is that he is enforcing rights against a foreign sovereign 
indirectly, when he supports the vie\v that over his 
4710P.D.'33. 
60 (1862) 1 II. & ~I. 49.5; 32 L. J. (Ch.) 155. 
6t (1872) L . R. 7 Ch. 550. 
62 (1878) 9 Ch. D. 351. 
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property there is by English la'v an inchoate lien which 
will diminish the value of that property by lowering 
the price that a private purchaser will give for it. 
I appreciate that the matter becomes of international 
importance, if States increase their commercial trading 
by national fleets. I have already in The Porto Alex-
andre 12 expressed my views on the disadvantage of State 
immunity in such circumstances. But the remedy is, in 
my opinion, State agreements by diplomatic action, not 
infringement of legal principles based on the comity of 
nations. 
For these reasons I think the appeal must be allowed 
with costs here and below, and the writ against the 
Tervaete set aside. 
ATKI~, L. J.: This case raises a question of consider-
able importance. I have found it difficult, and I differ 
from the reasoning of the learned president 'vith hesita-
tion; but having formed a judgment which is not in 
agreement with his conclusion I must express it. 
I understand the argument made by the respondents 
and enfqrced by the president to be this. Collision 
damage caused by the negligent navigation of a ship 
creates a right in the person injured to recover damages 
from the owner responsible for the navigation. It also 
creates a right in the person injured to a maritime lien 
over the ship, so causiri.g damage. That lien is not a 
possessory lien; but consists of the right by legal pro-
ceedings in an appropriate form to have the ship seized 
by officers of the court and made available by sale if not 
released on bail to pay the collision damage. If the ship 
is the property of a foreign sovereign it is admitted that 
legal proceedings can not be commenced against him 
either personally or in rem-i.e., for the arrest of the 
ship-because by comity of nations no process can be 
brought in the courts against the person or the property 
of a foreign sovereign. But this is only a personal 
privilege of the sovereign not to be impleaded. The 
right of the injured person to damages and to a lien still 
exists; and as the right to a lien is not abrogated when 
the ship is transferred into the property of a third person, 
so when the ship formerly o'vned by the foreign sovereign 
becomes the property of a third person not protected by 
the personal privilege of the sovereign, the right to a lien 
becomes effective, and the necessary proceedings in rem 
42 [1920] P. 30. 
NATURE OF LIENS 
may be taken against the ship. The right to a maritime 
lien, it is said,. is equivalent to a charge created by the 
voluntary hypothecation of a chattel by the sovereign, 
a charge "rhich may not be capable of enforcement while 
the chattel is in the possession or o'vnership of the 
sovereign, but can be enforced as soon as it is transferred 
to the property of a third person. 
A part of this reasoning is irresistible. It seems to me 
correct to say that the acts of a foreign sovereign may 
constitute breaches of contract or of duty not arising 
from contract which create rights in the other party. 
True, such rights may be of little value, as they can not 
ordinarily be enforced by action. But the inability is a 
mere personal inability to sue; they can be made effective 
in defense as, for instance, by set-off 'vhere the rights 
give rise to a power of set-off; and, as I should suppose, 
by a plea of contributory negligence; and should the 
sovereign submit to the jurisdiction in respect of a claim 
based upon such rights, I apprehend that the court 
would be bound to give effect to them. 
But in my judgment upon a true analysis of vvhat is 
meant by a maritime lien the right to such a lien is not 
such as can be created at all by the act of a sovereign. 
It is not a right to take possession or to hold possession 
of the ship. It is confined to a right to take proceedings 
in a court of law to have the ship seized, and, if necessary, 
sold. The action in rem is an action in which the o'vners· 
of the ship are named as parties to the proceedings and 
in which, according to our procedure, if they appear, sub-
ject to the statutory right to limit liability, they 'viii be 
made liable personally for the full damage regardless of 
the value of the res. The ovvner, therefore, in such an 
action is directly impleaded. But whether it be directly 
or indirectly, the o'vner who is a foreign sovereign can 
not be impleted at all. The result appears to me to be 
that the maritime lien against a foreign sovereign can 
not exist at all. A right which can only be expressed as 
a right to take proceedings seems to me to be denied 
'vhere the right to take proceedings is denied. No in-
dependent liability of the sovereign such as a liability for 
debt or damages remains pendent protected only by an 
immunity from legal proceedings. The right of mari-
time lien appears, therefore, to be essentially different 
from a right of property hypothec or pledge created by the 
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voluntary act of the sovereign. If this reasoning be 
correct, inasmuch as there never 'vas a time during the 
ownership of the Belgian Government when the re-
spondents could aver that they possessed a maritime lien 
over the Tervaete, there was no obligation 'vhich attached 
to the ship or to the new owners when the ship became 
their property. On the explanation of the origin of a 
maritime lien given by Jeune, P., in The Dictator,63 one 
may perhaps be allowed to 'vonder how such a right 
avo,vedly dependent upon the personal liability of the 
o'vner could be held to be enforceable against a ne'v 
owner not in any 'vay personally liable for the collision. 
It is too late to raise a doubt as to this point after the 
decision of The Bold Buccleugh.64 But 'vhere there 'vas 
no right against the old owner, the new owner must 
escape. I myself should in any case feel bound by the 
dictum of Lord Esher in The Parlement Belge, 7 referred 
to in the judgment of the president. 
I have thought it necessary to state my vie,vs on this 
difficult question in my own way, because I am not sure 
that I feel so much pressed as my brothers "-rith the con-
tention that a dormant maritime lien over a foreign sover-
eign's ship 'vould affect the value of the ship in his hands, 
and therefore must be negatived. The supposition that 
the liability existed as for personal claims, but was merely 
~nenforceable, does not seem necessarily to be invalidated 
by the fact that such liability would impose pecuniary 
disadvantages upon the sovereign. A voluntary pledge 
or hypothec would be attended with the same results, 
but would it not be valid~ I do not, however, dissent 
from their view. I concur in the views taken by my 
brothers of the cases cited by them and of their bearing 
on this case. I only desire to add a 'vord or t'vo on The 
Newbattle 41 in the court of appeal. There the court held 
that upon the construction of the admiralty court act, 
1861, where a foreign Government had brought an action 
in rem against the o'vners of the Ne1.vbattle, an order could 
be n1ade staying the action until security had been given 
by the plaintiffs to ans,ver the cross claim of the defendant 
in respect of the same collision. The relevance of the 
case is that under the section a condition precedent of 
such an order is that the plaintiffs' ship can not be 
7 5 P. D. 197. 
4110 P. D. 33. 
63 [1892] p. 304. 
6t 7 Moo. P. C. 267. 
THE ISLAND 
arrested, and the decision of·the court proceeds upon the 
ground that though the foreign sovereign had invoked 
the jurisdiction of the court and though he was under 
possible liability for damages in an effective cross suit, 
yet his ship vvas exempt from arrest. That a maritime 
lien was not enforceable under such circumstances 
appears to afford strong support for the vievv that it did 
not exist at all. 
For these reasons I think the appeal must be allovvcd 
and the order made as stated by Bankes, L. J. 
Appeal allowed. 
THE "ISLAND " 
January 30, 1918 
(2 Entscheidungen des Obcrprisengerichts in Berlin, 8) 
In the prize matter concerning the Danish steamer 
Island, home port Copenhagen, the imperial superior 
prize court in Berlin in its session of January 30, 1918, 
decreed: 
The appeal against the judgment of the prize court in 
Kiel of May 30, 1917, is dismissed. The costs of the 
appeal are to be borne by the claimant. The further 
complaint of the owners against the decision of Decem-
ber 12, 1919, of the prize court in Kiel is hereby disposed 
of. 
Reasons: 
The Danish steamer Island, on the way from Copen- statement of 
hagen to New Castle in ballast, was brought to by a the facts. 
German war vessel on December 2, 1916, and, for 
purposes of a more thorough search, \Vas taken in to 
S\vinemunde, where seizure in prize followed on Decem-
her 12, 1916. 
The vessel, built in Glasgow in the year 1894, can1e into 
Danish possession in the year 1900, and, after frequent 
changes of ovvnership and name in Denmark, \vas sold 
by an agreement of November 24, 1915-July 21, 1916, 
by the then owner, the Steamer Island Corporation, in 
Copenhagen, to the claimant, Atlantic Ocean Stca.1nship 
Co., a corporation in Copenhagen. The vessel, \vhich 
formerly was called Esrom, was rechristened Island by 
the predecessor of the plaintiff. The Island Co. bought 
the ship in December, 1914, for 275,000 cro\vns; the 
claimant bought it for 1,000,000 cro\vns. According to 
an appraisal made at the instigation of the claimant by 
7 6 VESSELS : 0\Vl\ER.SHIP, CHARTER.J AND SERVICE 
three experts named by the admiralty and commercial 
court in Copenhagen, pres en ted to the court of first 
instance, the ship is supposed to be no\V worth 3,120,000 
crowns. 
E~g~irht.ure by In October, 1915, the ship, at that time still under the 
name of Esrom, while on a voyage from America to 
Sweden, was captured by the English and ordered to 
Hull. The English thought there was ground for the 
assumption that the vessel '\Vas in whole or in part Ger-
man property. 
Thereupon the English Admiralty, after the ship had 
lain idle a \vhile, requisitioned her, despite the protest of 
the owners and of the Danish Government, and sailed 
her under the English flag from January to July, 1916. 
le~~~ditional re· In August, 1916, the release of the vessel was accom'-
plished on the condition that she be chartered to an 
English firm, and on August 16, 1916, having in the 
meantime been taken over by the present claimant, 
she set sail for Copenhagen from London, where she had 
lain. Here she was to be docked and undergo_ extensive 
repairs, for which there had been no opportuinity in 
Chart.ertoEng-England. By an agreement of August 23, 1916, the ship 
lish firm. was chartered by the clain1an t to the firm of Furness, 
Withy & Co., Liverpool, as of September 30 at the latest. 
• It is provided in the charter party that under certain 
conditions the time of delivery to the charterer may be 
extended still further. On December 2, 1916, after 
partial repairs, the vessel set out in ballast for England, 
and on this trip was stopped . by a German \Var vessel. 
These facts, in part cleared up for the first time in the 
court of second instance, are incontestable in vie\v of 
the records. 
Claim \vas raised by the Atlantic Ocean Steamship 
Co. in Copenhagen for the release of the steamer, or com-
pensation to the extent of 3,120,000 crowns. The claim 
was based on the ground that the ship as neutral \vas not 
subject to capture; more especially that the fact that for 
six months she had sailed under the English flag under 
compulsion had not brought about a change of flag. 
DecisionofKiel By decision of the prize court at Kiel on May 30, 1917, prize court. 
the claim was rejected, and confiscation of the vessel 
decreed. The prize court stands upon the ground that 
in truth the illegal requisitioning on the part of the Eng-
lish Admiralty, and the ensuing use under the English 
flag, did not change the nationality of the ship. It as-
UNNEUTRAL SERVICE 
sumed, however, that the charter of the ship to the firn1 
of Furness, Withy & Co. was already running at the time 
of the arrest, and that this contract of charter was tan~a­
mount to a charter to the English Government, inasmuch 
as it was known to the prize court, through secret infor-
mation to the German Admiralty staff from a reliable 
source, that that English firm was an agent of the Eng-
lish Government. It was therefore to be presumed, until 
the contrary was proved, that a chartering to the English 
Government- had been consummated. 
This would be conclusive in the terms of article 55 c of 
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the Prize Code. . 
Against this decision the claimants have appealed Terms or char· · ter party. 
They deny that at the time of capture the ship was under 
charter to the English. According to the charter party, 
which was produced, the charter was rather to begin on 
the day of the· delivery of the ship to the charterer in 
condition to carry cargo. This, however, had not yet 
ensued at the time of the arrest. Furthermore, the judge 
of first instance errs concerning the burden of proof, in 
laying upon the claimant the proof that the chartering to 
Furness, Withy & Co. was not done in the interests of 
the English Government. Moreover, article 55 c of the 
Prize Code is a provision to be strictly interpreted one 
which does not permit of application by analogy. In the 
oral pleading before the superior prize court the claimants 
also contended that unneutral service in the sense of. Unneutral serv-
' 1ce. 
article 55 of the Prize Code, could only be assumed if the 
service to the enemy was voluntary. Such was not the 
case here, however, because the claimant had been com-
pelled to conclude the charter, for only under this con-
dition was their ship released by the English. The im-
perial commissioner before the superior prize court 
denied this contention, and asked that the appeal be 
rejected. 
This petition should be gran ted. 
The judge of the lower court pronounced the con-
demnation of the vessel in accordance 'vith article 55 c of 
the Prize Code, the relevant version of which reads as 
follo,vs: 
"A neutral ship renders unneutral service to the 
enemy if it is chartered by the enemy government." 
rrherefore, the question next presents itself 'vhether 
in the present case chartering by the enemy government 
can be regarded as proved. 'fhe superior prize court 
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does not hesitate to affirm this in common \vith the 
judge of first instance. According to official information 
of. the German Admiralty staff, the English firm, Furness, 
Withy & Co., who concluded the contract of charter 
~ ~ r~~~~\. of Gov· with the claimant, is notoriously an agent of the English 
Government. There is no ground for doubting the 
accuracy of this information; it is, moreover, sub-
stantiated by other circumstances. The contract be-
tween the claimant and the above-named firm \vas 
concluded after the English Government had already 
compelled the ship to sail for six months on her account 
under the English flag. That this in itself involved 
service for the English Government is evidenced by the 
entry in Lloyd's Shipping Register, 1916-17-men-
tioned by the judge of first instance-where against the 
name of the vessel is noted: "Requisitioned by the . 
Admiralty." Only upon an engagement to charter the 
vessel for a considerable time to an English ~.rm \Vas the 
English Government prevailed upon to give up the ship 
to its owners. The presumption that in reality this 
charter was only a mode of continuing the previous 
service on behalf of the English Government is therefore 
not refuted. In addition to this, the charter was en-
tered into principally for trips to France and Italy. 
Since the English Government, as is well kno,vn, has 
undertaken to supply these countries with all the neces-
sities of war, especially with coal, it goes without saying 
that the English Government had an especial interest in 
the acquisition of tonnage for this service. The con-
tentions of the claimant tending to prove that, contrary 
to the assumption of the judge of first instance, in the 
fall of 1916 there was as yet no lack of cargo space in 
England, are not pertinent. Otherwise, charter rate of 
£8,055 a month, or about 2,000,000 marks a year, for a 
ship of 3,208 gross registered tonnage, for \vhich a pur-
chase price of some 300,000 marks was paid in 1914, 
would be utterly inexplicable. 
Such being the state of affairs, one can not but agree 
\Vith the prize court in its assumption that the steamer 
Island was chartered by the English Government. That 
t.he contract was not concluded through an official organ 
of the Government, or in its name, is of no consequence. 
According to the sense and the purpose of the provision 
,)f the Prize Code, it is sufficient ·that the charter \Vas 
FORCE OF CHARTER 
entered into for the account of and in the interests of an 
enemy government. 
The second plea of the claimant is to the effect that 
article 55 c of the Prize Code could have no application 
because at the time of capture the ship 'vas not yet 
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sub]. ect to the terms of the charter, for the latter, accord- t Entefrinhg t into orce o c ar er. 
ing to sections 1 and 26 of the original text of the con-
tract-presented in the court of second instance-was 
only to come into force upon the delivery of the ship 
ready for loading in a port on the east coast of England. 
This is correct to the extent that certainly from the 
point of view of private la\v the charter had not yet 
begun to run; that is to say, that the obligations of the 
firm of Furness, vVithy & Co. toward the claimant only 
began at the time mentioned. This civil la\v point of 
view, however, can not be decisive here. On the contrary, 
the matter stands thus: ~he sttip was engaged upon this 
trip to England in order to fulfill the charter contract, 
i. e., to place itself at the immediate disposition of the 
charterer, arrived at the east coast of England. The 
sole cause and purpose of the voyage was the fulfillment 
of the contract, by which· the ship was thus bound to 
undertake this voyage, too. What the decision would 
be had the vessel been chartered for some future period, 
and at the time of capture had been on a voyage in no 
way connected therewith, an independent, harmless 
carriage of freight, does not need to be discussed. In 
this instance the case is different, and to it article 55 c 
of the Prize Code must be applied. The pertinent sec-
tion of the Prize Code concerns itself with direct unneu-
tral service. The article mentioned deals specifically 
with service rendered the enemy government by furnish-
ing cargo space. The declared purpose of article 55 c is, 
t~en, to prevent the increase of enemy tonnage through 
the charter of neutral ships. Regarded from this point 
of view, the unneutral service in the present instance had 
already begun when the steame:r Island left in ballast for 
England, there to fulfill the terms of the charter. 
It is impossible to expect of a belligerent po\ver that it 
should release a ship chartered to its enemy 'vhich had 
fallen into its hands while on the way to assume the obli-
gations of the charter, because in the private-lu\V sense 
the charter contract had not yet begun to run. 'fhus 
the conclusion of the judge of first instance is to be 
assented to, even though his assu1nption that the charter 
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contract was already running at the time of the arrest 
of the Island proved incorrect in view of proofs produced 
in the court of second instance. 
Whereas, finally, the plaintiff contends that unneutral 
service was not involved, because he was forced into the 
contract with the English firm, that does not follow. 
The superior prize court has already repeatedly taken a 
position in the negative (cf. the Kiew) on the question 
whether it is of importance that an act of which cogni-
zance is taken in prize law be committed under the 
influence of psychological compulsion. As it was con-
sidered in the last-mentioned decision sufficient proof of 
enemy destination that the goods were on their way to 
enemy territory, knowingly and intentionally-even if 
under the influence of coercion-so, in this case, it must 
suffice that the ship was chartered for the English Gov-
ernment, even if the conclusion of the contract may not 
oi': 
have resulted from a spontaneous decision of the owners. 
Moreover, in this case, the chartering did represent the 
desire of the owners. They could have declined to con-
clude the contract had they been willing to forego a 
profit which was only to be attained by unneutral service. 
As, therefore, the condemnation of the vessel was rightly 
decreed by the judge of first instance, and therefore no 
question of compensation for the plaintiff is at issue, at 
the same time as the decision of the main point, the 
further complaint of the plaintiff, against the evaluation 
made by the judge of first instance, can be held to have 
Condemnation been disposed of without opposition. The judgment is 
affirmed. therefore affirn1ed; costs to be decided according to 
section 37 of the prize court rules. 
THE "DRAUPNER" 
June 27, 1918 
(2 Entscbeidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 62) 
In the prize matter concerning the N or,vegian steamer 
Draupner, home port Bergen, the imperial superior prize 
court in Berlin, in its session of June 27, 1918, decided: 
On the appeal of the o"\vners the decree of February 
22, 1918, of the imperial prize court in Hamburg is 
altered to this extent: The destruction of the ship is 
declared to have been illegal and hence the claim of the 
owners to compensation is legitimate. For the deter-
THE DRAUPNER 
mination of the amount of the claim, the matter will be 
remanded to the court of first instance. The decision 
concerning the costs of the O\vners' appeal is reserved. 
The appeal of the War Risk Insurance Co. for Norwegian 
Ships is dismissed with costs. 
Reasons: 
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On November 30, 1916, the :Norwegian steamer tb~tr~~~~ent of 
Draupne1'', in ballast from St. N azaire to Cardiff, \Vas 
brought to by a German submarine and destroyed. The 
ship '.Vas tirne chartered to the_ French coal firm, Com- Charter. 
pagnie de Charbons de Blanzy et de l'Ouest, in Nantes. 
The charter dated fron1 August 7, 1915, and was re-
peatedly extended, the last time on August 9, 1.916, until 
the end of January, 1917. Under the charter, the ship 
had been employed exclusively in the coal transportation 
service between England and France, and was at the 
time when it was sunk returning from such a voyage to 
reload in England. According to the official report, 
destruction ensued because, although ostensibly the ship 
was chartered by a private firm, in reality this firm was 
only a go-between for the English Government, which 
had secured complete disposition of the vessel in order 
to make use of it in fulfilling its obligation to deliver coal 
to France. The private firm served only to veil the 
real facts, in order to circumvent the provisions of article 
55 c of the Prize Code. 
,...,h · · 1 · · H b h ld h d Judgment of 
.1. e Imperia prize court Ill am urg e t e estruc- Hamburg prize 
tion of the ship valid and dismissed the claim of the court. 
owners on account of the vessel, as well as that of the 
War Risk Insurance Co. for N or,vegian Ships on account 
of the effects and wages of the crew. The decision is 
based upon article 55 c of the Prize Code, according to 
which unneutral service exists if the vessel is chartered 
by an enemy government. It is notorious, so it \Vas 
declared, that England had obligated herself to supply 
coal to France and Italy, and it is well known that with-
out permission of the authorities in England no ves.sel 
may clear from an English port. Ho\V important a part 
coal plays in the present war needs no further elucidation. 
Even if it was effected between private firms on both 
sides, the supply of coal to France and Italy could only 
take place with the consent of the English Government, 
which, with every load, so far acquitted itself of the 
obligation it had assumed. All this \Vas likewise kno\vn 
to and desired by the neutral O\vners, \vho, by corrections 
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in the original draft of the charter, had expressly revealed 
themselves privy to the fact that goods "\Vere to be 
included in the cargo which would lay the vessel open to 
seizure by the German forces. For such a situation the 
provisions of article 55 c of the Prize Code seem to have 
been made. During a war it is not likely that an enemy 
government will itself charter a vessel. They 'vill, 
rather, employ private individuals for that, as was custom-
ary even before the London conference in the Russo-
J apanese War, as regards the relations between the 
L~~~~~ation orRussian Government and German shipo"\vners. There-
fore, under "chartering," in article 46 of the Declaration 
of Londo.n, to which article 55 c of the Prize Code con-
forms, reference can not be made only to the instances 
when the government appears itself as the charterer, 
but to all cases where the ship is placed at the disposal 
of the enemy government by means of the charter party, 
and the neutral owner knew and intended this. 
The appeal 'of the owners entered against this decision 
appears to be well founded. 
The claimants appeal in the first place to article 112 
of the Prize Code. They contended, and in this court 
have again reverted to the contention that, according 
Destruction or to article 112, section 2, the destruction of a neutral ship 
neutral vesseh for unneu tral service might only be effected if certainty 
existed that the fact could be proved before the prize 
court, and hence, that if the evidence which the ship's 
officer had at his command left room for doubt, the 
destruction must be held illegal and the claim for com-
pensation allowed, even if later in the proceedings before 
the prize court, the fact of unneutral service was proved. 
· The prize court was right in rejecting that contention. 
It requires no further argument that the Prize Code 
could not have intended any such contradictory provision. 
Article 112, section 2, of the Prize Code is not ambiguous. 
Its sole purpose is to keep before the mind of the com-
mander what important consequences his decision may 
have, and "\vhat he must keep especially in view before 
he proceeds with the destruction. The judge of the 
Oontinuousfirst instance also raises the question whether the voyage 
voyage. f h h' d · l . h b o t e s 1p oes not 1nvo ve a continuous voyage "\V ere y 
the trip in ballast would be part of the carriage of the 
coal. He leaves it undecided "\vhether even in this case 
the capture, and the final destruction, can not be justi-
fied. Ho,vever, the suggestion must be thrown out. 
GOVERNMENT C'HARTER 
For even if one wishes to regard it from the point of 
view of carriage of contraband, one would be forced 
to admit that capture can no more take place on the 
ground of a complete carriage than on the ground of one 
merely contemplated but not yet begun. Therefore, 
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only the actual stipuiations of article 55 c come under 0~;!!~~ 5~~i~e 1 
consideration. The provision required-in the form in Code, 
'vhich it applied at the time the ship was captured-that 
the vessel be chartered by the enemy government. 
That in the meantime the law has been changed so that 
it suffices for the vessel to have undertaken the voyage in 
the interest of the enemy's conduct of the war, can not 
be regarded by the prize court, which incidentally draws 
no inferences from the fact, as a merely interpretive 
explanation. On the contrary, a new and essentially 
more comprehensive provision is established along with 
the former. Moreover, it must be observed that, so 
far as concerns the original version, which corresponds 
"rith the Declaration of London, the definite limitation 
of the general notion which is to be found also in section 
c is to be referred to the instigation of the German repre-
sentative at London. Just on this point he opposed the 
more general and elastic wording of the proposition of 
the English. Nor can anything be concluded from that 
fact that the English text of the Declaration of London, 
instead of speaking of "chartered" vessels, speaks of 
those in the "employment" of the government. The 
French is the official text, and the more elastic expression 
of the English translation is to be referred to it for its 
true meaning. 
At all events, it is correct to say that it makes no 
difference whether the government be named in the 
charter as a party to the contract, "'~hether the former 
be drawn up in '\Vriting or agreed to by 'vord of mouth. 
On that principle the superior prize court has already 
rendered a decision-the Island. Other,vise the pro-
vision wrould be meaningless in practice. For there is 
nothing easier than to find private concerns "~ho are ready 
to enter, ostensibly as contractants, into a charter party 
'vhich is really being concluded for the government. It 
must suffice that the vessel be placed at the disposition 
of the government as fully as if it had itself chartered 
her. 
So far the reasoning of the decision fron1 'vhich appeal 
is taken may be followed. On the other hand, there is 
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no ground for the assumption that the circumstances 
of the present case correspond with the fundamental 
requirement. 
Deliveries of It · f 11 k - th t th E I" h G coal to France IS, 0 COUrse, We no\\ n a e ng IS OVern-
and Italy. merit has pledged itself to deliver stipulated quantities 
of coal to France and Italy. From this it may at once 
be concluded that the supply of this coal is dependent 
upon an extensive control on the part of the English 
Government. But contract of this sort may be exercised 
v1ithout the Government necessarily taking the exporta-
tions directly into its o\vn hands. There is no support 
for the contention that one had entered into the execu-
tion of a Government operation in England on this 
behalf. When it is reported that in the countries of 
destination-France and Italy-comrnittees ,,-ere to 
be for1ned to distribute the necessary amount of coal in 
the different districts, and like,vise in England com-
mittees to insure the equal distribution of the orders; 
if, moreover, fixed prices for the coal and fixed maximum 
rates for the freight \Vere established; \vhen, further-
more, the English Government reserves to itself the 
sanction of every single charter party to be conclude~ 
with a Norwegian shipowner, that all tends to prove 
that in regard to the supply of coal to France and Italy, 
the free traffic of the open freight market, even if strictly 
controlled and more or less limited, is in no ·wise excluded, 
and that the conveyance of the coal was not accom-
plished directly by the Government itself. Moreover, 
it must be considered that the present case concerns 
itself with a charter agreement "rith \vhich no English 
firm was concerned at all, one which, on the contrary, 
'vas concluded directly between the French importer 
and the Norwegian shipovrner. 
It is not denied that our interests in the conduct of 
the \Var demanded that we combat this coal transporta-
tion by all the means at our disposal. The proposition 
that wars are only carried on against the military forces 
of the States involved in war no longer holds to-day· 
At all events, it does not hold of the present 'var, upon 
which the stamp of the English method of conducting 
\var has been more and lnore impressed. In addition to 
the direct employmen.t of armed forces, all possible 
means of \Veakening the economic life . of the enemy 
countries are employed as 1neasures of \Var, and, to that 
extent, one is "rarranted in saying that every ship taking 
WAGES 
coal to France or Italy is opposing the purpose of our 
conduct of the "rar and supporting that of our enemy. 
The application of this theory to the administration of 
justice finds its limits at the point where positive legal 
axio1ns are encountere~. On these and their observance 
the neutral must be able to rely, if faith in la\v and 
justice is not to be deceived and shattered. Even if 
the greater severity which the Prize Code assumed 
by the ne\V version of article 55 c was vvarrantable, it 
still remains true that it can not be applied to a time at 
\Yhich it \Vas not yet in force. 
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Thus the detention of the vessel is proved unjustifiable, 
and the appeal of the o\vner succeeds. 
0 h h h d l l . f h . Claim of in· n t e ot er an , t 1e c aim o t e Insurance company surance com· 
for \vages and effects of the crew \Vas correctly denied. pany. 
In the first place, it is insufficiently supported by the 
claimants in that a policy has neither been presented 
nor even an allegation set up as to who the insured is or 
are, \vhose rights the claimant is prosecuting before the 
prize court. The claiin on behalf of V{ages lost is further Wages. 
opposed by the consideration that it is not clear what 
wages are involved. If it is the vvages for the current 
voyage and if, as is to be assumed by the statement of 
the owners and from the claims asserted by them, the 
freight was paid in advance, then the amount of the 
\Vages \vill be made good from the compensation for the 
freight, which amount the owners may on no account 
retain for themselves. According to the assertion now 
made by the claimant, which has been verified by docu-
mentary evidence, it must be borne in mind that, con-
cerning the wages as well as the effects, it is not a ques-
tion of real insurance and of indemnification for an actual 
loss vvhich gives the measure of the amount of damages. 
On the contrary, the claims are made in virtue of a 
la\V-\vhich \Vas unmistakably proinulgated to counteract 
the aversion of sailors to service on board ship, which has 
become very dangerous-to give to every member of the 
cre"r, officers as well as men, a definite sum, figured in 
round numbers, upon the loss of their vessel, 'vithout 
regard to \Vhether wages and effects had actually been 
lost, and if so, to what extent. 
Compensation for such performances can certainly not 
be demanded. Granted that the capturing State is 
bound according to prize la\v to make compensation for 
damages, it only has to compensate for losses 'vhieh have 
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actually occurred. But there can not be included in 
that the expenses that a third party-here, the State-
grants to those who '\Vere involved in the affair, without 
regard to whether damages have occurred or not and 
ho'\V high they run. 
Therefore the judgment is affir~ed. 
THE ''ESPERANZA'' 
June 27, 1918 
(2 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 169) 
In the prize matter concerning the Norwegian steamer 
Esperanza, home port Tonsberg, the imperial superior 
prize court in Berlin in its session of June 27, 1918r 
decided: 
The appeal against the judgment of the imperial prize 
court in Hamburg of February 22, 1918, is dismissed with 
costs. 
Reasons: 
fa~t.atement ot On January 15, 1917, theN orwegian steamer Esperanza,. 
in ballast from Spezia to Barry, was brought to and sunk 
by a German submarine. The ship was chartered to the 
firm of Furness, Withy & Co. for 12 months under date of 
February 4, 1916, and had carried coal to Italy. She 
was on the return voyage to England to take on a nH\V 
cargo of coal. Appeal is brought by the owners for the· 
ship, equipment, and expenses of repatriating the crew 
and by the War Risk Insurance Co. for N or'\vegian Ships 
for the lost wages and effects of the crew. 
Decision.of The imperial prize court in Hamburg held that the 
Hamburg pnze 
court. destruction of the ship was legal and dismissed the 
claims. The ae~ision is based on article 55 c of the Prize 
Code, according to which one is guilty of unneu tral service 
if the vessel is chartered by an enemy government. It. 
is notorious, so it '\Vas said, that England had assumed 
supply of coal the obligation of delivering coal to Italy and France, and 
to France and · · kn h · h · · f 1 1 · t' · lta1y. It Is own t at Wit out permission o t 1e aut 10ri Ies Ill 
England no ship might leave an English harbor. What 
an important role coal plays in the present '\Var does not 
need to be expatiated upon. 'rhe supplying of coal to. 
France and Italy, even if it '\Vas effected bet'\\reen private 
concerns, could only take place '\Vith the permission of 
the English Government, '\Vhich, 'vith each delivery,. 
acquitted itself to that extent of the obligation it had 
TIIE ES.PERANZA 
assumed. The neutral owners kne'v and intended this, 
for by corrections in the draft of the charter they ex-
plicitly declared that they understood that goods 'vere 
to. form the cargo which 'vould lay the vessel open to 
the danger of capture by the German forces. Such a 
case is provided for by the provisions of article 55 c of 
the Prize Code. It is unlikely in war that an enemy 
goverpment should itself charter the vessel; it 'viii rather 
employ private individuals for that, as v;as the custom 
even before the London conference in the Jlusso-J apanese 
War in the relations existing bet,veen the Russian Gov-
ernment and German shipowners. In article 46 of the 
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Declaration of London, to w,.hich article 55 c of the Prize Lg~~~~ation o·f 
Code conforms, under the head of "chartering" refer-
ence must be made, not only to the case where the Gov-
ernment itself appears as charterer, but to all those 
instances in 'vhich the vessel is at the disposal of the 
enemey government and the neutral owners kno'v and 
desire it. 
'rhe appeal of the claimants entered against this judg-
ment fails. In his conclusion the judge of first instance 
must be upheld, even if the deductions in the grounds 
for the decision can not ahvays be considered correct. 
If at the time of capture article 55 c of the Prize Code a!~t~l~n55:iri~: 
had already been in force in the form 'vhich it acquired Code. 
by the ordinance of July 29, 1917, the decision 'vould be 
rendered without further ado. For it is not contested 
that the vessel was on a voyage from and to enemy terri-
tory and 'vas chartered by an enemy subject. One 
Yrould have to assur.a.e, therefore-as the facts do not 
gainsay the assumption, of 'vhich more later-that the 
vessel had set sail "in the interests of the enemy's con-
duct of the 'var." But the la'v did not yet read thus when 
the Esperanza 'vas destroyed, and the judge of first in-
stance can not be concurred 'vith in assuming that the 
supplementary la'v of July 29, 1917, did not add any-
thing ne,v, but \\.,.as rather a commentary on the la'v 
already in force. One n1ust not forget that article 55 c 
of the Prize Code, like its prototype article 46 of the 
Declaration of London, set itself the task of circum-
scribing the uncertain and vague conception of unneutral 
service. When, under section c it is specified that the 
ship be "chartered by the enemy government" one Chn rt or to.. 
. . ' enemy govern-
may Indeed say that every vessel so chartered IS sailing mcnt. 
in the interest of enemy conduct of the 'var. But it 
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'\Von't do at all simply to transpose the sentence. On 
the other hand, it is quite correct that it can make no 
difference whether the enemy government is designated 
in the contract of charter as the charterer, or "\Vhether 
it appears at all as party to the contract. The provi-
sion 'Nould other'\vise be without practical significance, 
for if an enemy government "\Vishes to secure for itself 
the disposition of a merchant vessel, "\Vithout this. fact 
appearing, nothing is easier than for it to employ a 
go-bet\veen for .this purpose, who puts himself forw·ard 
in place of the government in the role of charterer. In 
the sense of the provision of the law it must suffice that 
the government has in fact secured that control over 
the vessel that it would have procured by a contract of 
charter concluded directly with the ovlner. 
In the cases of the Draupner, Asta, and Saga, decided 
at the same time as the present case, where the capture 
and destruction of the vessels took place under appar-
ently similar circumstances, the court refused to affirm 
the condemnation. Here, on the contrary, the parti-
cular circumstances lead to a contrary decision. 
The Draupner and the Astra were chartered directly 
by the Norwegian owners to French coal companies, who 
were outside the immediate sphere of power of England, 
and the Saga was admittedly chartered by an English 
firm, but nothing was known of the latter's connection 
with the Government. Moreover, this firm had sub-
chartered the vessel to different firms for the current 
and several previous voyages, and that not only for the 
transport of coal. The Esperanza, on the other hand, 
was leased to the firm of Furness, Withy & Co., in 
London, whose relation to the English Government has 
already come to the knowledge of the court in the prize 
matter of the Island. 
The Island. In that case, too, it "\Vas a neutral ship that "\Vas char-
tered by the above-n1entioned firm, and it "\Vas evident 
from the accompanying circumstances that it "\Vas a 
question only of the execution of a demand for the ship 
made by the Government in this form. The relation of 
this firm to the English Governn1ent, "\vhich can be 
deduced from the above, is fully elucidated by an incident 
in the English I-Iouse of Commons, of \vhich a report is 
given in No. 1756 of "Fairplay" for April 5, 1917. 
According to it, upon a question being raised in Parlia-
ment concerning ru1nors of excessive '\Var profits of ship-
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owners, and of the very firm in question, the latter was 
protected by the Government representative. He 
explained that" during the period August, 1914, to March 
15, 1917, many neutral vessels have been chartered by 
Furness, Withy & Co. on behalf of His Majesty's Gov-
ernment;'' that the Government had never paid even a 
commission to the firm. On the contrary, that even such 
commission as they draw from foreign shipowners they 
place to the credit of the Government and that the 
Government is glad to seize the opportunity to express 
its thanks to the company "for their ungrudging and 
invaluable services." So in the present case, in the charter 
concluded with the owners, Furness, Withy & Co. have 
arranged for a commission of 272 per cent for themselves 
as intermediary which, it is to be assumed from this 
explanation of the English Government representative, 
has also been placed to the credit of the English Govern-
ment. Further light is shed upon the facts and law of 
the case by the correspondence of the firm with the 
captain, which was found among the ship's papers. It 
was addressed to Palermo, and directed the captain to 
deliver up his cargo to the Italian Government if the 
consignee should not be on the spot, as they were covered 
against claims for recovery which might be preferred by 
the rightful possessors of the bills of lading. Accordingly, 
the charterer was in a position to deliver his entire cargo 
of coal to the Italian Government without regard to the 
possessor of the bill of lading, a fact which shows unmis-
takably that on the English side as well it was a question 
of a transaction of the . Government. 
In view of all this, there can be no doubt that the 
firm, Furness, Withy & Co., was only concerned in the 
matter as an organ of the English Government, and 
that the latter had the same power of disposition over 
the vessel as if it had itself concluded the charter. Ac-
cording to what has been said above, the requirement 
of article 55 c of the Prize Code seems to be fulfilled. 
The vessel 'vas, therefore, legally captured, and as a 
sequel destroyed. 
The claimants rely upon article 112 of the Prize Destruction or 
• neutral vessPls 
Code. In the court of first Instance they con tended, 
and have reverted to the contention in this court, tha.t 
according to article 112, section 2, of the Prize Code, 
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may only take place when certainty exists that the fact 
can be proved before the prize court, and hence, if the 
evidence at the command of the ship's officer still left 
room for doubt, the destruction of the prize must be 
declared illegal and indemnity allowed, even if in the 
proceedings before the prize court the fact of unneutral 
service is proved. The prize court was right in dis-
missing that contention. Article .. 112, section 2, is not. 
ambiguous. Its sole purpose is to remind the com-
mander what serious consequences his decision may 
have, and what he must especially aim at before pro-
ceeding to the destruction . 
. So far as concerns the appeal of the War Risk In-
surance Co. for Norwegian Ships on account of lost 
property and wages of the crew, this appeal also fails if 
for no other reason than that article 115 of the Prize 
Code, upon which the claimant relies, only provides 
indemnity for neutral cargo. 
For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed. 
THE "SYLVAN ARROW" 
([1923], p. 220) 
Shipping-Collision-Ship under Government requisition-Officers 
and crew servants of Government-Action in rem for collision 
damage-Whether maritime lien attaches after ship released from 
requisition. 
While under requisition by, and manned and operated by, the 
United States Government, the defendants~ steamship was in 
collision with and did damage to the plaintiffs' steamship. 
After the vessel had been released .from requisition the plain-
tiffs commenced an action in rem for their ~ollision damage. 
In that action the defendants pleaded (inter alia) that "at 
the time when the collision is alleged to have taken place the 
Sylvan Arrow was under requisition by and under the sole 
control and management of the Government of the United 
States and was being navigated by persons who were the 
servants of the said Government and for whose negligence 
the defendants were and are in no wise responsible. * * * 
The defendants say that the action is not maintainable in 
rem by reason of the facts set out" above. On the hearing of 
this question as a preliminary point of law: 
Held, on the facts, that the defendants had surrendered their vessel to 
the United States Government under compulsion, that in no 
sense could it be said that the master and crew derived their 
authority from the defendants, and that in the circumstances 
no maritime lien attached to the vessel by reason of the col-
lision and her owners were not, either through their vessel or 
otherwise, liable .to the plaintiffs. 
T'HE SYLVAN ARROW 
Quaere, as to where an owner voluntarily places his vessel in the 
possession and control of charterers or other persons, whether 
The Lemington ([1874] 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475) was correctly 
decided, having regard to the principles laid down in The 
Parlement Belge ([1880] 5 P. D. 197, 218) and other cases. 
Action of damage by collision. 
The plaintiffs were the owners of the steamship W. · I. 
Radcliffe. 
The defendants were the owners of the steamship or 
vessel Sylvan Arrow. 
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On December 1, 1918, a collision was alleged to have, ststatement o( 
&8C • 
taken place in New York Harbor between the plaintiffs' 
steamship W. I. Radcl1jfe and the defendants' steamship 
Sylvan Arrow. The Sylvan Arrow, a vessel owned by 
the Standard Transportation Co., an American corpora-
tion, vvas at the time of the alleged collision admittedly 
manned and operated by officers and men appointed by 
the United States Navy Department, under a form of 
requisition charter entered into between the owners and 
the United States Government, pursuant to an order of 
requisition dated December 29, 1917. On July 6, 1922, 
after the Sylvan Arrow had been returned to her owners, 
the owners of the W. I. Radcliffe commenced the present 
action in rem against the Sylvan ... 4rrow, and although the 
two years allowed by the maritime conventions act, 1911, 
for the commencement of actions had expired, they ob-
tained the leave of the court to maintain their suit. By 
their defense of that action the owners of the Sylvan 
Arrow pleaded that they had no knowledge or information 
of the alleged or any collision between the Sylvan Arrow 
and the W. I. Radcliffe)· that "(2) alternatively if any 
collision took place between the W. I. Radcl~tfe and 
Sylvan Arrow, which the defendants do not admit, the 
defendants deny that the collision and damage mentioned 
in the statement of claim were caused or contributed to 
by the alleged or any negligence on the part of them-
selves or their servants. At the time when the said col-
lision is alleged to have taken place the Sylpan A rro117 
was under requisition by and under the sole control and 
management of the Government of the United States 
and was being navigated by persons who were the servants 
of the said Government and for whose negligence the 
defendants were and are in no wise ·responsible. * * * 
(4) The defendants say that the action is not maintainable 
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The question of law so raised was argued as a prelimi-
nary point. 
for Raeburn, K. C., and Dumas for the defendants: All the 
old cases dealing with this matter are to be found sum-
marized in the judgment of Gorell Barnes, J., in The 
Ripon Oity.65 In every case where the owner has been 
found liable for damage done by his ship while she was in 
the possession and control of other persons it has been 
because the owner has voluntarily parted "\vith the posses-
sion and control of the vessel to those other persons, and 
those who have been guilty of the negligence must be 
deemed to have derived their authority fron1 the owner. 
The owner would be liable even if he had handed over the 
vessel to charterers under a demise charter, which put it 
out of his power to choose the master and crew, if he had 
entered into the charter voluntarily. Here there was not 
a voluntary surrender but a compulsory taking by the 
United States Government. You can not imply the 
owner's authority, and therefore no maritime lien at-
taches to the vessel and her owner is not liable. 
for Dunlop, K. C., and Ballock for the plaintiffs: The Docu-
ments establish that the notice of requisition was never 
acted upon and that at the date of the collision, the Sylvan 
Arrow was in the possession of the American Government 
as charterers by demise, under a charter party dated 
December 29, 1917, and an agreement made on July 15, 
1918. It was from the charter party and agreement that 
the American Government derived their authority and 
not from the order of requisition. There is no evidence 
that the Government had any power to compel the owners 
to enter into the said charter party and agreement, or 
that the vessel was handed over under any compulsion. 
Instead of requisitioning the vessel the Government pre-
ferred to make a voluntary agreement for hire. It is none 
the less voluntary because, if the defendants had not 
agreed, the Government had power to take the vessel by 
a totally different proceeding. There is no suggestion in 
the defendants' affidavits that they entered into the 
agreement because they had been served "\Vith a re-
quisition order. All they say is that they entered into a 
requisition charter, and for all the evidence to the con-
trary that charter may have been entered into at the 
owners' request. The return of the vessel is not. a release 
from a requisition order but a redelivery from a requi-
115 [1897] p . 226. 
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sition charter. If- the owners have voluntarily given the 
charterer the option of putting his own cre'v on board 
and exercising sole control of the navigation, the crew are 
deemed to have derived their authority from the owners 
through the charter, and a maritime lien attaches to the 
vessel for damage occasioned by the negligence of the 
crew: See The Lemington/6 the judgment in which case 
was approved by Gorell Barnes, J., in The Ripon Oity.67 
[They also referred to The Edwin 68 and The Tervaete. 69] 
Raeburn, K. C., in reply: The chain of cases which in-
clude The Ticonderoga 70 ; The Lemington 66 ; The Tas-
mania 71 ; and The Ripon City 67 would seem to have 
gro,vn up before it was fully appreciated that the liability 
of the ship and the liability of the owner must march 
together; see, moreover, The Parlement Belge 7 and The 
Utopia.72 The compulsion was to give up the possession 
of the ship under the requisition order. The agreement 
was merely as to the terms of the requisition. 
July 16. HILL, J.: On December 1, 1918, the plaintiffs? 
steamship, the W. I. Radcliffe, and the defendants' 
steamship, the Sylvan Arrow, were in collision in New 
York Harbor. The Sylvan Arrow was then, and still is, 
owned by the defendants, the Standard Transportation 
Co., a private corporation, registered under the laws of 
the State of Delaware. It. is admitted, and clearly ap-
pears from the affidavits put in, that at the time of the 
collision the master and crew of the Sylvan Arrow were 
the servants not of the defendants but of the American 
Government, appointed, employed, and controlled by 
the Navy Department. The issue now to be determined 
is whether, assuming the collision to have been caused 
by the negligence of those in charge of the Sylvan Arrow, 
any maritime lien attached to the Sylvan Arrow, and 
whether by reason of such lien the defendants can be 
proceeded against by writ in rem against the ship. The 
defendants raise this question by paragraph 2 of the 
defense: "The Sylvan Arrow 'vas under requisition by Requisition . 
and under the sole control and management of the Gov-
ernment of the United States and '\Vas being navigated by 
persons \vho were the servants of the said Government 
and for '\vhose negligence the defendants 'vcre and arc in 
no,vise responsible." The plaintiffs argued that this did 
7 5 P. D.l79. 
66 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475. 
67 [1897] p. 226. 
6E (1864) Br. & Lush. 281. 
og [1922] P. 259. 
iO (1857) Swn. 215. 
71 (1888) 13 P. D. 110. 
72 [1893] A. C. 492. 
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not truly represent the facts and that the facts should be 
stated thus: "The Sylvan Arrow 'vas chartered by the 
defendants as owners to the Government of the United 
States under a charter party operating as a demise and 
was therefore under the sole control and management of 
the Government of the United States and was being navi-
gated by persons who were servants of the said Govern-
ment and for whose negligence the defendants were and 
are in nowise personally responsible." The plaintiffs 
contend that upon those facts the ship became subject 
to a maritime lien, and that an action can be maintained 
to enforce it. They rely, of course, upon The Leming-
ton 66-a decision of Sir Robert Phillimore in 1874-and 
the dicta in The Ticonderoga 73-Doctor Lushington, 1857 
and The Tasmania 74 (Sir James Hannen, 1888) and The 
Ripon City 67 (Gorell Barnes, J.). Some day, and prob-
ably by a higher court, The Lemington 66 and tho.se dicta 
and the contrary dictum of Doctor Lushington in The 
Druid 75 ;,vill have to be considered in the light of the 
principles .so clearly laid down by the court of appeal 
in The Parlement Belge 76 by the House of Lords in The 
Gastlegate 77 and by the privy council in The Utopia. 78 
The general principle is thus stated in The Utopia: 79 
" The foundation of the lien is the negligence of the 
owners or their servants at the time of the collision, and 
if that be not proved no lien comes into existence, and 
the ship is no more liable than any other property which 
the owners at the time of collision may have possessed. 
In the recent case of The Gastlegate 77 * * * lan-
guage used by the present master of the rolls in The 
Parlement Belge 76 which expresses the above vie,v, was 
quoted with an approval which their lordships desire to 
repeat." What Brett, L. J., said was: "Though the 
ship has been in collision and has caused injury by reason 
of the negligence or want of skill of those in charge of her, 
yet she can not be made the means of compensation if 
those in charge of her were not the servants of her then 
owner, as if she was in charge of a compulsory pilot." 
In The Gastlegate 77 Lord Watson stated the principle of 
the maritime law to be that "inasmuch as every pro-
ceeding in rem is in substa_nce a proceeding agninst the 
66 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475. 
fl7 [1897] p. 226. 
73 Swa. 215. 
;4 13 P. D. 110. 
76 (1842) 1 " •. Rob. 391. 
76 5 P. D. 197, 218. 
77 [1893] A. C. 38, 52. 
78 [1893] A. C. 492, 497, 499. 
7o 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475, 478. 
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owner of the ship a proper maritime lien must have its 
root in his personal liability." He then refers to damage 
actions (The Le1nington 66 and The Ticonderoga 73 had been 
cited) and says; "It was argued that the case of lien for 
damages by collision furnishes another exception to the 
general rule, and there are decisions and dicta which 
point in that direction; but these authorities are hardly 
reconcilable with the judgment of Doctor Lushington in 
The Dru.id 75 or with the law laid down by the court of 
appeal in The Parlement Belge,1 '' and he then quotes 
Brett, L. J. But it may be that for me, The Lemington/9 
which is a direct decision, is the governing authority. 
Let us see what the decision in that case and the dicta 
in the other cases come to. If they are law, they make 
an exception to the general rule. What precisely is the 
exception~ In The Ticonderoga 80 the observations of ooihe 
Doctor Lushington appear to me to be clearly obiter. 
In that case it does not appear that the master and crew 
were appointed or paid by the charterers-the French 
Government-but only that the ship was under the orders 
of the charterers, ''in the service of the French Govern-
ment." In the course of his judgment he said: "I am 
not aware, where there has been any proceeding in rem, 
and the vessel so proceeded against has been clearly 
guilty of damage, that any attempt has been made in 
this court to deprive the party complaining of the right 
he has by the maritime law of the world of proceeding 
against the property itself. Supposing a vessel is char-
tered so that the owners have divested thelnselves, for a 
pecuniary consideration, of all power, right, and author-
ity over the vessel for a given time, and have left to the 
charterers the appointment of the master and cre\v, and 
suppose in that case the vessel had done damage, and 
was proceeded against in this court-! will admit, for 
the purposes of argument, that the charterers, and not 
the owners, would be responsible elsewhere, although I 
give no opinion upon that point-but still I should 
here say to the parties who had received the damage, 
that they had, by the maritime la'v of nations, a remedy 
against the ship itself." Then he goes on to contrast the 
case of a pilot by compulsion. 'I'he next case is Tlie 
7 5 P. D. 197. 
ee 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475. 
73 ewa. 215. 
75 (1842) 1 \V. Rob. 391. 
v 2 Asp. M. C. L. 47.5, 478. 
b wa. 215, 217. 
95 
Ticonder • 
96 VESSELS: OWNERSHIP, CHARTER, AND SERVICE 
The Lemington. Lemington,'9 in which Sir Robert Phillimore said: "I 
think the la 'v was correct! y laid do,vn by Doctor Lush-
incrton * * * in the case of The Ticonderoga·" 73 
b ' 
and he went on: "A vessel placed by its real o'vners 
wholly in the control of charterers or hirers, and employed 
by the latter for the lawful purposes of the hiring, is held 
by the charterers as pro hac vice owners.· Damage 
'vrongfully done by the res whilst in possession of the 
charterers is, therefore, damage done by the 'o'vners' or 
their servants, although those owners may be only tem-
porary. Vessels suffering damage from a chartered ship 
are entitled prima facie to a maritime lien upon that ship, 
and look to the res as security for restitution. I can not 
see how the owners of the res can take away that security 
by having -temporarily transferred the possession to 
third parties. A maritime lien attaches to a ship for 
damage done, through the negligence of those in charge 
Maritimelien. of her, in whosesoever possession she may be, if that 
damage is inflicted by her whilst in the course of her 
ordinary and la,vful employment, authorized by her 
owners. Whether the damage is done through the de-
fault of the servants of the actual owners, or of the serv-
ants of the chartering owners, the res is equally respon-
sible, provided that the servant making default is not 
acting unlawfully, or out of the scope of his authority." 
It will be observed that in both those cases-! am not 
quite sure that it does not color much of the earlier judg-
ments in this matter-the ship is spoken of as being "the 
guilty party." The next case is The Tasmania, 81 in 
which Sir James Hannen reviewed the cases; and in 
The Ripon Oity 82 Gorell Barnes, J., expressed the 
opinion that The Lemington 79 was rightly decided. 
Speaking of The Parlement Belge, 7 and the dicta I have 
referred to, he said: "I am convinced that the judges 
did not intend to decide that in no circumstances can a 
maritime lien be obtained unless the o'vners of the res 
are personally liable in respect of the claim. It will be 
found, in accordance with modern principles and author-
ities, that there are certain cases in 'vhich a maritime 
lien may exist and be enforced against the property of 
7 5 P. D. 197. 
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persons not personally liable for the claim, and who are 
not the persons 'vho, or whose servants, have required the 
service or done the damage." A little later, speaking of 
a maritime lien, he says: " This right must, therefore, in 
some way have been derived from the owner either di-
rectly or through the acts of persons deriving their 
authority from the owner." Then he considers the case 
of a chartered ship: "The principle upon which o'vners 
'vho have handed over the possession and control of a 
vessel to charterers, and upon which mortgagees and 
others interested in her 'vho have allowed the owners to 
remain in possession are liable to have their property 
takeq. to satisfy claims in respect of matters 'vhich give 
rise to maritime liens, may, in my opinion, be deduced 
from the general principles I have above stated and thus 
expressed. As maritime liens are recognized by law, 
persons who are allowed by those interested in a vessel to 
have possession of her .for the purpose of using or employ-
ing her in the ordinary manner, must be deemed to have 
received authority from those interested in her to sub-
ject the vessel to claims in respect of which maritime 
liens may attach to her arising out of matters occurring 
in the ordinary course of her use or employment, unless 
the parties have so acted towards each other that the 
party asserting the lien is not entitled to rely on such pre-
sumed authority. In my opinion, it is right in principle 
and only reasonable, in order to secure prudent naviga-
tion, that third persons whose property is damaged by 
negligence in the navigation of a vessel by those in charge 
of her should not be deprived of the security of the ves-
sel by arrangement between the persons interested in 
her and those in possession of her. * * * The persons 
in teres ted in a vessel in placing her in the possession and 
control of other persons, to be used or employed in the 
ordinary way, must contemplate that claims may arise 
against her in respect of rights given by the maritime la,v, 
and may be taken to have authorized those persons to 
subject the vessel to those claims." 
In these cases it will be seen that the liability of the 
ship and of the owner through the ship is based upon the 
fact that the negligent persons "derived their authority 
from the owner" and that "the owner placed the ship 
in the possession and control of other persons to be used 
and employed in the ordinary way"; and that ''char-
terers in whom the control of the ship has been vested 
33474-25t-8 
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hy the owners are deemed to have derived their authority 
from the owners so as to make the ship liable for the 
negligence of the charterers who are pro hac vice owners.'' 
Let us see whether the United States Navy men in charge 
of the Sylvan Arrow derived their authority from the 
defendants-whether the defendants placed the Sylvan 
Arrow in the possession and control of the United States 
Government-whether the control of the ship was vested 
by the defendants in the United States Government. 
According to the affidavit of Mr. Ali sworn on October 
12, 1922, paragraph 3, the Sylvan Arrow was requisitioned 
by the United States Government in December, 1917, 
and handed over under such requisition to the Navy 
Department on July 15, 1918, and remained under· such 
requisition until January 21, 1919. To the affidavit of 
Mr. Morse (sworn on March 2, 1 923) are exhibited the 
requisition charter party, and it is sworn that from July 
15, 1918, to January 21, 1919, the Sylvan Arrow was under 
that portion of the exhibit which is designated the "bare-
boat" form. By an affidavit sworn in this action on 
July 25, 1922, Mr. D. Radcliffe for the plaintiffs stated 
that the plaintiffs were advised that the Sylvan Arrow 
had been requisitioned by the United States Government 
in December, 1917, and in the following July had been 
taken over by the Navy Department, and was released 
by the Navy Department early in 1919. It was upon 
the strength of that affidavit that the plaintiffs obtained 
leave to maintain the action, notwithstanding that more 
than two years had elapsed from the date of the collision. 
The requisition charter party exhibited is executed by the 
defendants and by the director of operations for the 
Requisition United States Shipping Board. It is headed: ''Requisi-
charter. 
tion charter," and begins: "This requisition charter made 
and coilcluded upon in the District of Columbia the 29th 
day of December, 1917." It recites: "Whereas by 
requisition order dated December 29, 1917, pursuant to 
the urgent deficiency act of the 15th of June, 1917, and 
the President's Executive order of the 11th July, 1917, 
the United States has requisitioned the use of the steam-
ship Sylvan Arrow * * * and whereas it is desired 
* * * to fix the compensation which the United 
States shall pay to the o'vner for the use of the steamship 
so requisitioned and to define by agreement the rights 
and duties of the United States and of the owner 'vith 
respect to the operation of the vessel under the requi-
sition * * *" No,v therefore it is agreed as follows: 
REQUISIT'ION CHARTER 
''First. The terms and conditions under which the vessel 
is to be operated shall be those contained in the 'time 
form' hereto annexed; provided, however, that at the time 
of the requisition or at any time thereafter, on five days' 
written notice, the United States may operate the vessel 
under the terms and conditions contained in the 'bare 
boat form' hereto annexed." The time form contem-
plates that the Government has taken possession of the 
ship and delivers possession back to the owner for the 
ov;ner to oper~te the ship for the Government; under 
it the master and crew are the servants of the owner. 
The bare-boat form contemplates that the ship shal 
remain in the service of the United States under the 
requisition order, and provides that the United States 
shall man and operate the vessel. It is not quite clear, 
but I was told that in December, 1917, the ship was still 
in the builders' hands. From correspondence exhibited 
it appears that by direction of the United States Shipping· 
Control Committee she was handed over to the Navy 
Department on July 15, 1918, and in the same month 
notice was given that the Government would operate 
the vessel under the "bare boat" form of charter. The 
precise status of the shipping control co1nmittee does not 
appear, but if it was not a branch of the United States 
Shipping Board or of the United States Shipping Board 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, the correspondence shows 
that its acts were ratified by the corporation. 
From all this I draw the conclusion that the ship was 
in fact compulsorily surrended by the owners · to the 
United States Government. I am the more certain of 
this conclusion because the ship was an oil tanker. In 
1917-18 any shipowner· who had a tanker free from 
Government control could have become "rich beyond the 
drealns of avarice." I see no reason why I should doubt 
the affidavits or the documents which state that the ship 
was requisitioned. It is said for the plaintiffs that no 
requisition order has been produced or disclosed, and it 
is suggested that in fact there was no order on December 
29, 1917. Whether an order was actually made or not 
does not seem to me to matter much. If the intention 
to make an order 'vere intimated to the o'vner, it 'vould 
be as effective a compulsion as if it 'vere actually dra,vn 
up. The essential fact is that the O"\Vner entered into the 
charter party because the United States Government had 
po,ver to compel him to give possession of the ship to the 
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Government. It was also said that the method adopted 
en¥:~~c~~ <leflci· by the Government was not in strict compliance with the 
urgent deficiency act, 1917. By section 1 (e) the Presi-
dent is given power (inter alia) to requisition, or take 
over, the possession of * * * any ship now con-
structed or in the process of construction. By section 2 
the President was given power to take immediate posses-
sion if his orders were not obeyed. By section 3 just 
compensation was to be paid, to be determined by the 
President, with a power to sue to persons dissatisfied 
with the amount. By section 4 the President may 
exercise the powers through such agency or agencies as he 
shall determine. By Executive order the President dele-
gated his powers to the United States Shipping Board 
and the Emergency Fleet Corporation. It is said that 
because the Government, instead of fixing the just com-
,pensation for the Sylvan Arrow, proceeded to enter into 
a charter party with the owner defining the hire and the 
other mutual obligations of the Government and the 
owner, the element of compulsion disappeared and the 
o'\vner must be treated as one who had voluntarily 
chartered his ship to the Government. I can not agree. 
Underlying the whole transaction was the compulsion-
the fact that the Government had and '\Vould have 
exercised the power to take possession of the ship whether 
the owner consented or not, and also had power to oper-
ate the ship by its own servants if it so chose. I am not 
in the least suggesting that in fact the Government did 
not proceed in the precise '\Vay intended by the act; but, 
supposing it did not, the plaintiffs' case is no better, 
because if it exercised a compulsion illegally it exercised 
compulsion; if it exercised it legally it exercised com-
pulsion. If it was illegal the position '\Vould be 
analogous to that of a ship which had been seized by 
pirates, in which case it could not possibly be suggested 
that the O'\Vner of the ship should, in form of procedure, 
be responsible for the negligent navigation by the pirates. 
Such being the position, it can not in any sense be said 
that the master and crew of the Sylvan Arrow, '\Yho '\Vere 
the servants of the United States Navy Department, 
derived their authority froln the defendants, or that the 
defendants placed the ship in the possession and control 
of the Navy Departlnent, or that the control of the ship 
was vested by the defendants in the Navy Department. 
LIABILITY FOR COLLISION 
Accepting the decision in The Lemington 83 and the dicta 
in The Ticonderoga, 73 The Tasmania 81 and The Ripon 
Oity 84 as sound law, the facts of the present case do not 
come w-ithin them. Upon those facts I hold that no 
lnaritune lien attached to the vessel by reason of the 
eollision and that the defendants are not, either through 
their vessel or otherwise, responsible to the plaintiffs for 
the collision damage. There \vill be judgment for the 
defendants, with costs. 
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